On July 18, 1976, the Soviet naval vessel, Kiev, transited the Turkish Straits from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, with Turkish consent. Questions have been raised concerning the international legality of this transit, and in light of earlier reaction to an alleged violation by the Soviet Union of the rules on the passage of submarines through the Turkish Straits it seems appropriate to examine the facts and the governing law.

In a recent article in this Journal by Dr. Shihata, it is implied that the English text of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) of November 22,1967 on the situation in the Middle East should, for purposes of interpretation, enjoy some measure of precedence over the French version. This view appears to be based on the fact that English was the original language of the draft resolution which without change became Security Council Resolution 242 (1967). The underlying issue is now famous. The English and French versions of this resolution are considered to conflict in that the latter provides, literally, for withdrawal of Israeli forces from all occupied territories, whereas partial withdrawal would appear to satisfy the requirements of the former.

The material in this section is arranged according to the system employed in the annual Digest of United States Practice in International Law, published by the Department of State.

In an article in this Journal some years ago, Professor Georg Maier analyzed the legal cases presented by the Republics of Peru and Ecuador during their long boundary dispute and concluded that the Ecuadorian Government had a much stronger de jure title to the disputed territory, while the Peruvian Government’s claim rested primarily on a strong de facto title. Consequently, he argued that the 1942 Rio Protocol which awarded the Peruvian Government the bulk of the territories in question was not an equitable solution to the dispute since such a solution would lie between the extremes of Ecuador’s de jure case and Peru’s de facto case. He further concluded that a more equitable solution should be sought so the dispute would no longer be an impediment to amicable relations between the two countries. The conclusion of this writer is that the Peruvian Government’s de jure case in the dispute was stronger than that of the Ecuadorian Government and that Peru’s legal case was then buttressed by a prolonged occupation and development of much of the disputed area. Furthermore, even if the Rio Protocol was not an equitable solution to the problem, no legal justification exists for demanding the renegotiation of a pact signed and ratified by both the Peruvian and Ecuadorian Governments and then guaranteed by four other American Governments.