¹ The term “local level” as used throughout this paper refers to the 46 prefectures, in the capital of each of which is located an American military government team. Although the prefecture is not regarded by the Japanese as being the local level of government, it is the lowest level in the structure in which American units are found. The occupational structure in Japan is not of parallel stratification to the Japanese government. The American structure ascends in hierarchy from the prefectural team through a regional headquarters, a Corps headquarters, and Eighth Army, to SCAP in Tokyo. The Japanese governmental structure descends from the national government in Tokyo directly to the prefectural governments and thence to cities (shi) and counties (gun). Oun are further divided into towns (machi) and villages (mura).

² See Latham, Earl, The Federal Field Service (1947), 1Google Scholar.

³ Occupation forces in Japan can be grouped by function into three categories:

(1) The most numerous are tactical troops, who have almost no official contact with the Japanese. Considered the “strong arm of the military government,” they are concerned with combat training and occasional patrol duty when called upon by military government. Included in this group are the British Commonwealth Occupation Forces (BCOP) and those sections of headquarters of Eighth Army at Yokohama, I Corps at Kyoto, and IX Corps at Sendai which are concerned primarily with troop relationships.

(2) Military government personnel in the field and the military government staff sections of Eighth Army, I Corps, IX Corps, and the special staff sections of GHQ, SCAP, which deal primarily with Japanese affairs. Large numbers of civilians at both field and headquarters levels are included in this category.

(3) Counter Intelligence Corps units, made up largely of Nisei, located in nearly every prefecture are the investigative arm of military government. Although smallest of the three groups, they have even closer contact with the Japanese than do the military government field units.

⁴ MacLean, Malcolm S., “Military Government—Fact and Fancy,” Public Administration Review, Vol. 7, p. 275 (Autumn, 1947)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵ Table of Organization and Equipment 20–56T, dated July 22, 1945.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ For an evaluation of the courses of the Civil Affairs Training Schools, see Zink, Harold, “The Contribution of Universities to Military Government,” American Association of University Professors Bulletin, Vol. 32, pp. 687–695 (Winter 1946)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a detailed description of the courses and an account of the planning for and organization of the training program, see Charles S. Hyneman, “Wartime Area and Language Courses,” ibid., Vol. 31, pp. 434–7 (Autumn, 1945). A general description of the training of officers for Japan can be found in an account by Friedrich, Carl J. and Haring, Douglas G., “Military Government for Japan,” Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 14, pp. 37–40 (Feb. 14, 1945)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸ These civil affairs teams were known as Philippines Civil Affairs Units (PCAU), and initially had an entirely different structure from the units organized for Japan.

⁹ The unit assigned to administer Tokyo was a reorganized Philippines unit redesignated as the 32nd Military Government Company. Although slight modifications in strength were made (such as the attachment of officers to assist in liquidating the Bank of Japan), its organization was not much different from that of other companies.

¹⁰ Headquarters, Eighth Army, Letter Order 6–44 (Reorganization of Military Government in Japan), August 7, 1946. Although this T/O & B was not published until August 7, the reorganization had been tentatively effected on July 1.

¹¹ Yamanashi, IsMkowa, Pukui, Shiga, Nara, Wakayama, Tottori, Shimane, Kagawa, Tokushima, Kochi, Miyazaki, and Saga.

¹² Akita, Iwate, Toyama, Gifu, Fukushima, Niigata, Tochigi, Ibaraki, Chiba, Saitama, Nagano, Mie, Okayama, Yamaguchi, Ehime, Kumamoto, Oita, and Kagashima.

¹³ Hokkaido, Aomori, Miyagi, Yamagata, Gumma, Aichi, Shizuoka, Kyoto, Hyogo, Hiroshima, Fukuoka, and Nagasaki.

¹⁴ Kanagawa is the name of the prefecture of which Yokohama is the capital city.

¹⁵ The eight superintendencies-general were created by the Imperial Government (now designated as the National Government) in January, 1943, and abolished in November, 1945. For further discussion, see Braibanti, Ralph J. D., “Neighborhood Associations in Japan and Their Democratic Potentialities,” Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol. 7 (Feb., 1948), p. 136, note 3CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁶ Military government regions are designated as Hokkaido, Tohoku, Kanto, Tokai-Hokuriku, Kinki, Chugoku, Shikoku, and Kyushu. See Hille, Lt. Col. Henry L., “Eighth Army's Rô1e in the Military Government of Japan,” Military Review, Vol. 27 (Feb., 1948), pp. 9–18Google Scholar, for a general description of field units as of July 1, 1947. Two useful organizational charts are included in this article.

¹⁷ Headquarters, Eighth Army, Letter Order No. 12–18 (Reorganization of Military Government in Japan), Dec. 11, 1946.

¹⁸ This policy was first expressed in a message transmitted to General MacArthur by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on September 6, 1945, and again in a Far Eastern Policy Decision of June 19, 1947. These documents are accessible, respectively, in State Department Publication 267, Far Eastern Series 17, Occupation of Japan—Policy and Progress, p. 73, and Activities of the Far Eastern Commission, Feb. 26, 1946–July 10, 1947 (1947), p. 49Google Scholar.

¹⁹ A less well known but equally important concept of occupation policy is the provision that “the Supreme Commander is not committed to support the Emperor or any other Japanese governmental authority. The policy is to use the existing form of government in Japan and not to support it.” (Part II, par. 2, Basic Past-Surrender Policy for Japan, FEC Policy decision, June 19, 1947). But the boundary line between “using” and “supporting” does not admit of easy delineation. The political naivete1 of most military government administrators and their lack of experience in positions of governmental authority tend to make them stand in awe of prefectural officials or officials of the national ministries. Hence such anachronisms have occurred as a group of officers saluting the Emperor when he arrived in their prefecture. Military government officers in the field tend to become so allied with the government that in subtle and unintentional ways they lend support to the status quo against changes initiated by liberal elements or even by SCAP.

²⁰ Urwick, L., The Elements of Administration (1943), p. 66Google Scholar. This term is more appropriate for SCAP activities because it implies “instructions as to policy and occasional discussion as to means and methods.” This is not the same type of activity performed at the local levels.

²¹ These judicial devices include the International Military Tribunal of the Far East, as well as subordinate military commissions and provost courts.

²² Of these behaviors, one writer states; “In practice, most of the important decisions relating to the governing of Japan … have been greatly influenced by a large number of American experts on the staff of the … SCAP … Since these advisers come in direct and almost daily contact with Japanese agencies, their opinions and advice serve as a strong stimulant for the Americanization of objectives, techniques, and organizational patterns.” See Blakemore, Thomas L., “Postwar Developments in Japanese Law,” Wisconsin Law Review (July, 1947), pp. 633–4Google Scholar.

²⁴ For further discussion of this problem, see Cassidy, Velma H., “The Program for Reëducation in Japan—A Survey of Policy,” Documents and State Papers, Vol. 5 (Apr., 1948), p. 29Google Scholar.

²⁴ Latham, op. cit., p. 5.

²⁵ For detailed discussion of a typical SCAPIN (in this case SCAPIN 550, the famous purge directive), see Quigley, Harold S., “The Great Purge in Japan,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 20, pp. 299–308 (Sept., 1947)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁶ Headquarters, Eighth Army, Operational Directive No. 19, Inspection of Japanese Educational Institutions, Feb. 13, 1946.

²⁷ SCAP Memorandum AG 350 CIE, Administration of the Educational System of Japan, Oct. 22, 1945.

²⁸ New York Times, Feb. 15, 1948, 10:1. A further description of the general apathy increasingly displayed by the Japanese toward their government can be found in ibid., Apr. 11, 1948, 22:1.

²⁹ The Eighth Army, for example, has held eminently successful conferences on problems and procedures of procurement for the 46 procurement officers of the military government teams. SCAP has held many similar conferences, including one for all natural resources and commerce and industry officers from local teams on the administration of the Rural Land Reform Act. Early in 1947, SCAP held a conference with representatives of each of the 46 military government teams to standardize procedures for the administration of the purge of government officials. Both Corps I and Corps IX have held conferences on education and public health, but SCAP functional specialists in each case were present to explain policies which only SCAP has authority to formulate.

³⁰ Headquarters, Eighth Army, Operational Directive Number 29/2, Aug. 17, 1946, par. 3.

³¹ Idem.

³² GHQ, SCAP, Establishment, of Military Occupation Courts, Feb. 19, 1946Google Scholar.

³³ Headquarters, Eighth Army, Operational Directive No. 29, Establishment of Military Occupation Provost Courts, Mar. 11, 1946.

³⁴ Headquarters, Corps IX, Operational Memorandum No. 43/2, Provost Courts, Oct. 19, 1946.

³⁵ Headquarters, Eighth Army, Operational Directive 29/2, Aug. 17, 1946.

³⁶ Ibid., par. 2.

³⁷ General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Summation of Non-Military Activities, No. 23, Aug., 1947, pp. 44 and 47.

³⁸ Patrols of tactical troops were used to assist military government personnel in these duties.

³⁹ Election for members of the Diet, in which women voted for the first time.