Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which allows a state that is not a party to the Statute to “accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court” by way of a declaration lodged with the registrar, is one of the Statute's most inconspicuous provisions. It has attracted only brief notice either in the general literature on the jurisdiction of the ICC or in the particular context of the debate over U.S. objections to the Court's third-party jurisdiction. Few writers have looked closely at the provision's construction and procedural regime, and the first declaration made by a state under this provision—by the Ivory Coast in February 2005—has gone almost unnoticed in international theory and practice.

In October 2003, the Israeli permanent representative addressed the United Nations General Assembly on why Israel felt compelled to build a lengthy barrier spanning hundreds of kilometers across certain areas of the occupied West Bank of the Jordan River. Among other things, Ambassador Dan Gillernian stated:

In its decision on assigned counsel's motion for withdrawal in the Milosevic case, the trial chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) observed “that assignment of counsel against the wishes of the accused is a developing area of the law both in national and international jurisdictions.” This area of law witnessed rapid development by international criminal tribunals in the latter half of 2004.

Israel has justified the construction of its barrier wall as a nonforcible measure taken in selfdefense to protect its citizens against terrorist attacks emanating from the occupied Palestinian territory. This essay addresses two issues. First, was the International Court of Justice’s conclusion in paragraph 139 of the advisory opinion Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory that “Article 51 of the Charter has no relevance in this case” wellfounded? This question involves consideration of three interrelated substantive aspects of paragraph 139: the Court’s finding that Article 51 was irrelevant because Israel did not claim that the attacks against it were imputable to a foreign state; the relevance of the Court’s reliance on the fact that Israel exercises control over the occupied Palestinian territory; and the Court’s conclusion that the situation differs from the circumstances contemplated in Security Council Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001) and that, accordingly, Israel could not invoke these resolutions in support of its claim to be exercising a right of self-defense. The second issue is whether the approach of the Court to the substantive content of Article 51 can be defended as an appropriate discharge of its judicial function. To avoid undue suspense, let it be said at the outset that paragraph 139 is well-founded, and the Court properly fulfilled its task.

This Note will examine developments in the practice of the United Nations secretary-general on reservations and declarations to treaties, particularly since 1994 when the Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as Depositary of Multilateral Treaties was last updated. This period was marked by some notable developments in the previous practice, especially in connection with human rights treaties.

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 (Vienna Convention) provides the framework for the functions of the secretary-general in his role as depositary of multilateral treaties. Most aspects of the law relating to reservations and declarations to treaties are also codified in the Vienna Convention.

Over five hundred multilateral treaties are deposited with the secretary-general. The complex requirements relating to these treaties and the concerns of the many disparate states that may undertake treaty actions with regard to them have significantly influenced his practice. He is also conscious of the political sensitivities surrounding his decisions and the need to protect his own integrity and impartiality.

Ever since the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza began in 1967, the Supreme Court of Israel has entertained petitions challenging actions of the Israeli authorities in those territories. The Court has delivered dozens of judgments in which it addressed questions of international humanitarian law in a situation of belligerent occupation. For a long time the Supreme Court was the sole judicial actor in this sphere. While its judgments were subjected to scrutiny and criticism by academics, no other judicial organs, domestic or international, ruled on the difficult legal issues discussed by the Court. The request for an advisory opinion provided the International Court of Justice (ICJ) with a unique opportunity to address and clarify some of the issues that had previously remained in the exclusive domain of the Supreme Court of Israel. Unfortunately, the Court did not take full advantage of this opportunity. As Judge Rosalyn Higgins noted in her separate opinion, the Court refrained from engaging in a detailed analysis of the law, thereby failing to follow “the tradition of using advisory opinions as an opportunity to elaborate and develop international law.” The opinion is especially weak on questions of international humanitarian law (IHL), which makes it extremely difficult to know what the Court actually decided on these questions.

During 2004 the International Court of Justice decided three important matters. In March the Court found that the United States had violated the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations with respect to a number of Mexican nationals sentenced to death in U.S. state court proceedings. In a much-noted advisory opinion, the Court concluded in July that Israel's construction of a security wall or fence in occupied Palestinian territory violated international law. And in December it found that it did not have jurisdiction over Serbia and Montenegro's claims against eight NATO countries regarding NATO's 1999 bombing campaign aimed at halting the conflict in Kosovo. In other developments, the Court heard and had under deliberation Germany's preliminary objections to Liechtenstein's suit regarding certain property of Crown Prince Adam. Finally, Judge Gilbert Guillaume, a member of the Court since 1987 and its former president, announced that he would resign in February 2005.

I shall confine my brief thoughts on the recent advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territory (OPT) to the Court’s treatment of international humanitarian law (IHL) in general, and to the law of belligerent occupation in particular. To that end, I will focus on the following four areas: the Court’s consideration of the applicable law as regards IHL; the Court’s interpretation of Article 6 of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War; the Court’s consideration of the concept of military necessity in the context of foreign military occupation; and the Court’s consideration of the responsibility of third states, particularly the high contracting parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention, for violations of relevant principles of IHL by an occupying power.

Are obligations assumed by states under international human rights treaties applicable extraterritorially during periods of armed conflict and military occupation? This was one of the issues addressed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its advisory opinion Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The Court indicated that the obligations assumed by Israel under the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESC), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CROC) applied in the occupied territories and that the construction of the security barrier constituted “breaches” by Israel of various of its obligations under these instruments.