¹ “A Challenge to Political Scientists,” in the issue of Aug., 1943, at p. 697.

² The Mind and Society (1935). See also Henderson, L. J., Pareto's General Sociology (1935).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³ See, for example, Smith, Munroe, “The Domain of Political Science,” Political Science Quarterly (Mar., 1886), pp. 1–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rowe, L. S., “Problems of Political Science,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (Sept., 1897), pp. 165–186Google Scholar; Merriam, C. E., “The Present State of the Study of Politics,” in this Review (May, 1921), pp. 173–185Google Scholar; Ford, H. J., “The Scope of Political Science,” Proceedings of the American Political Science Association, II (1905), pp. 198–207CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Fairlie, J. A., “Politics and Science,” Scientific Monthly (Jan., 1924), pp. 18–37Google Scholar; Barnes, H. E., The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences (1925)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rice, S. A., Quantitative Methods in Politics (1928)Google Scholar; Lasswell, H. D., Psychopathology and Politics (1930)Google Scholar; Lasswell, H. D., Politics: Who Gets What, When, How? (1936)Google Scholar; Merriam, C. E., Political Power: Its Composition and Incidence (1934)Google Scholar; Rice, S. A. (ed.), Methods in Social Science; A Case Book (1931)Google Scholar; Friedrich, C. J., Constitutional Government and Democracy (1941)Google Scholar, particularly Chap. 25. This list is by no means exhaustive, but serves to indicate that the problem of methodology has not been neglected.

⁴ Munro, W. B., “Physics and Politics—An Old Analogy Revised,” in this Review (1928), Vol. 22, pp. 1–11.Google Scholar

⁵ Rice, S. A., Quantitative Methods in Politics (1928), p. 14.Google Scholar

⁶ Catlin, G. E. G., Science and Method of Politics (1927), pp. 347–348.Google Scholar

⁷ Whyte, op. cit., p. 692.

⁸ For an excellent analysis, see Tillich, Paul, The Religious Situation (1932).Google Scholar

⁹ Whitehead, A. N., Science and the Modern World (1925), p. 6.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Ruggiero, Guido de, “Positivism,” Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 12, p. 260.Google Scholar

¹¹ Whitehead, A. N., Science and the Modern World (1925), p. 6.Google Scholar

¹² Ibid., p. 6.

¹³ Whitehead, A. N., Adventures of Ideas (1933), p. 157.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Jessop, T. E., “The Scientific Account of Man,” in Jessop, T. E.et al., The Christian Understanding of Man (1938), p. 40.Google Scholar

¹⁵ A boy gets his feet wet in the rain, he sits all day in school with wet stockings, and is kept after school by the teacher for a breach of discipline. He develops a cold which his mother neglects. Finally he comes down with pneumonia and his mother calls the doctor. The doctor is busy with another patient and arrives several hours after being called. He administers drugs, but the child dies. What is the cause of the child's death? The physician has a ready answer, but it is not one which satisfies the mother's conscience. She thinks her neglect is the cause of the death, and the teacher is not certain but that she is responsible. Or is the boy himself responsible? Where in such a chain of events do the cause and the effect lie?

¹⁶ Cohen, Morris R., Reason and Nature; An Essay on the Meaning of the Scientific Method (1931), pp. 36–37.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 11.

¹⁸ Spengler, Oswald, Politische Schriften (1934), pp. 85–86.Google Scholar Quoted in Rader, Melvin, No Compromise: The Conflict between Two Worlds (1939), p. 304.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Spengler, Oswald, The Decline of the West (1928), II, p. 368.Google Scholar Quoted with approval by the British Fascist James Drennan, B.U.F.: Oswald Mosley and British Fascism (1934), p. 183.Google Scholar

²⁰ For an excellent analysis of the influence of positivism upon the German mentality, see Kuhn, Helmut, Freedom: Forgotten and Remembered (1943).Google Scholar In part, Kuhn declares: “Freedom is rational choice. The flight from freedom into forget-fulness presented itself, within the rarefied atmosphere of abstract thought, as a dialectic through which Reason was divorced from Choice. The Historicist, fastening on understanding to the exclusion of choice, reduced the mind to an impotent spectator. The Existentialist, exalting choice at the expense of reason, entrusted the self with a blind power of decision, thus reducing it to an irresponsible agent. After whittling away freedom from both ends, the two found themselves united in the task of consecrating the unfreedom of the totalitarian state.” Op. cit., p. 25.

²¹ For a more detailed and documented analysis of the influence of positivism upon these concepts, see the present writer's The Decline of Liberalism as an Ideology (1943).