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Convergence's Democracy Problem: A Critique of Kogelmann and Stich

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 April 2018

BENJAMIN R. HERTZBERG
BENJAMIN R. HERTZBERG*
Affiliation:
Emory University
*
Benjamin R. Hertzberg is a visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science, Emory University (bhertzberg@emory.edu).
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Abstract

In their 2016 American Political Science Review article, Kogelmann and Stich argue that public reason fails to provide the assurance reasonable citizens require to act justly and that, as a consequence, Rawls's account of political stability fails. Convergence discussions, because they are a costly signal, provide such assurance. Kogelmann and Stich fail to recognize that constituents influence representatives such that the costs of convergence discourse are unknown. It thus cannot assure. Constituents’ influence also undermines convergence's ability to show how decision-making processes that follow its norms result in justified laws. Far from supporting convergence, then, the stability question demands revision of the view. This response develops these objections, extends them from Kogelmann and Stich's analysis to other convergence theorists and political liberals, and explores what political theorists can learn from convergence's difficulties.

Type
Letter
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 112 , Issue 2 , May 2018 , pp. 423 - 427
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2018 

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Footnotes

I am grateful to Ryan Davis and the APSR's anonymous reviewers for their feedback on earlier versions.

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