¹ Chinese text in Hsüeh-hsi [Study] (Peking), No. 10 (1954), pp. 3–14 (Oct. 2, 1954). English translations are in: People's China (Peking), No. 19 (1954), supp. (Oct. 1, 1954); Hsin-hua News Agency [NCNA] (Peking), Daily News Release [DNR], Sept., 1954, undated supp.; American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Current Background [CB], No. 297 (Oct. 5, 1954).

² The “general line of the State during the period of transition to Socialism” was introduced in an editorial of Jen-min jih-pao [People's Daily, JMJP] (Peking), Oct. 1, 1953Google Scholar, and elaborated by Li Wei-han, Director of the CCP Central Committee's United Front Work Department, on October 27, 1953, CB, No. 267 (Nov. 15, 1953). As a “fanfare” movement, the subject can be traced through JMJP editorials in Nov.–Dec., 1953, which are collected in Kuo-tu shih-ch'i tsung-lu hsin hsüeh-hsi ts'an-k'ao tzu-liao [Collected Materials for the Study of the General Line of the Transition Period], 2 vols. (Peking, Jenmin ch'u-pan she, 1954). A translation of the JMJP New Year's Editorial, Jan. 1, 1954, “Everything for the Implementation of the General Line,” is in DNR, Jan., 1954, pp. 6–9. DNR references are to monthly bound copies of the daily issues, which may be one or more days behind the date of actual release.

³ Substantially complete documentation of the 1949 measures is in Chung-kuo jen-min cheng-chi hsieh-shang hui-i ti i-chieh chuan-t'i hui-i, chiang-hua, pao-kao, fa-yen [Speeches, Reports and Discussions at the First Session of the First CPPCC] (Shanghai, Hsin-hua shu-tien, 1949); and Chung-hua hsin-min kung-ho-kuo k'ai-kuo wen-hsien [Documents of the Chinese People's Republic] (Hong Kong, 1949). The Common Program offers a basis for comparing policy in 1949 with policy in 1954, and spells out specific policy implications of Mao Tse-tung's Lun hsin-min chn-i chuan-cheng [On People's Democratic Dictatorship] (June, 1949).

⁴ NCNA, Peking, Jan. 16, 1953; DNR, Jan., 1953, pp. 89–90.

⁵ Mao Tse-tung (Chairman), Chu Teh, Chou En-lai, Lin Po-ch'ü, Kao Kang, Ch'en Yün, P'eng Te-huai, Tung Pi-Wu, and Liu Shao-ch'i (in the order listed in the communique). Kao Kang had disappeared from public notice before the committee held its first meeting.

⁶ Lin Feng, Ulanfu, Ch'en Po-ta, Hsi Chung-hsün, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Teng Tzu-hui, Po I-p'o, and Jao Shu-shih.

⁷ Li Wei-han and Hu Chiao-mu.

⁸ DNR, March, 1954, p. 165. Chen's explanation has not been published.

⁹ Statements by Tung Pi-wu, Li Wei-han, Kao Kang and others on the indirect operational techniques of the CCP in controlling the government are assembled in Steiner, H. A., Chinese Communism in Action (Los Angeles, 1953), Pt. I, pp. 46–57Google Scholar. Although the Central Committee held a Plenary Session February 6–10, 1954 (its first since 1950), the resulting communique gave no hint that the Central Committee had assumed the initial drafting responsibility. NCNA, Peking, Feb. 18, 1954, DNR, Feb., 1954, pp. 111–14; People's China, No. 6 (1954), pp. 3–7 (March 16, 1954).

¹⁰ En-lai, Chou, “Draft Common Programme of the Chinese People's PCC,” China Digest (Hong Kong), Vol. 7, no. 1, p. 10 (Oct. 5, 1949)Google Scholar; also reported in the two Chinese documentary collections cited in note 3, ante, at pp. 50–54 and 253–60, respectively.

¹¹ Report of the Drafting Committee, June 11, 1954; NCNA, Peking, June 14, 1954, DNR, June, 1954, pp. 146–47.

¹² NCNA, Peking, June 14, 1954, DNR, June, 1954, p. 149. The full text of this draft is in Hsüeh-hsi, No. 7 (1954), pp. 3–13 (July 2, 1954). English translations are in DNR, June, 1954, supp. to issue of June 16; People's China No. 13 (1954), supp. (July 1, 1954); CB, No. 286 [287], June 17, 1954.

¹³ Liu Shao-ch'i, Kuan-yü Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho-kuo hsien-fa ts'ao-an ti pao-kao [Report on the Draft Constitution of the CPR], Sept. 15, 1954, in Hsüeh-hsi, No. 10 (1954), pp., 16–29 (Oct. 2, 1954). English translations occur in DNR, Sept., 1954, pp. 171–87; People's China, No. 19 (1954), pp. 5–33 (Oct. 1, 1954); and in CB, No. 294 (Sept. 20, 1954). This is the basic official commentary on the new Constitution, and will hereafter be cited as Liu, Report.

¹⁴ NCNA, Peking, Sept. 11, 1954, DNR, Sept., 1954, p. 112.

¹⁵ Explained by Barnett, A. Doak, “Mass Political Organizations in Communist China,” The Annals, Vol. 277, pp. 76–88 (Sept., 1951)Google Scholar; Kuo-chün, Chao, “Mass Organizations in Mainland China,” this Review, Vol. 48, pp. 752–65 (Sept., 1954)Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Liu, Report, Pt. III.

¹⁷ NCNA, Peking, Sept. 9, 1954, DNR, Sept., 1954, p. 87. For the text of the definitive September draft, which was adopted without change (see note 1).

¹⁸ The daily sessions of the NPC Sept. 15–28 were closely reported in JMJP, with English translations of reports and speeches in DNR issues of Sept.–Oct., 1954, and in successive issues of American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Survey of the China Mainland Press, daily, beginning with No. 889 (Sept. 16, 1954). A complete procès-verbal of the proceedings of the NPC is unlikely, if earlier practice is observed.

On September 20, the NPC adopted its own organic law (or règlement); and on September 21, it adopted four other organic laws dealing with the organization and operation, respectively, of the State Council, the People's Courts, the People's Procurator's Office, and the Local People's Congresses and Local People's Councils of all Levels. The various organic laws were drafted and submitted by the Constitution Drafting Committee, and were adopted unanimously and without debate.

¹⁹ Tung Pi-wu, Address to the First Conference of North China hsien Magistrates, Peking, September 23, 1951, in JMJP, Jan. 30, 1952; translated in CB, No. 162 (Feb. 22, 1952).

²⁰ The elitist character of the CCP received special emphasis during the “remoulding and reform” movement of 1952–1953. The “eight standards” of a CCP member, originally formulated by Liu Shao-ch'i in an unpublished address on November 4, 1951, were spelled out by An Tzu-wen, Deputy Director of the Organization Department of the CCP Central Committee, in JMJP, July 1, 1953. Related materials will be found in Steiner, Chinese Communism in Action, pp. 66–87.

²¹ Steiner, H. A., “The Role of the CCP,” The Annals, Vol. 277, pp. 57–59 (Sept., 1951)Google Scholar.

²² Liu, Report, Pt. IV.

²³ Since the “state form” is multi-party and multi-social, the CCP does not have the monopolist character attributed to the CPSU by Article 126 of the Soviet Constitution of 1936.

²⁴ Report, Pt. IV.

²⁵ Report, Pt. I.

²⁶ As stated by JMJP, March 25, 1952. Also see Steiner, H. A., “Total Law in Red China,” New Leader, Vol. 26, no. 7, pp. 6–8 (Feb. 12, 1951)Google Scholar.

²⁷ On People's Democratic Dictatorship (cited note 3)

²⁸ Documentary collections cited in note 3, ante, pp. 46–49 and 241–45, respectively; also China Digest, Vol. 7, no. 1, p. 20 (Oct. 5, 1949)Google Scholar.

²⁹ Hsin min-chu chu-i lun [On New Democracy], in Mao Tse-tung hsüan-chi [Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung], 2d. ed. of the official edition (Peking, 1952–1953), Vol. 2, pp. 655–704, esp. pp. 668–70 [Mao, Selected Works]. This text has been compared with a pre-Peking version. An English translation of substantial accuracy, “China's New Democracy,” is in The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism, Supp. III (C), House Doc. No. 154, Pt. 3, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, 1949), pp. 67–91Google Scholar.

³⁰ In “China's New Democracy,” p. 71.

³¹ Ibid., p. 75.

³² Idem, in variant form.

³³ Mao, On People's Democratic Dictatorship.

³⁴ The question will seem less complex when it is realized that “dictatorship” (chuan-cheng) as used in “people's democratic dictatorship” does not connote a particular form of government (as opposed, for example, to a democratic form of government) but is closer in meaning to “state” or “state form.”

³⁵ A literal translation of the title of Mao's report, December 25, 1947, to the First Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee, but not unique in that usage.

³⁶ In May, 1937, Mao argued for the adoption of the San-min chu-i (Three People's Principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen) as the interim temporary program of the CCP. Chung-kuo kung-ch'an tang tsai kang-Jih shih-ch'i ti jen-wu [Tasks of the CCP during the Anti-Japanese War] (May 3, 1937), in Mao, , Selected Works, Vol. 1, pp. 243–60Google Scholar. On this basis, he attacked the Kuomintang in January, 1940 (On New Democracy) on the ground that alleged failures to implement the Three People's Principles, the bible of the Kuomintang itself, would disqualify the Kuomintang from taking part in a truly “new democratic” revolution. On New Democracy (cited in note 29), pp. 80–84.

³⁷ Chung-kuo she-hui ko chieh-chi ti feng-hsi [Analysis of Classes in Chinese Society] (March, 1926), is the opening selection in Mao, , Selected Works, Vol. 1, pp. 3–13Google Scholar. From this sketchy beginning, Mao developed a work of Marxist-Leninist significance: Chung-kuo koming ho Chung-kuo kung-ch'an tang [The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party] (Nov., 1939), in Selected Works, Vol. 2, pp. 615–60Google Scholar, which is principally important for its evaluations of the revolutionary potential of the different classes of Chinese society. Later class analyses, as in 1949, developed within that frame of reference, although the revolutionary potential of a particular class was differently identified according to the situation of the moment.

³⁸ Examples will be found in Cole, Allan B., “The United Front in the New China,” The Annals, Vol. 277, pp. 35–45 (Sept. 1951)Google Scholar.

³⁹ The “line” was quite different during the “first united front” (1923–1927) in which CCP members joined the Kuomintang and were under direction to accept Kuomintang leadership. The first united front was explicitly directed by the Kremlin; while later united fronts were consistent with the 1935 directive of the Comintern, CCP practice in China under Mao Tse-tung developed its own unique applications.

⁴⁰ Lun lien-ho cheng-fu [On Coalition Government] (April 24, 1945), in Selected Works, Vol. 3, pp. 1029–1100, at p. 1061Google Scholar.

⁴¹ The text just cited is “selected” in more ways than one! As compared with other editions of the same work—the 1949 edition of Hsin min-chu ch'u-pan she (Hong Kong), for example—the paragraph following that from which the quoted passages are taken is entirely omitted. The omitted paragraph stresses the necessity for some form of “coalition government” in China into the indefinite future, even after a system of “democratic elections” might be instituted. It may be that the omitted paragraph of the unabridged version was a direct response to the political situation of the moment, at a time when the Kuomintang had the question of elections for the National Assembly under consideration and the CCP was making propaganda to influence the outcome, and was deleted from the official collection of Mao's works to avoid ambiguity. On the other hand, however, the reference that “Chinese history will determine the Chinese system” has such relevance to the basic attitudes of Mao Tse-tung that it may be difficult to understand how he could act in disregard of that canon at a later time.

⁴² Certainly I do not suggest that these differences entail possible Chinese Communist retreats from “Marxism-Leninism,” or significant ideological conflicts between Chinese and Soviet Communists. There may be important differences, however, and they should be called to the attention of those who have studied Sino-Soviet relations from some other than the Chinese perspective, and who might thus jump to the conclusion that “Socialist society” in China would be conceived as an integral copy of the Soviet model. The M. SU-1 (1936) could hardly be identical with the M. C-1 of some time after 1954.

⁴³ I have tried to suggest some aspects of the problem of “national interest” in a Communist China in “The United States and China: The Prospect before Us,” Yale Review' Vol. 44, pp. 161–79, esp. pp. 171–77 (Winter, 1955)Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ The corresponding text in the Preamble of the Common Program of 1949 read: “The Chinese people's democratic dictatorship is the State power of the people's democratic united front of the Chinese working class, peasantry, petty bourgeoisie, national capitalists, and patriotic elements based on the alliance of workers and peasants and led by the working class.”

⁴⁵ Report, Pt. II (1).

⁴⁶ Authorized translation by Wang Chung-hui (New York, 1947).

⁴⁷ Constitution of 1954, Articles 3 and 67–72, inter alia. Liu, Report, Pt. II (4). The Chinese literature is substantial and voluble, but a helpful reference is Min-tsu cheng-t'se wen-hsien hui-pien [Collection of Materials on Nationality Policy] (Peking, Jen-min ch'u-pan she, 1953).

⁴⁸ See note 2 above.

⁴⁹ Report, Pt. II (2).

⁵⁰ Commentary on Stalin's Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR (Oct., 1952), in the important leading JMJP editorial of Oct. 30, 1952; NCNA, Peking, Oct. 30, 1952; DNR, Oct., 1952, p. 286.

⁵¹ Liu, Report, Pt. II (2), paraphrasing Article 7 of the Constitution.

⁵² CB, No. 255 (Aug. 10, 1953) gives the entire document in full translation. The version in People's China, No. 17 (1953), pp. 7–11 (Sept. 1, 1953) is abridged and bowdlerized to a remarkable degree.

⁵³ People's China, No. 13 (1953), supp. (July 1, 1953) has a presumably complete translation of the Decisions. Subsequently, the Central Committee adopted on Dec. 16, 1953, a “Decision on the Development of Agriculture Producer Cooperatives” calculated to secure the foundations for later collectivization. NCNA, Peking, Jan. 8, 1954. For translation, see CB, No. 278 (Feb. 15, 1954).

⁵⁴ Pt. II (1). In his separate report to the NPC on September 23, 1954, Premier Chou En-lai expressed “hope that by the end of the First 5-Year Plan [i.e., ca. 1957], over one-half of all peasant households throughout the country will have joined the agricultural producer cooperatives, and over half the land will be pooled in the cooperatives.” DNR, supp. to the issue of Sept. 27, 1954; People's China, No. 20 (1954), pp. 3–31, at p. 10 (Oct. 16, 1954).

⁵⁵ With other relevant documents, including Liu Shao-ch'i's report on the same subject, in T'u-ti kai-ko shou-ts'e [Agrarian Reform Handbook] (Peking, 1950)Google Scholar; The Agrarian Reform Law of the People's Republic of China (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1950)Google Scholar offer the essential materials in translation.

⁵⁶ Report, Pt. II (1).

⁵⁷ State-capitalism is private capitalism brought under the control of the state-owned sector by joint public-private operation or by more recent arrangements in which private industry is made to depend for existence and operation upon favorable contracts concluded with state agencies.

⁵⁸ Liu, Report, Pt. II (1). According to the State Statistical Bureau's Communique on Fulfilment of the 1953 State Plan, released by NCNA, Peking, Sept. 13, 1954, DNR, Sept., 1954, pp. 140–41, private industry in 1953 accounted for 38 per cent of the total national industrial output in terms of value, as compared with 53 per cent for state-owned industry and nine per cent for joint public-private enterprises. The trend for private industry is “down,” but for the present the state relies heavily upon the not inconsiderable proportion of the National industrial output contributed by private capital.

⁵⁹ Report, Pt. II (2).

⁶⁰ Liu, Report, Pt. II (1).

⁶¹ DNR, March, 1953, pp. 15–19. For official commentary by Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing, see DNR, March, 1953, pp. 21–24, 31–34.

⁶² A new constitution for the CPPCC, replacing the organic law of September 27, 1949, was adopted by the Second National Committee of the CPPCC on December 25, 1954. The text of the new constitution has not become available, but Premier Chou En-lai's explanation of December 26 indicated that the CPPCC (and its lower level counterparts) would continue to be consulted on the nomination of candidates for election to the NPC (and local people's congresses). Peking Radio, December 25 and 26, 1954.