Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home
Hostname: page-component-77ffc5d9c7-jlnts Total loading time: 0.392 Render date: 2021-04-23T15:33:03.479Z Has data issue: true Feature Flags: { "shouldUseShareProductTool": true, "shouldUseHypothesis": true, "isUnsiloEnabled": true, "metricsAbstractViews": false, "figures": false, "newCiteModal": false, "newCitedByModal": true }

Money Talks: Deterring Quality Challengers in Congressional Elections

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

David Epstein
Affiliation:
Columbia University
Peter Zemsky
Affiliation:
INSEAD

Abstract

We examine the role of incumbent fundraising in deterring strong challengers. We construct a signaling model in which incumbents can use fundraising strategically to ward off quality challengers. We show, however, that only under very limited circumstances will there be an observable relationship between fundraising and challenger quality. Therefore, previous empirical tests for deterrence have systematically underestimated the effects of fundraising in decreasing electoral competition. Our analysis also suggests that by making fundraising easily observable, Federal Election Commission regulations may encourage candidates to overinvest time and resources accumulating large war chests instead of governing.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1995

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below.

References

Ansolebehere, Stephen. 1990. “Winning Is Easy, but It Sure Ain't Cheap.” University of California, Los Angeles. Typescript.Google Scholar
Austen-Smith, David. 1987. “Interest Groups, Campaign Contributions, and Probabilistic Voting.” Public Choice 54:123–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Austen-Smith, David. 1990. “Rational Consumers and Irrational Voters: A Review Essay on Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory.” Economics and Politics 3:7392.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Banks, Jeffrey, and Kiewiet, D. Roderick. 1989. “Explaining Patterns of Candidate Competition in Congressional Elections.” American Journal of Political Science 33:9971015.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baron, David. 1989a. “Service-related Campaign Contributions and the Electoral Equilibrium.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 104:4572.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baron, David. 1989b. Service-induced Campaign Contributions, Incumbent Shirking, and Reelection Opportunities. In Models of Strategic Choice in Politics, ed. Ordeshook, P.. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
Baron, David. 1992. “Electoral Competition with Informed and Uninformed Voters.” Stanford University. Typescript.Google Scholar
Baron, David, and Mo, Jongryn. 1993. “Campaign Contributions and Party-Candidate Competition in Services and Policies.” In Political Economy: Institutions, Information and Voting, ed. Schofield, N.. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Bauer, Monica, and Hibbing, John R.. 1989. “Which Incumbents Lose in House Elections? A Response to Jacobson's ‘Marginals Never Vanished’.” American Journal of Political Science 33:262–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Box-Steffensmeier, Janet, and Lin, Tse-min. 1992. “Estimating Lagged Effects of Incumbent Expenditures.” University of Texas, Austin. Typescript.Google Scholar
Cameron, Charles, and Enelow, James. 1990. “Asymmetric Policy Effects, Campaign Contributions, and the Spatial Theory of Elections.” Columbia University. Typescript.Google Scholar
Cho, In-koo, and Kreps, David. 1987. “Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 102:179222.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Denzau, Arthur, and Munger, Michael. 1986. “Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented.” American Political Science Review 80:89106.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Drew, Elizabeth. 1983. Politics and Money: The New Road to Corruption. New York: Macmillan.Google Scholar
Farrell, Joseph. 1988. “Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games.” In Mathematical Models in Economics, ed. Dempster, M.. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Fenno, Richard F. 1978. Home Style. Boston: Little, Brown.Google Scholar
Fowler, Linda. 1993. Candidates, Congress, and the American Democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
Fudenberg, Drew, and Tirole, Jean. 1991. Game Theory. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Gilligan, Thomas, and Krehbiel, Keith. 1992. “Who Specializes? Expertise in the House Energy and Commerce Committee.” Stanford University. Typescript.Google Scholar
Green, Donald Philip, and Krasno, Jonathon S.. 1988. “Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent: Reestimating the Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections.” American Journal of Political Science 32:884907.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Green, Donald, Robins, James, and Krasno, Jonathon. 1991. Using Polls To Estimate the Effects of Campaign Spending by U.S. House Incumbents. Washington: American Political Science Association.Google Scholar
Hall, Richard L. 1989. “Committee Decision Making in the Postreform Congress.” In Congress Reconsidered, ed. Dodd, L. C. and Oppenheimer, B. I.. Washington: Congressional Quarterly.Google Scholar
Hinckley, Barbara. 1980a. “The American Voter in Congressional Elections.” American Political Science Review 74:641–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hinckley, Barbara. 1980b. “House Reelections and Senate Defeats: The Role of the Challenger.” British Journal of Political Science 10:441–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hinich, Melvin, and Munger, Michael. 1989. “Political Investment, Voter Perceptions, and Candidate Strategy: An Equilibrium Spatial Analysis.” In Models of Strategic Choice in Politics, ed. Ordeshook, P.. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
Jackson, Brooks. 1988. Honest Grafi: Big Money and the American Political Process. New York: Knopf.Google Scholar
Jacobson, Gary C. 1990a. The Electoral Origins of Divided Government. San Francisco: Westview.Google Scholar
Jacobson, Gary C. 1990b. “The Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: New Evidence for Old Arguments.” American Journal of Political Science 34:334–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jacobson, Gary C., and Kernell, Samuel. 1983. Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Joskow, P., and Klevorik, A.. 1979. “A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy.” Yale Law Journal 89:213–70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Krasno, Jonathon S., and Green, Donald Philip. 1988. “Preempting Quality Challengers in House Elections.” Journal of Politics 50:920–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mann, Thomas, and Wolfinger, Raymond. 1980. “Candidates and Parties in Congressional Elections.” American Political Science Review 74:617–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Morton, Rebecca, and Cameron, Charles. 1992. “Elections and the Theory of Campaign Contributions: A Survey and Critical Analysis.” Economics and Politics 4:79108.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Saloner, Garth. 1981. “Dynamic Equilibrium Limit Pricing in an Uncertain Environment.” Stanford University. Typescript.Google Scholar
Snyder, James. 1990. “Campaign Contributions as Investments: The U.S. House of Representatives, 1980–1986.” Journal of Political Economy 98:11951227.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sorauf, Frank. 1992. Inside Campaign finance: Myths and Realities. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar

Full text views

Full text views reflects PDF downloads, PDFs sent to Google Drive, Dropbox and Kindle and HTML full text views.

Total number of HTML views: 0
Total number of PDF views: 21 *
View data table for this chart

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between September 2016 - 23rd April 2021. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

Send article to Kindle

To send this article to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle.

Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Money Talks: Deterring Quality Challengers in Congressional Elections
Available formats
×

Send article to Dropbox

To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox.

Money Talks: Deterring Quality Challengers in Congressional Elections
Available formats
×

Send article to Google Drive

To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive.

Money Talks: Deterring Quality Challengers in Congressional Elections
Available formats
×
×

Reply to: Submit a response


Your details


Conflicting interests

Do you have any conflicting interests? *