Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-75dct Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-05-01T04:36:33.232Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

An Individual-Level Multiequation Model of Expenditure Effects in Contested House Elections

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Christopher Kenny  and
Michael McBurnett
Christopher Kenny
Affiliation:
Louisiana State University
Michael McBurnett
Affiliation:
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

We shall address questions concerning the impact of candidate spending in congressional elections in a new way. We develop a multiequation model of congressional vote choice that takes the endogeneity of expenditures into account. We then estimate both this model and the more traditional single-equation model using individual level survey data. The substantial differences we find between the two models indicates that the simultaneity bias present in the single-equation model is not trivial. The challenger and incumbent expenditure terms are each significant (whereas only challenger expenditures are in the single-equation setup) and of much greater magnitude in the multiequation case. In addition, we evaluate hypotheses grounded in persuasive communications theory concerning the type of individuals most affected by the messages emanating from the campaigns. We find that individuals with higher education, those with greater interest in campaigns, and those with strongly held convictions are unaffected by candidate spending, whereas individuals lacking each of these attributes are greatly influenced by campaign expenditures.

Type
Research Notes
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 88 , Issue 3 , September 1994 , pp. 699 - 707
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1994

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Alexander, Herbert E. 1992. Financing Politics: Money, Elections, and Political Reform. Washington: CQ Press.Google Scholar
Barone, Michael, and Ujifusa, Grant. 1986. The Almanac of American Politics. Washington: National Journal.Google Scholar
Bartels, Larry M. 1991. “Instrumental and Quasi-Instrumental Variables.” American Journal of Political Science 35:777–800.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brown, Robert D, and Woods, James A.. 1991. “Toward a Model of Congressional Elections.” Journal of Politics 53:454–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Elections 84. 1984. Congressional Quarterly 42, Suppl.:2485–2612.Google Scholar
Goldenberg, Edie, and Traugott, Michael. 1984. Campaigning for Congress. Washington: CQ Press.Google Scholar
Jacobson, Gary. 1978. “The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections.” American Political Science Review 72:469–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jacobson, Gary. 1980. Money in Congressional Elections. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Jacobson, Gary. 1984. “Money in the 1980 and 1982 Congressional Elections.” In Money and Politics in the United States, ed. Malbin, Michael. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.Google Scholar
Jacobson, Gary. 1985. “Money and Votes Reconsidered: Congressional Elections 1972–1982.” Public Choice 47:7–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jacobson, Gary. 1990. “The Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: New Evidence for Old Arguments.” American Journal of Political Science 34:334–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Johnston, John. 1984. Econometric Methods. New York: McGraw-Hill.Google Scholar
Kenny, Christopher, and McBurnett, Michael. 1992. “A Dynamic Model of the Effect of Campaign Spending on Congressional Vote Choice.” American Journal of Political Science 36:923–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kenny, Christopher, and McBurnett, Michael. 1993. “Forms of Contact and the Influence of Campaign Expenditures.” Presented at the annual meeting of the Southwestern Political Science Association, New Orleans.Google Scholar
Kieweit, D. Roderick. 1983. Macroeconomics and Micropolitics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Lindzey, Gardner, and Aronson, Eliot. 1985. Theory and Method. Vol. 1 of Handbook of Social Psychology. 3d ed.New York: Random House.Google Scholar
Milburn, Michael A. 1991. Persuasion and Politics: The Social Psychology of Public Opinion. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole.Google Scholar
Miller, Warren, and Stokes, Donald. 1966. “Constituency Influence in Congress.” In Elections and the Political Order, ed. Campbell, Angus, Converse, Philip E., Miller, Warren E., and Stokes, Donald E.. New York: John Wiley & Sons.Google Scholar
Ragsdale, Lyn. 1981. “Incumbent Popularity, Challenger Invisibility, and Congressional Voters.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 6:201–18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ragsdale, Lyn, and Cook, Timothy E.. 1987. “Representatives' Actions and Challengers' Reactions: Limits to Candidate Connections in the House.” American Journal of Political Science 31:45–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Scammon, Richard M., and McGillivray, Alice V.. 1985. America Votes 16. Washington: Congressional Quarterly.Google Scholar
Smith, Mary John. 1982. Persuasion and Human Action: A Review and Critique of Social Influence Theories. Belmont: Wadsworth.Google Scholar
Thomas, Scott J. 1989. “Do Incumbent Expenditures Matter?” Journal of Politics. 51:965–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thomas, Scott J. 1990. “A Negative Advertising Theory of Campaign Expenditures.’ In Predicting Politics, ed. Mark Crain, W. and Tollison, Robert D.. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar