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The Cooperative Resolution of Policy Conflict

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Paul J. Quirk
Paul J. Quirk
Affiliation:
University of IllinoisChicago
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Abstract

I develop an approach for analyzing the conditions for cooperative resolution of policy conflict. I analyze certain policy conflicts as bargaining situations, with opportunity for cooperation, among opposing issue factions. As a framework for analysis, I present an informal game-theoretic interpretation of nonzero-sum policy conflict. With that foundation, I derive implications about the conditions for cooperative outcomes with respect to several aspects of the policy process: issue content, the structure of conflict, leadership, party politics, and political institutions.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 83 , Issue 3 , September 1989 , pp. 905 - 921
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1989

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