1. Ish-Shalom, Binyamin, “Tolerance and Its Theoretical Basis in the Teaching of Rabbi Kook” (Hebrew), Daat 20 (Winter 1988): 151–168;Google ScholarEfrati, Binyamin, Sanegoriya (Seeing the Good Side) in the Teaching of R. Kook(Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1959);Google ScholarYaron, Zvi, The Philosophy of R. Kook(Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Jewish Agency Torah Dept., 1974), chap. 12: “Toleration,” pp. 323–373;Google ScholarSchweid, Eliezer, Judaism and the Solitary Jew(Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1975), chap. 3: “Secularism from a Religious Perspective-R. Kook′s Teaching,” pp. 178–192.Google Scholar

2. I owe special thanks to Avi Sagie, who at the eleventh hour of my writing kindly shared with me the manuscript of his forthcoming article, “The Jewish Religion: Toleration and the Possibility of Pluralism.” His elegantly drawn apparatus helped me to sharpen and amplify upon some of my own distinctions, which are similar to his, but allow for greater overlap between pluralism and toleration.

3. As has been done by Jay Newman, “The Idea of Religious Tolerance,” American Philosophical Quarterly15, no. 3 (July 1978): 187, andGoogle Scholar by Strawson, P. F., Freedom and Resentment(London: Methuen, 1974), chap. 4: “The Limits of Toleration,” p. 43.Google Scholar

4. See Newman, “Idea of Religious Tolerance,” p. 194.

5. For a more elaborate explication of these two models of toleration and the respective philosophical and political difficulties they engender when forming the basis for practical policy, see Marcuse, Herbert, “Repressive Tolerance,” in A Critique of Pure Tolerance, ed. Wolff, R. P., Moore, B.Jr., and Marcuse, H. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), pp. 81–123;Google ScholarKendall, W., “The ′Open Society and Its Fallacies,” American Political Science Review 54 (1960): 972–979;CrossRefGoogle ScholarLewis, David, “Mill and Milquetoast,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (1989): 152–171;CrossRefGoogle ScholarPopper, Karl, “Toleration and Intellectual Responsibility,” in On Toleration, ed. Mendus, S and Edwards, D. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), pp. 17–34;Google ScholarHed, David, “Two Concepts of Liberalism,” in In the Labyrinth of Democracy, ed. Yuval, Lurie and Hayim, Maranz (Ben-Gurion University, 1990), pp. 169–184.Google Scholar The two versions of maximalism and minimalism have alternatively been described as thick or thin, rightist or leftist, individualistic or pluralistic, when applied not only to toleration as such, but also to the broader concept of liberalism as a form of government.

6. Although these motives are separate and distinct justifications for toleration, they are not always mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they may reinforce each other. See Mendus′s, Susan introduction to Mendus and Edwards, On Toleration, pp. 3–4. Mendus terms the three motives “prudence,” “rationality,” and “morality.Google Scholar”

7. It is worth noting in this connection, however, that the distinction between holding and expressing an opinion is easily eroded if a person is not prepared to lie in response to direct questioning or to perform acts that are inconsistent with his private convictions. See Strawson, “Limits of Toleration,” p. 46.

8. Contrary to what is usually assumed, it is this version of intellectual skepticism that supports J. S. Mill′s liberalism. Mill opposes the idea of public truth not becausesociety must have freedom of speech, but for the same reasonthat it must have freedom of speech, i.e., an assault on one definitive truth. For Mill, skepticism and tolerance are integrally connected. He thinks our choice is either never to silence or to declare ourselves infallible. See Kendall, “Open Society,” pp. 975–976; Strawson, “Limits of Toleration,” p. 50.

9. Newman, , “Idea of Religious Tolerance,” pp. 190–191.Google Scholar

10. Strawson, “Limits of Toleration,” p. 47.

11. For those who accept the Kantian criterion of universalizability, with the implied universality and absoluteness of moral principles, the impossibility of tolerance would apply here too. It has, however, been argued that one cannot draw a distinction between the moral and the nonmoral by contending that one is based on reason and the other on feeling. Morality itself is based on strong feelings, and the concept of morality would wither away and become lost in the concept of expediency if strong feelings or sentiment were not involved in the judgment that something is morally right or wrong. The conclusion is therefore drawn that no sharp line can be drawn between what I dislike and what I disapprove of. See Baroness Warnock′s article, “The Limits of Toleration,” chap. 7 in On Toleration, p. 126. However, Wamock also argues that there is no necessity to identify relativism (the belief that nothing is ultimately better or worse than anything else) with the belief that morality is based as much on feeling as reason, for some feelings may be better or more important (culturally, historically) than others.

12. According to R. M. Hare in Freedom and Reason(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 177, “what distinguishes the liberal is that he respectsthe ideals of others as he does his own. This does not mean he agrees with them-that would be logically impossible if they are different from his.” But if his and others′ conflict, “he will-in arbitrating between people′s interests and ideals, give as much weight to each person′s as to any other′s; he will not give his own ideals and interests preference because they are his own. It is only when somebody else′s pursuit interferes with others′ that this arbitration becomes necessary.” But Hare then continues: “He does not claim finality for his own ideal, though he may be sure that it is the best that he has discovered so far. He may even think that a diversity of ideals is in itself a good thing, not only because people are different and what they are likely to achieve is different but also, because it takes all sorts to make a world” (p. 180).

13. Thus, as Newman points out (“Idea of Religious Tolerance,” p. 188), when toleration is applied to moral positions or to rational argument, the concept need not necessarily represent a normative ideal. A person may criticize himself or others for merelytolerating what calls for stronger approval or respect, or for eventolerating something that calls for stronger measures of disapproval and denunciation.

14. Newman, loc. cit.; Strawson, “Limits of Toleration,” pp. 43–55.

15. Strawson, “Limits of Toleration,” p. 47.

16. Ibid, p. 49.

17. Ibid, p. 47.

18. See ′Avot 3:18. For further amplification of this theme, see Lichtenstein, Aaron, “The Dignity of Created Beings” (Hebrew), Mahanayim 5 (May 1993): 8–16;Google Scholar Menahem ′Elon, “Freedom of Expression and the Control of Minority Rights in Jewish Law,” Ibid, pp. 28–30, pars. 5–6. See also TB Kritot 6b: “Every fast-day in which the sinners of Israel do not participate is not a true fast-day, as we see from the case of the helbena(galbanum), which has a bad smell but is included by Scripture (Exodus 30:34) among the ingredients to be included in the incense to be offered in the service of the sanctuary”; the theme is elaborated upon in Derashot Ha-ran(Nissim b. Reuven of Gerondi), edited by L. A. Feldman (Jerusalem, 1973), first derasha, pp. 3ff.

19. For further amplification and sources, see ′Elon, “Freedom of Expression,” pp. 25–26. A spirit of pluralism based on such sources surely animates the toleration of diversity in the realm of halakhic practice exemplified in such contemporary rulings as R. Moshe Feinstein′s permitting the sale, during the year of shmita(the sabbatical year), of ′etrogim(citrons) produced in the framework of belief in heter mekhirah(the possibility of “selling” the land of Israel in order to obviate its lying fallow) even to those who do not accept this heter, since there is no violation of “placing a stumbling block before the blind” regarding anything that is done in accordance with the decision of a sage until a Sanhedrin actually rules against it (Igrot Moshe, Orah Hayim, vol. 1, sec. 186). That is, it is recognized here that the fragmentation of religious authority allows for many opinions. Compare the Responsa Mishnat Yosef, pt. 1, sec. 100. Another leading contemporary decisor, R. Eliezer Waldenberg, in his Responsa Tzitz Eliezer12, pt. 16, sec. 3, forbids practicing a humra(stringent measure) which will shame someone else who does not keep the same stringency. He wrote this in response to a query regarding the practice of the saintly Hafetz Hayim, who behaved in this manner regarding the eating of matzah sheruyah(moistened unleavened bread) on Passover; the questioner asked whether he was obligated to perform a hatarat nedarim(remission of vows) in this connection.Google Scholar

20. E.g., see R. Moshe Feinstein′s ruling in his Igrot Moshe, Orah Hayim, vol. 1, sec. 46, that although the Israeli flag is a symbol of the state of the wicked heretics who deny Jewish tradition, there is no ban on it, for there is nothing against placing a secular object in the synagogue. Therefore, it is not worth creating a dispute over something which is not actually forbidden. In this case, the imprudence of divisiveness overrides the distaste for the dissident. One source that might be construed as extending the toleration principle even further is TB Menahot 27a, which compares the obligation to bind together the ′arba′ minim(four species of plants blessed on Sukkot) to the obligation to bind together all types of Jews, which includes even the wicked among them. But the intent is most likely directed to tolerance of their persons, not of their wickedness per se.

21. E.g., see Maimonides′ opinion in his Guide of the Perplexed, III, chap. 51, regarding the second class of people surrounding the palace in search of the king. Since they hold wrong opinions, sometimes they must be slain and all memory of their opinions destroyed, so that they will not mislead others.

22. Rambam, Hilkhot Gerushin 2:2. See also Yaron, Philosophy of R. Kook, p. 327, and especially n. 13.

23. 23. TB Pesahim 113b; Shulhan ′Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 272:11.

24. Tanya′, pt. 1, chap. 32. For discussion of further references which mitigate the level of hatred one is obligated to harbor for the transgressor, see Yehudah ′Amital, “Regarding the Status of the Secular Jew in Our Days” (Hebrew), ′Alon Shvut le-Bogrei Yeshivat Har Etzyon, no. 6 (Elul 1988), pp. 11–12; Gafni, Mordecai, “The Halakhic Approach Toward Secularists” (Hebrew), Mahanayim, pp. 189–190, May, 1993Google Scholar.

25. Rambam, Hilkhot Rotzeah, end of chap. 4.

26. This disparity between halakhic legislation and its execution has been likened to the difference in style of fatherly and motherly upbringing. See ′Amital, “Regarding the Status of the Secular Jew,” pp. 9–10, and Gafni, “Halakhic Approach Towards Secularists,” pp. 200–201.

27. This separatism was expressed in prescribing the avoidance of social contact with such dissident Jews, not mourning or eulogizing them, banning them as kosher witnesses, and forbidding intermarriage with them. See the collected writings of Maharatz Hayot, vol. 2, Iggeret Kannaut, p. 908 and on.

28. R. Ya′aqov Ettlinger (1798–1891), in Responsa Binyan Zion ha-Hadashot10, sec. 23, rules that since many Sabbath transgressors even make Kiddush on Shabbat and pray, they cannot be regarded as deliberate Sabbath transgressors. Therefore one can be lenient regarding use of their wine, even though more stringent behavior is to be preferred. Precedent for taking into account the sinner′s own view of his behavior can be found in the stance of the Radvaz (Rabbi David ben Zimrah, 1479–1573) at the time of the Spanish expulsion, in a responsum regarding a certain maggidwho propounded views in the synagogue that confounded simple faith. The Radvaz ruled that the maggidwas absolved of guilt, since he had not arrived at his heresy willfully, but only through faulty reasoning. See Yesh′ayahu Leibowitz′s treatment of this responsum in “Two Conceptions of Toleration in Judaism” (Hebrew), in Emunah, Historiah ve-′Arahim(Jerusalem: Aqademon, 1982), p. 18. A similar line of reasoning can be found in a responsum of R. Aqiva Eiger, the rabbi of Posen at the end of the eighteenth century, who was asked whether someone who shaved with a razor could be regarded as a kosher witness. The answer: since this practice has become so widespread-for all our many sins-among so many Jews, many do not regard it as forbidden. Here too there is a recognition that if many Jews do not observe a certain mitzvah, this affects its religious-halakhic status, or at least promotes a more lenient evaluation of its transgression; i.e., an admission that a religious-social change stemming from the fact that many Jews are not keeping a certain mitzvah has the power to evoke a new attitude regarding those Jews which does not regard them as religious transgressors. But this responsum still relates to people who are in principle observant Jews, and have merely lapsed in regard to the observance of a particular mitzvah. Both responsa assume that Jewish society at large should be governed by halakhah in principle, and that even a massive number of transgressors must still be regarded as exceptions to the halakhic rule which governs society as a whole.

29. R. David Zvi Hoffman (in Responsa Melamed Leho′il1, 29) establishes that the transgressors cannot even qualify as public Sabbath desecrators. The definition of farhesiya(“public”) has changed, since it is now the majority that do not observe Shabbat. On the basis of this observation, he permits including them in a minyan, even though it is preferable to pray in another congregation if this can be done with creating offense.

30. A ruling by Maimonides that although it is a mitzvah to kill epiqorsimand mumarimwho deny the divinity of the Torah, the children of such dissenters are to be regarded as tinoqot shenishbuwho had no choice, serves as the basis for posqimin recent generations to regard current secularists leniently. The lack of choice stems from a recognition of the possibility of intellectual seduction. E.g., see R. Meir Simha Ha-cohen of Dvinsk (1843–1928) in Meshekh Hokhma, Shemot 3, 19, or R. Tzadoq Ha-cohen in Tzidqat ha-Tzaddiq, sec. 43. An even more ingenious and radical rationale for relating to modern heretics be- ′avotot ahavah(“lovingly”) rather than with tokhehah(“chastisement”), and not applying the law of kofrimto them, is suggested by the Hazon ′Ish (Yoreh De′ah, Hilkhot Shehitah 2, end of n. 16): i.e., the fact that Divine Providence is not evident in our day.

31. Hazon ′Ish′s commentary on Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot De′ot 6:3.

32. ′Orot(Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook,), pp. 73–74. [au. year of pub.?]Google Scholar

33. igrotR′ayahI (Jerusalem, 1962), pp. 58, 160–161.

34. For several examples of such criticism, see Ravitzky, Aviezer, Messianism, Zionism and Jewish Religious Radicalism(Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, Tel Aviv, 1993), p. 160Google Scholar

35. See Ahitov, Yosef, “The Attitude Towards Secularists” (Hebrew), in Be-Hevlei Massoret u-Temura(Rehovot, 1990), pp. 35–50.Google Scholar

36. Igrot R ′ayahI, pp. 20–21. Further development of this idea appears in R. Kook′s letter to the Ridbaz (Igrot R′ayahII, pp. 184–198). In this letter R. Kook also employs another metaphysical concept to justify his refusal to distance himself from the secular Zionists, i.e., the midrashic understanding of the ′erev rav(“mixed multitude”) as those who were destined to produce superior offspring in the generations that follow. The use of this notion relates to a kabbalistic dispute about whether the final redemption will be the result of a separation of the holy and the profane, or the sanctification of the profane and its elevation.

37. J grot R′ayah II, 170–171.

38. Ibid I, pp. 170–171, 368–370; ′“Al Bamoteinu Halalim,” Ma′amarei R′ayahI (Jerusalem, 1980), pp. 90–91.

39. Igrot R′ayah I, pp. 100–101.

40. Ibid, pp. 170–171, 100–101.

41. Ibid, p. 305.

42. For an expression of this view, see the letter R. Kook wrote to his parents in Igrot R ′ayahI, pp. 352–353, regarding the policy of those who opposed his approach to the secularists. (In this letter he displays great nobility and personal tolerance regarding his adversaries on this issue.)

43. ′“Al Bamoteinu Halalim,” pp. 89–93.

44. Yoreh De′ah 340:5.

45. IgrotR′ayahl, p.18.

46. Ibid, p. 19.

47. Ibid, pp. 19–21.

48. This is in contradiction to the view of some that R. Kook′s tolerance never goes beyond the status of post-factum (bedi′avad).E.g., see Ahitov, Yosef, “Reflections Regarding the Future of Relations with the Secularists” (Hebrew), in Be-Hevlei Massoret u-Temura, ed. Menahem Kahanah (Rehovot: Kivvunim, 1990), pp. 37–38.Google Scholar

49. ′Orotha-′Emunah(Jerusalem, 1985), pp. 66–67.

50. “Talelei ′Orot,” Ma′amarei R′ayahI, p. 26, sec. 8.

51. ′Orot ha-QodeshI (Jerusalem, 1963), pp. 176–177; ′Orot ha-′Emunah, pp. 67–68; ′Arpelei Tohar(Jerusalem, 1983), p. 62.Google Scholar

52. ′Eder ha-Yaqar(Jerusalem, 1963), p. 14.

53. Ibid, pp. 14–15. See also “Ma′amar Meyuhad,” in Ma′amarei R′ayahI, p. 105; Igrot R′ayah, pp. 192–193.

54. ′Orot ha-QodeshI, 22; ′Orot ha-Emunah, pp. 67–68.

55. ′Orot ha-QodeshIII (Jerusalem, 1964), introduction, p. 26.

56. ′Orot ha-Emunah, p. 21; ′Orot ha-QodeshHI, introduction, p. 44.

57. oOrot, pp. 73–74.

58. Igrot R′ayah, pp. 171–172.

59. ′Orot ha-Emunah, pp. 67–68.

60. E.g., see Ginzei R′ayah6 (Jerusalem, 1990), p. 151, where love of the rasha′is perceived as problematic because it could lead to a blurring of the distinction between the bearer of the wickedness and the wickedness itself.

61. Igrvt R′ayahI, 19–20.

62. ′Orot ha-QodeshIII, 282.

63. ′Arpelei Tohai;p. 18.

64. Ibid, p. 27.

65. Maimonides, for example, often differentiates ′emunot davar bilvad(theoretical opinions) and emunot ha-mevi′ot liyedei ma′aseh(opinions that lead to action). E.g., see Ma′amar Tehiyat ha-Metim, sec. 4; Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Sotah, chap. 3.

66. [grot R′ayah II, pp.184–198.

67. Ibid, p. 188.

68. Strawson, “Limits of Toleration,” p. 53.

69. Strawson, “Social Morality and Individual Ideal,” p. 44.

70. ′Ish-Shalom,-“Tolerance and Its Theoretical Basis,” p. 153.

71. See particularly his Appearance and Reality, 2nd ed. (London, 1897) and Essays on Truth and Reality(Oxford, 1914)

72. ′Orot ha-Emunah, pp. 23–24 (a parallel passage appears in ′Arpelei Tohar, p. 45).

73. Ibid, pp. 153–154.

74. The danger is intensified by the fact that R. Kook himself (Igrot R′ayahI, p. 47) describes the Jewish understanding of all human perceptions as “subjective and relative,” without adding any further distinctions.

75. ′Orot ha-QodeshII, p. 403; Ibid Ill, p. 327.

76. “Ne′edar ba-Qodesh,” Ma′amarei R′ayahII, p. 400.

77. Igrot R′ayah 1, p.164.

78. See Schweid, Judaism and the Solitary Jew, pp. 180–181, for a similar account.

79. ′Orot ha-QodeshI, pp. 17–18.

80. ′Ederha-Yaqar, p. 14.

81. ′Orot ha-QodeshIII, p. 327; see also ′Orot ha-QodeshII, p. 484.

82. ′Orot, pp. 130–131.

83. lgrotR′ayahI, pp. 19–21.

84. ′Ikvei ha-Tzon, pp. 147–148.

85. ′Orot, pp. 42^4, ′Orot ha-′Emunah, p. 105.

86. E.g., see R. Kook′s remarks on the status of the Jewish woman. The fact that Jewish society is composed of households and families, rather than individuals, as the basic unit guarantees the Jewish woman her unique position within her home, and spares her the need to resort to the indignities of political hustling (Igrot R′ayahIII, pp. 50–51).

87. ′Orot, pp. 130–131.

88. IgrotR′ayahI, pp. 19–20.

89. ′Orot, p. 152, sec. 2. This theme was also stressed by Mazzini, in delineating the nature of modem nationalism.

90. Ibid 64, sec. 10; “Talelei ′Orot,” Ma′amarei R′ayahI, p. 21; “Le-mahalah ha-′Ideiotbe-Yisrael,” ′Orot, p. 120.

91. ′Orot, pp. 129–130, 138; ′Olat R′ayahI, pp. 376–377. R. Kook′s view of knesset yisraelas the concentrate of all humanity is rooted in the special status that this concept has in qabbalistic symbolism, where knesset yisraelis equated with malhut, the lowest sefira, which serves as a final receptacle for the bounty of all the higher sefirotthat flow into it. This sefirais characterized by the fact that it has no special character of its own. Its lack of a distinguishing quality is just what allows it to best serve as a sponge for collecting all the others, for its own character poses no barrier.

92. ′Arpelei Tohai;pp. 3, 105–106; ′Orot ha-Teshuvah, chap. 5, sec. 2; ′Orot ha-QodeshIII, pp. 65–66; ′Orot, p. 138, sec. 3.

93. ′Olat R′ayahI, pp. 386–387.

94. ′Arpelei Tohar, pp. 56–57, 64; ′Orot, p. 138.

95. ′Ikveiha-Tzon(Jerusalem, 1963), pp. 124–125; ′Orot, pp. 63–64, sec. 9; IggerotR′ayahn, pp. 186–187.

96. ′Ilcvei ha-Tzon, pp. 147–148; Orot ha-QodeshIII, pp. 117–118; ′Olat R′ayahII, pp. 43–44; ′Orot ha-QodeshII, pp. 561–562.

97. ′Igrot RayahII, pp. 65–66; ′Orot, p. 144, sec. 3.

98. Ibid

99. This paradox parallels the paradox commonly attributed to liberalism: the liberal must be intolerant of the anti-liberal in the name of liberalism.

100. ′Arpelei Tohar, pp. 56–57; ′Orot ha-QodeshIII, pp. 349–350; “Ikvei ha-Tzon”, p. 123.

101. According to R. Kook, the Jewish people′s unique comprehensive quality of concentrating all powers and meshing them into one coherent whole gives rise to concomitant other qualities, just as one is not surprised that the brain and heart of the individual organism exhibit manifestations of life that are not found in the rest of the body (′Orot, p. 138, sec. 2). Because they contain all tendencies, the Jewish people are more prone to inner conflict. For the same reason, they are more self-sufficient, (Ibid, p. 169). Another difference is the creative power of the history and culture of the Jewish people. The national cultures of other nations merely rearrange what already exists in various forms and constellations; they describe and preserve. But Jewish creativity is ex nihilo, true innovation (′Orot ha-QodeshIII, pp. 67–69). This is similar to the view of R. Yehudah Halevi, who also held that Israel′s uniqueness did consist in its comprising an organism separate from the rest Of humanity, but rather in its serving as the heart of the general universal organism. There is no room for questions of equality within an organism, because all parts of the hierarchy work together for the common good. It is only when the various elements are viewed in partial, individual terms that there is room for talk of inequity.

102. ′Orot, p. 156, sec. 11.

103. ′Igrot R′ayah I, pp. 100–101.

104. ′Orot, pp. 73–74; ′Iggerot R′ayahI, pp. 48^*9.

105. For a modified version of the more usual suggestion of a modus vivendibetween the religious and secular camps, which works in reverse (appealing to the religious on prudential grounds, in the interest of social cohesion, and to the secularists in terms of their ideological commitment to pluralism), see Hed, “Two Concepts of Liberalism,” pp. 183–184.

106. ′Igrot R′ayah I, p.311.

107. For a discussion of this exchange, see Shatz, Rivka, “R. Kook′s Stand Regarding the Question of Religious Legislation in 1920” (Hebrew), Kivvunim 33 (1986): 101–104.Google Scholar

108. If the son′s behavior is any measure of the father′s policy, it is worth noting that R. Zvi Yehudah objected to nonobservant visitors donning a head covering merely out of deference to him when such practice was unaccompanied by inner conviction. He was also a card-carrying member of the League Against Religious Coercion until he became convinced that his unlikely colleagues had no comparable objection to the coercion of secular practices. See Yaron, Philosophy of R. Kook, p. 337, n. 40.

109. For one of the earliest systematic presentations of this argument, see Locke′s Epistola de Tolerantia, published in 1688. This most likely served as the subsequent basis for viewing autonomous decision as a necessary prerequisite of morality in Kantian ethics.

110. For sources, see Sagie, “Jewish Religion.”

111. As proposed by Yesh′ayahu Leibowitz in his writings. See also Agassi, Joseph, Religion and Nationality: Toward an Israeli National Identity(Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Papyrus, 1984).Google Scholar

112. Seen. 22.

113. Naphtali Berlin makes the same conjecture regarding Yehudah′s, R. Zvi position in “Why Did R. Zvi Yehudah Join the League Against Religious Coercion?” (Hebrew), Mahshevet ha-Dor, no. 1 (Jerusalem: Hamahon le-Limmud ve-′Iyyun be-Mishnat ha-R′ayah Kook Zatzal, 1991), pp. 21–23.Google Scholar

114. For a more extensive account of communitarianism and its critique of liberalism, see Taylor, Charles, “Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate.” in Liberalism and the Moral Life, ed. Nancy Rosenblum, L. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989);Google ScholarBuchanan, Allen E., “Assessing the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism,” Ethics 99 (July 1989): 852–882.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

115. Goldman, Eliezer, “The Structuring of Rabbi Kook′s Thought (1906–1909)” (Hebrew), Bar Ilan Annual 23 (1987): 115–116.Google Scholar

116. Duquette, David D., “Liberal Purposes and Community” (Paper presented at the Ninth Annual Social Philosophy Conference, Davidson College, North Carolina, August 1992).Google Scholar

117. See Sagie, “Jewish Religion.”