¹ Stimson, Henry L., The Far Eastern Crisis (New York, 1936), pp. 41, 59, and 62.Google Scholar

² E.g., on November 6 the Secretary of State issued this statement: “The policy of the United States remains unchanged, namely, by acting independently through the diplomatic channels and reserving complete independence of judgment as to each step, to coöperate with and support the other nations of the world in their objective of peace in Manchuria.”

³ The American Government's first note of concern was sent to Japan on September 22. The League sent a similar note, and apparently, though it was sent “at night,” it preceded that of the United States. Geneva time is five or six hours ahead of Washington's, and the League's note was given precedence in the State Department's collection of documents. Conditions in Manchuria, Sen. Doc. 55, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932).

⁴ Dawes, C. G., Journal as Ambassador to Great Britain (New York, 1939), p. 417.Google Scholar Cf. Secretary Stimson's instructions to Dawes, Ambassador, For. Rel., pp. 41–44Google Scholar, especially p. 44: “I do not want us to push or lead in this matter; neither do I want the American Government to be placed in the position of initiating or instigating League action.”

⁵ There is no evidence that the United States was consulted or exercised any influence to induce the League to take jurisdiction, and there appears no possibility that the League would have refused jurisdiction, whatever the attitude of the United States.

⁶ See the argument in the Secretary's dispatch of September 24 to Johnson, Nelson T., American minister in China. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States—Japan: 1931–1941. (Two vols., Government Printing Office, 1943), Vol. I, p. 10.Google Scholar This volume is elsewhere cited as For. Rel.

⁷ The attack was specifically upon the university in which Chang Hsueh-liang, the governor of Manchuria, had set up his government temporarily. Americans who had felt that they must credit the Japanese professions began to see the light and to recognize a campaign to drive Chinese authority completely out of Manchuria. Compare Lord Robert Cecil's “It now began to look,” quoted below, p. 110. Various observers in Manchuria in the summer of 1931 had noted Japan's preparations for attack and had predicted it. Cf. dispatches from the American minister in China, Sept. 21 and 22, For. Rel., pp. 3 and 5.

⁸ Throughout this paper, the italics are inserted by the writer.

⁹ Members of the Council were generally minieters of foreign affairs or diplomatic officers of the highest rank.

¹⁰ “You are authorized to participate in the discussions of the Council when they relate to the possible application of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, to which treaty the United States is a party. You are expected to report the result of such discussions to the Department for its determination as to possible action. If you are present at the discussion of any other aspect of the Chinese-Japanese dispute, it must be only as an observer and auditor.” (Instructions to Prentiss Gilbert, quoted from Stimson, op. cit., p. 65).

¹¹ Persons inclined to stress the plurality of a “Government” may say that part of the Government did think of action. It was reliably reported that Secretary Stimson and certain others in the State Department favored action, even sanctions if other measures failed. But the President overruled them; he was the Government in this instance. This difference of opinion, naturally, is excluded from the documents; but note that on September 24, prior to the President's intervention in the matter, the Secretary's dispatch to the American minister in China, said, as paraphrased: “Since in this matter the League has already taken action and since as members of the League both parties have agreed to submit to the action therein provided, this Government would be inclined to favor, in case direct conversations are unsuccessful between the two parties, action under Article XI and subsequent articles of the League Covenant signed by both Japan and China” (For. Rel., pp. 10–11). Article XV provided for sanctions.

¹² See partial text in Wilbur, and Hyde, , The Hoover Policies, pp. 600–601Google Scholar, or in Myers, William Starr, The Foreign Policies of Herbert Hoover (1940).Google Scholar It is not necessary to assume that the memorandum was the personal work of the President. The President may have left the drafting, e.g., to William R. Castle, Jr., Under-Secretary of State, who led the opposition in the State Department to any interventionist policy, according to contemporary reports inside and outside of the State Department. He served as ambassador to Japan in 1930. After Japan's renewed attack on China in 1937, he made isolationist speeches on United States foreign policy. He disclaimed being pro-Japanese, but accepted Japanese claims, e.g., that the Chinese were the attackers on September 18, 1931—even though they had been discredited by impartial investigation.

This memorandum is not dated, but its language suggests that it was written not long after the start of the Manchurian Affair. “The League of Nations has already taken up the subject” would scarcely be the language of a man writing some months later. “We should coöperate with them in every field of negotiation or conciliation” is a general directive such as would naturally be written in a memorandum near the beginning of the Affair, when the President was laying down a policy. The date, however, is not vital. Two members of the cabinet give us the text and ascribe it to the President. The American policy was clear and consistent and reflects throughout the spirit of the memorandum, whenever it may have been written.

The note of “assurance of support” was dated October 5, but was not cabled to Geneva until the 9th, and on the 11th the Secretary-General of the League gave it to members of the Council. Morley, Felix, The Society of Nations (Washington, D. C., 1932), p. 446.Google Scholar Secretary Stimson says: “On October 9 I had discussed the matter in all its aspects before the Cabinet. On October 10, I had a long talk with the President, whose mind up to that time had been so preoccupied with the financial crisis at home that necessarily he had been able to give but little thought to Manchuria…. At this conference on October 10th President Hoover, having evidently been thinking over the matter since my Cabinet discussion the day before, plunged vigorously and sympathetically into my problem and expressed himself quite ready to authorize such a joint session centered on the subject of the Kellogg-Briand Pact.” This passage may be taken as proof that the President's memorandum was not written earlier than October 9 or 10; perhaps we may plausibly conjecture that it was written on the 10th or 11th to give rounded and definite form to the views of the President given orally on the 9th and 10th. But, as stated above, the date of the memorandum makes little or no difference.

¹³ Cecil, Viscount Robert states that this resolution “was settled by Lord Reading in concert with members of the Secretariat.” A Great Experiment; Autobiography of Viscount Cecil (London, 1941), p. 226.Google Scholar But see Gilbert's, Consul report, For. Rel., pp. 31–33.Google Scholar

¹⁴ The Memorandum of November 3 may have been timed to allow Ambassador Forbes, returning to Tokyo, to present it in person on the 5th. See text in For. Rel., pp. 34–35.

¹⁵ For. Rel., p. 36.

¹⁶ Morley, op. cit., p. 461. See full text in footnote 2 above. Note that the League as such is not mentioned, and the support is for its objective, not its means.

¹⁷ Viscount Cecil, quoted by Wright, Quincy in “The Manchurian Crisis,” in this Review, Feb., 1932.Google Scholar For full discussion of the procedure, see Myers, Denys P., The Sino-Japanese Conflict; The Procedural and Factual Summary of Governmental and Institutional Action (Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1931–1932).Google Scholar Mimeographed.

¹⁸ November 12, according to Dawes', Journal. For. Rel., p. 41Google Scholar, states that the Secretary called Mr. Dawes on the telephone on Nov. 10; and the instructions to him (pp. 41–44) are dated Nov. 10, 8 p.m. Perhaps a day was lost in decoding the instructions.

¹⁹ Just following this reference to three meetings with the Japanese Ambassador, Dawes wrote: “I shall meet the Chinese representative, Alfred Sao-ke Sze, at my hotel in Paris at noon on Sunday.”

In addition to general instructions from the Department, and the information provided by his friend Matsudaira, Mr. Dawes (who had had no experience with the Far East) had the assistance of Eugene Dooman. Mr. Dooman was born in Japan and in 1912–31 had risen from student interpreter there to secretary in the diplomatic service in Tokyo. He had no service in China. He became First Secretary in London on April 4, 1931. He served in the Department of State in 1933–36, was again in Japan in 1936–37, returned to Washington, and was in the State Department in the period of appeasement of Japan. After his service at Paris, Secretary Stimson cabled, “Please felicitate Dooman … for his highly efficient and competent service.”

²⁰ Dawes, C. G., Journal, p. 411.Google ScholarPubMed In some three weeks, Dawes and the Department of State exchanged about 100,000 words by cable (ibid., 417); every step seems to have been approved except one proposed statement.

Mr. Yoshizawa, Japanese representative in Geneva through December 10, 1931, returned to Tokyo and on January 18, 1932, became foreign minister. On the 19th, Ambassador Forbes reported: “He was particularly cordial in tone. Mr. Yoshizawa took occasion to speak in the highest terms of the part played by Ambassador Dawes in helping to bring about the form and adoption of the resolution of the League of Nations.” For. Rel., p. 79.

²¹ Journal, p. 414.

²² Morley, p. 463.

²³ Journal, p. 412.

²⁴ He should have said the Hoover Administration; for it is possible that if the League had imposed sanctions, public opinion would have led Congress to pass legislation contrary to President Hoover's policy.

²⁵ Journal, p. 416.

²⁶ For. Rel., p. 45.

²⁷ While this brief reference sounds decisive, it is far from proving that Lord Reading's Foreign Office and the MacDonald Government might not have followed, in some later crucial period, American lead for sanctions. Cf. Viscount Cecil's statement at the foot of the same page: “MacDonald thereupon reconstructed and enlarged his Government—the most important change from the League point of view being the substitution of Sir John Simon as Foreign Secretary instead of Lord Reading. However, we did not then know its importance.” Recall also Reading's authorship of the strong resolution of October 24. Viscount Cecil, op. cit., pp. 225–226.

²⁸ Carr, Edward Hallett, Britain; A Study of Foreign Policy from the Versailles Treaty to the Outbreak of War (1939), pp. 102–104.Google Scholar See also his Chap. II, which stresses the dependence of major British policies upon the attitude of the United States.

²⁹ Op. cit., p. 463. Note that Mr. Felix Morley was living in Geneva to observe the operations of the League.

The Under-Secretary of State in Washington on November 15 expressed the hope that China and Japan would reach a “compromise” during the meeting of the Council.

³⁰ The resolution began as follows: “The Council: (1) Reaffirms the resolution passed unanimously by it on September 30, 1931, by which the two parties declared that they are solemnly bound; it therefore calls upon the Chinese and Japanese Governments to take all steps necessary to assure its execution, so that the withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the railway zone may be effected as speedily as possible under the conditions set forth in the said resolution. (2) Considering that events have assumed an even more serious aspect since the Council meeting of October 24, notes that the two parties undertake to adopt all measures necessary to avoid any further aggravation of the situation and to refrain from any initiative which may lead to further fighting and loss of life.”

These paragraphs allowed some to dream that “if carried out in good faith” the resolution of December 10 would settle the whole affair.

Mr. Yoshizawa for Japan put on the record the reservation that paragraph 2 “is not intended to preclude the Japanese forces from taking such action as may be rendered necessary to provide directly for the protection of the lives and property of Japanese subjects against the activities of bandits and lawless elements rampant in various parts of Manchuria. Such action is admittedly an exceptional measure called for by the special situation prevailing in Manchuria, and its necessity will naturally be obviated when normal conditions shall have been restored in that region.”

³¹ An American consul wrote early in November, 1932, that a well-informed Japanese official had told him that the Japanese would not be ready for another forward move until the first of the year. On January 1, 1933, the Japanese seized Shanhaikwan and proceeded leisurely to occupy the whole province of Jehol—with incursions south of the Great Wall, leading to the Tangku Truce of May 31, 1933. The Japanese had seized Manchuria under the slogan: “We have no territorial ambitions in Manchuria.” On January 5, 1933, the Japanese ambassador assured SecretaryStimson, that “in any event Japan had no territorial ambition south of the Great Wall.” For. Rel., p. 107.Google Scholar

³² President Hoover wished it to be so known (see Myers, William Starr, The Foreign Policies of Herbert Hoover, 1929–1933, pp. 163–169Google Scholar). Compare President Hoover's speech accepting renomination, August 11, 1932: “My foreign policies have been devoted to strengthening the foundations of world peace…. We have given leadership in transforming the Kellogg Pact from an inspiring outlawry of war to an organized instrument for peaceful settlements backed by definite mobilization of world public opinion against aggression. We shall, under the spirit of that Pact, consult with other nations in times of emergency to promote world peace. We shall enter no agreements committing us to any future course of action or which call for the use of force to preserve peace…. Above all, I have projected a new doctrine in international affairs, the doctrine that we do not and never will recognize title to possession of territory gained in violation of the peace pacts. That doctrine has been accepted by all the nations of the world on a recent critical occasion, and within the last few days has been accepted again by all the nations of the Western Hemisphere. That is public opinion made tangible and effective.” [Sic!]

³³ It is discouraging to read what American leaders wrote in the inter-war period. Presidents and secretaries of state apparently believed they could eliminate war by such pious resolutions as the Kellogg Pact. They talked as if public opinion were a force, a conquering force, in all parts of the world. Secretary Stimson's book abounds in “action,” but the reader becomes aware that words and actions are not distinguished. Nowhere does his “action” even contemplate action. It is pitiful to note in the diplomatic correspondence how impossible it was, within the limits of the President's policy, for the Secretary of State to tell the Japanese anything to which they felt they had to pay serious attention. He urged “the serious effect on the opinion of the American public” (p. 56); “it would be most unfortunate for all and especially for Japan”…; it “would be regarded as unjustified by the world” (p. 64); “again frankly to convey to the Japanese Government expression of my apprehension”… “a most unfortunate effect on world opinion” (p. 66); “would make a very serious impression on everybody” (p. 70); “the American Government would view with great concern” (p. 90).

³⁴ However, after some weeks' delay, Britain and other Powers, and eventually the League, joined in non-becognition. At the end of January, 1932, the Japanese attacked Shanghai. The American Government refused to let its consul be a member of the Board of Investigation, but let him “coöperate” with it. The Japanese withdrew in May. Some have attributed the withdrawal to outside influences, stressing United States-League Coöperation and the greater firmness of the Powers against Japanese encroachment in a region in which Britain and France had large interests. It seems probable, however, that the Japanese withdrew because their over-all plan called for absorbing China piecemeal from the northeast southward and westward, which they hoped they could continue to do without exciting a na tional war with China or resistance from outside. Movements to boycott Japan made some progress in the United States and elsewhere while the Japanese were fighting in and around Shanghai, but people lost interest when the only Japanese aggressions were in north China.

³⁵ As Mr. Stimson favored sanctions, discussion of them in his narrative would have presented a dilemma: Either he must allow himself to appear as an opponent of sanctions or he must expose the rift between himself and his chief and condemn the views of the latter. Mr. Stimson admits that the American Government made errors, but he defends every step which he discusses; the errors were on points totally omitted from the narrative.