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British Foreign Policy and the Party System

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

F. S. Northedge
F. S. Northedge*
Affiliation:
London School of Economics
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Extract

It is a paradox of British politics that, while party discipline is such that no government has to depend on Opposition support in order to pursue the foreign policy of its choice, this very fact has been one reason for the normal consensus on questions of foreign policy between the two front benches. The greater the prospects of Opposition leaders forming the next government the greater the discipline they tend to exert over their ranks, and the more international realities are imposed upon the kind of fantasy-thinking to which a party denied power for many years is especially prone. These tendencies have been notable in British politics since the war; they are likely to continue, given that the Labour Party can control the forces of disruption unleashed by its recent defeat. In the five general elections since the wartime Coalition Government foreign policy issues have not merely occupied a minor role; they have been regarded by party leaders, though not always by the rank and file, as though they were primarily questions of personal qualifications for conducting policies the main outlines of which were not in dispute. At the general election in the autumn of 1959, although disagreements between Government and Opposition had undoubtedly grown since the quiet accords of 1955, the campaign turned, if on international issues at all, on the eligibility of Right or Left to represent the country in negotiations in which the likely British position was largely agreed on both sides. The Leader of the Opposition recognised that this was so, although his explanation for it was that Ministers had been forced to accept Labour's policy recommendations.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 54 , Issue 3 , September 1960 , pp. 635 - 646
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1960

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References

1 As reported in The Times, 10 September 1959.

2 Labour Believes in Britain, published by the Labour Party, 1949, p. 26.

3 Kenneth Younger, 557 H.C. Deb. 5s. Col 336 (24 July 1956).

4 Mr. Gaitskell has said: “Our party decided to support the manufacture of the hydrogen bomb here and we decided that, quite frankly, because we did not think it right that this country should be so dependent … upon the U.S.A.” 568 H.C. Deb. 5s. Col 71 (1 April 1957).

5 Report of the 56th Annual Conference of the Labour Party, Brighton, 1957, p. 175.

6 For the text see The Times, 25 June 1959; also Mr. Bevan's statement, 608 H.C. Deb. 5s. Col 1394 (8 July 1959). In a statement circulated by the Direct Action Committee against Nuclear War during the election campaign in the autumn of 1959 it was estimated that 33 Labour M.P.s in the previous Parliament were sympathetic towards unilateral British nuclear disarmament; The Times, 26 September 1959.

7 Labour's Foreign Policy, published by the Labour Party, 1958, p. 3. Mr. Gaitskell has emphasised the qualifications attached to these under-takings; 577 H.C. Deb. 5s. Col 474 (8 November 1957) and ibid., 582 Col 1235 (19 February 1958). Mr. Bevan was less cautious; ibid., 604 Col 915 (27 April 1959).

8 Selwyn Lloyd in a television broadcast, 21 September 1959; The Times, 22 September 1959.

9 Harold Macmillan, 582 H.C. Deb. 5s. Col 1520 (20 February 1958).

10 Denis Healey quoted a Bevanite pamphlet: “it is unhappily not within the power of British Labour alone, even when it succeeds to Government, to decide on the future of Germany.” Report of the 53rd Annual Conference of the Labour Party, Scarborough, 1954, p. 101; also Herbert Morrison, ibid., p. 107. The executive's resolution was carried by 3,270,000 votes to 3,022,000.

11 The Guardian, 16 December 1959.

12 National Union of Conservative and Union ist Associations, 74th Annual Conference, Blackpool, 1954, Official Report, p. 35. For the Conservative attitude in 1949–50 see Hunter, Leslie, The Road to Brighton Pier (London, 1959), p. 73.Google Scholar

13 As reported in The Times, 13 July 1959.

14 A favourite theme of the leftist Konni Zilliacus; 543 H.C. Deb. 5s. Col 358 (28 June 1955); 549 H.C. Deb. 5s. Col 862 (27 February 1956).

15 Labour's Foreign Policy, 1958, p. 4, where it is assumed that NATO will remain in being even after the retirement of NATO forces from Germany which the Labour Party advocates.

16 Philip Noel-Baker, 464 H.C. Deb. 5s. Col 2127 (12 May 1949).

17 Ibid., 582 Cols 1213–1524 (19 and 20 February 1958).

18 Ibid., 592 Cols 227–355 (22 July 1958).

19 The Times, 6 October 1959.

20 The Times, 23 September 1959, on the Labour election manifesto.

21 Mr. Macmillan in a speech at Manchester, 22 September 1959; The Times, 23 September 1959.

22 The Minister of State, Anthony Nutting, said: “I consider that the Soviet change of heart and attitudes represents an important and en couraging step forward”; 542 H.C. Deb. 5s. Col 273 (13 June 1955).

23 Labour's Foreign Policy, 1958, p. 4.

24 Mr. Gaitskell said: “Provided that the American Government thought the plan worth while, there is no reason on earth why this should involve the withdrawal of all American forces from Europe”; 600 H.C. Deb. 5s. Col 568 (19 February 1959). Also Mr. Bevan to the same effect, ibid., 596 Col 1391 (4 December 1958).

25 Mr. Ormsby-Gore, Minister of State, said: “As for the way in which we shall deal with dis engagement, that is a matter upon which we shall have to work out a common line with our allies,” ibid., 582 Col 1339 (19 February 1958); also Selwyn Lloyd, ibid., 582 Cols 1429, 1431 and 1432 (20 February 1958). The Prime Minister said on 20 February 1958: “I am not prepared … to put forward a scheme of this kind (i.e., disengagement) until it is agreed in detail with all the countries most affected among our Allies”; ibid., 582 Col 1579.

26 Ibid., 604 Col 920 (27 April 1959).

27 The Times, 15 September 1959.

28 Mr. Bevan, 596 H.C. Deb. 5s. Col 1384 (4 December 1958).

29 Mr. Bevan, ibid., 608 Cols 1382–5 (8 July 1959).

30 Mr. Ormsby-Gore, Minister of State, ibid., 600 Cols 575–8 (19 February 1959).

31 Alfred Robens, ibid., 549 Col 848 (27 February 1956); Mr. Bevan, ibid., 596 Col 1387 (4 December 1958); Mr. Healey, ibid., 604 Col 1015 (27 April 1959).

32 Alfred Robens gave an early formulation in the Commons on 23 July 1956; ibid., 557 Col 60. Mr. Gaitskell described the five-point Labour plan for Germany on 19 February 1959 as follows: (i) the withdrawal of foreign forces from this area, including the three satellite states, (ii) a plan for the reunification of Germany, (iii) a plan for the establishment of a specific disarmament zone covering these five territories with full control, (iv) a plan for a mutual security pact, underwritten by the great powers, (v) a plan for the withdrawal of Germany from NATO and of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland from the Warsaw pact; ibid., 600 Col 566.

33 In Defence of Europe, published by the Labour Party, 1954, p. 13. The N.E.C, accepted an annual conference resolution on German unity in 1952 while one proposing German neutralisation was remitted to the executive; Report of the 51st Annual Conference, Morecambe, 1952, pp. 119, 142.

34 Quoted by Mr. Nutting, 542 H.C. Deb. 5s. Col 714 (15 June 1955).

35 See the speech by Roy Jenkins, ibid., 615 Cols 1073–1084 (14 Decomber 1959).

36 Harold Wilson said in a debate on the Stockholm convention on 14 December 1959: “I say to the right hon. Gentleman” (the President of the Board of Trade), “‘Do not give all your thoughts to Europe.’ If one tenth of the energy which the right hon. Gentleman—and we commend him for his energy—has put into the European Free Trade Association had been devoted to strengthening inter-Commonwealth markets and aiming at creating a Free Trade Area for the Commonwealth, we might have been in a stronger position today”; ibid., 615 Cols 1163–4.

37 Report of the 56th Annual Conference of the Labour Party, Brighton, 1957, p. 181.

38 An account is given by Epstein, Leon D. in Britain—Uneasy Ally (Chicago, 1954), pp. 57–63.Google Scholar

39 Mackenzie, Norman, editor of the symposium of young British Socialists, Conviction (London, 1958)Google Scholar, has written (ibid., p. 13): “The Left was without a simple integrated answer to world problems. The world was divided into two systems of power, and that division cut right across the old lines of belief … it was possible to embrace neither side.”

40 As stated by Mr. Bevan, 594 H.C. Deb. 5s. Col 342 (30 October 1958).

41 The order of priorities in Conservative policy was given by Sir Anthony Eden in 1952 as foliowe: “First, to secure for our country peace through strength…. Secondly, to restore to our country economic stability and a surer solvency and prosperity. Thirdly, to build within our country a society in which prosperity and power … are shared and widely spread among the whole people”; quoted in The New Conservatism, Conservative Political Centre (London, 1955), p. 59.

42 Mr. Head, Secretary of State for War, warned the “Suez group” in the debate that “if they voted against the Government they would find that they had not merely voted against their own party but, in my opinion a more serious matter, against their own common sense”; 531 H.C. Deb. 5s. Col 731 (29 July 1954). 27 Conservative M.P.s voted against the agreement. For an analysis of the disciplinary action taken by the local party organizations against M.P.s of both parties who deserted their leaders on crucial votes on the Suez issues after the military intervention in 1956, see Epstein, Leon, “British M.P.s and Their Local Parties,” this Review, Vol. 54 (06, 1960), p. 374.Google Scholar

43 Quoted in Forward From Victory, published by the Fabian Society (London, 1946), p. 80.

44 White, R. J. (ed.), The Conservative Tradition (London, 1950), p. 3.Google Scholar

45 “An understanding of the power element in politics is the first necessity for a sound foreign policy,” Healey, Denis wrote in New Fabian Essays, ed. by Crossman, R. H. S. (London, 1952), p. 161.Google Scholar

46 The former Minister of Defence, Duncan Sandys, has said: “Two things must be brought about. The first is disarmament, and the second is the raising of the living standards of the populations of Africa and Asia”; National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations, 78th Annual Conference, Blackpool, 1958, Official Report, p. 119.

47 The Times, 12 September 1959, giving the text of the Conservative manifesto, The Next Five Years.

48 At the 1950 Conservative conference at Blackpool Lt. Col. Rhys, T. E. R. Google Scholar-Roberts, moving the resolution on Communism, said: “we must remove forever the economic conditions in which this political vision grows. Want and misery foster Communism.” A subsequent speaker, John Gower, opposing legislation to curb Communism, said: “if you get on with tackling your housing problem, if you solve the problem of unemployment, if you are able to go forwards abolishing want and misery … you will win away from (Communism) the mass of the people”; National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations, 71st Annual Conference, Official Report, pp. 39, 42.

49 See Anthony Head in foreign affairs debate on 16 July 1958; 591 H.C. Deb. 5s. Col 1287.

50 Emanuel Shinwell at the 1956 annual conference: “If you do not stand by the principle of Collective Security, which means providing for a measure of defence, if you go to the country and say that we should abandon our defences, you will be laughed completely out of court”; Report of the 55th Annual Conference, p. 148.

51 Emergency resolution moved by Mr. Attlee; Report of the 53rd Annual Conference, p. 92.

52 “It is part of the international order which the Charter seeks to create that nations do not decide for themselves questions in which their own interest is involved.” The Godkin Lectures at Harvard, published as The Challenge of Coexistence (London, 1957), p. 17.Google Scholar

53 Labour's Foreign Policy, 1958, p. 2.

54 A typical resolution on the U.N. was carried by an overwhelming majority at the Conservative annual conference in 1957: “This conference, while fully supporting the principles and objects of the U.N.O., recognises that the vital interests of Great Britain must always remain the permanent consideration in the conduct of foreign affairs by H.M. Government.” National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations, 77th Annual Conference, Official Report, p. 26.

55 In the words of Boyd-Carpenter, John, “(Conservatives) do not deceive themselves into the belief that membership of either body (the League or the U.N.) absolves them from the need to have a foreign policy of their own or to provide for their own defence. They regard them as being rather extensions of that policy and part of that defence.” The Conservative Case (London, 1950), p. 16.Google Scholar

56 From the Conservative election manifesto, The Next Five Years, published in The Times, 12 September 1959.

57 A former Labour Minister of State, Kenneth Younger, has said that “for all the Western Powers who have colonial responsibilities to put their colonial houses in order is perhaps the top priority in their international and world policy.” 549 H.C. Deb. 5s. Cols 949–950 (27 February 1956). Mr. Gaitskell told the Commons in July 1956: “The focal point of such struggle as may exist between Communism and the free world is likely more and more to be in the so-called uncommitted areas of the world,” ibid., 557 Col 226 (23 July).

58 Mr. Bevan: “I do not say Mr. Macmillan is a bad man. I do not say the Conservatives are evil people. What I say is that they have not quite grown up. They are politically immature. They have been brought up in ways which are now outmoded.” The Times, 25 September 1959.

59 The U.K. accession to the Turco-Iraqi Pact was agreed to by the Commons without a division on 4 April 1955. 539 H.C. Deb. 5s. Cols 834–903; see also ibid., 547 Col 833 (12 December 1955).

60 Alfred Robens, ibid., 549 Col 849 (27 February 1956); Mr. Bevan, ibid., 592 Col 237 (22 July 1958). See Anthony Nutting on Labour's change of view on the Bagdad Pact, ibid., 549 Cols 2113–4 (7 March 1956).

61 Philip Noel-Baker, ibid., 592 Cols 344–6 (22 July 1958).

62 R. H. S. Crossman, ibid., 542 Col 599 (15 June 1955); Denis Healey, ibid., 547 Col 839 (12 December 1955); Kenneth Younger, ibid., 542 Col 616 (15 June 1955).

63 Labour's Foreign Policy, 1958, p. 7.

64 536 H.C. Deb. 5s. Cols 159–60 (4 February): “Any attempt by the Government of the People's Republic of China to assert its authority over these islands by force would in the circumstances at present peculiar to the case give rise to a situation endangering peace and security.”

65 In the Conservative general election manifesto of May 1955, United for Peace and Progress, it was stated (p. 11) that “in the Formosa Straits we would like to see a guarantee on both sides not to resort to force, and the withdrawal of Chinese Nationalist forces from the coastal islands. This could lead to the reconsideration at an appropriate moment both of Chinese representation in the United Nations and the future status of Formosa.”