The Ethiopian experiment stands out among the burgeoning Afro-Marxist states which have sprung up since about 1976. Its uniqueness does not lie in the fact that the revolution which spawned it had its roots in historic feudalism (although this has given it a somewhat unique character), nor does its uniqueness result from being an uncommon example of an attempt to build a state socialist society in the Third World. There are others-among them Viet Nam, Cuba, Benin, Angola, and Mozambique (Young, 1982; Ottaway and Ottaway, 1981). In fact with the decline of the Soviet Union's ability to impose ideological conformity on its clients and allies in the post-World War II era, Third World states have found it increasingly easy to adapt the Marxist-Leninist model devised by the Soviets to fit their own countries' objective conditions as they interpret them. Furthermore, the Ethiopia experiment is not any more successful than other such experiments in the Third World.

Ethiopia's efforts to build a new socialist society are primarily of interest because it seems to be moving toward state socialism despite the architects of this transformation viewing this process more as a means to an end than as an end in itself. The higher goal is clearly the legitimation of the vanguard role of the “men in uniform.” The priority assigned to maintaining a central role in the revolution for elements of the military is evidenced in the manner in which the long-promised vanguard party of workers, peasants, and revolutionary intellectuals was formed between 1979 and 1984.

The government of Zimbabwe has publicly committed itself to a development strategy which it terms “Growth With Equity.” At least two official policy documents articulate the strategy: Growth With Equity (1981) and The Transitional National Development Plan: 1982/83-1984/85 (1982; hereafter TNDP). The theme appears frequently as well in the semi-official press and in Zimbabwe News, a publication of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) party. In each, the government claims that Growth With Equity will move the country away from the capitalist socio-economic system it inherited to a socialist order better able to redress the extreme racial and class inequities which were Rhodesia. Transformation is the watchword.

The degree to which the strategy will transform Zimbabwe-indeed, the degree to which it is even intended to do so-draws increasingly skeptical commentary. From the ranks of neoclassical economists comes the critique that Growth With Equity sets over-high standards and is technically unfeasible (EIU Special Report, 1981). Mainstream development theorists call attention to the moderate-reformist aspects of the strategy which predict a Fabian socialist future (Bratton, 1981). Radicals, once quite willing to give the Mugabe government the benefit of doubt, are becoming disillusioned; the most promising aspect of Growth With Equity, some say, is its Gramscian logic (Saul, 1980; The Review of African Political Economy, 1980; Bush and Cliff, 1984).

There is no dearth of Zimbabwe-watching and no shortage of opinion on the country's development prospects.

Increasing attention has been paid to population growth in the Third World. Although it is commonly held that mortality decline has been responsible for the population increases that have occurred, in many instances fertility has contributed significantly to the population increases as well. Many traditional societies have relatively high fertility rates, but they are still often below the potential maximum. Fertility in these pre-modern societies has been held in check by health conditions of the society, by prolonged breastfeeding, and by sexual restraint, particularly after the birth of a child (Lesthaeghe, 1981: 3–23). The move from a traditional to a more modern society can mean increased health care and better nutritional status, both of which may improve the health of the mother and child and lead to increased fecundity and higher fertility. In addition, the relaxation of postnatal sexual abstinence and the decrease in the length of lactation which usually accompanies this transition can lead to shorter birth intervals and higher fertility levels. The time lag between the effects of fertility-increasing factors and the changes in values and norms which favor smaller family size allows rapid population growth to occur.

Evidence for this pattern of fertility increase can be found in many Third World countries (Nag, 1981). In Africa, for example, a rise in fertility during the beginning stages of modernization has been documented in Zaire (Romaniuk, 1980), Nigeria (Olusanya, 1969), and Sudan (Henin, 1969). In each case, the rise has been accounted for through the spread of social and economic change.

The study of Malawi's colonial history has been dominated by the establishment of British rule, the spread of Christian mission influence, and the development of nationalism, among other themes. Perhaps due to the Whiggish approach to history which has influenced many historians of colonial Malawi, critical issues such as ethnic awareness–which was developing in a pronounced way at the same time as the expansion of mission schools and the evolution of national feelings-have been neglected until recently (Vail, 1983: White, 1983). It appears that ethnic awareness has been taken for granted and accepted without a proper understanding of it. This article discusses ethnicity in the old North Nyasa district in the period 1891-1938. It demonstrates how the economic and political changes which took place in the region in the first three decades of the establishment of colonial rule promoted ethnic tension, and it argues that the indirect rule system (which assumed that the African was a tribal man, inward-looking, with a primary loyalty to so-called traditional authority) was not only divisive, but also a major catalyst for greater ethnicity. It also argues that through certain educational practices which tended to discriminate against some peoples of the region, a number of Karonga-based missionaries of the Livingstonia Synod encouraged the growth of this phenomenon. The article, like some recent studies (Ilifte, 1979: 318–41; Ranger, 1979) pays particular attention to the role played by the elites of North Nyasa in the heightening of ethnicity in the district.

Claude Ake (1982: 8, 3), in his Presidential Address to the 1982 Convention of the Nigerian Political Science Association, criticized Nigerian society, politics, and state behavior in damning terms:

A predatory capitalism has bred misery, turned politics into warfare and all but arrested the development of productive forces. The Nigerian ruling class has assaulted the masses with physical and psychological violence and thwarted their aspirations, particularly their escape from underdevelopment and poverty.

Legitimacy has receded to the background, making way for relations of raw power and the perception of right as being coextensive with might.

Ake's views reflect a common perception that the Nigerian state survives by coercion as other means of gaining the compliance of the populace-the capacity to create a legitimating consciousness or utilitarian pay-offs-have proven ineffective, or have been wasted by a rapacious ruling class and its clients. Coercion, of course, means the police and the military.

This paper focuses on the control and autonomy of coercion, concretely examined as the actions of the police, in the political economy of Nigeria. Who controls the police and how autonomous are they as an organization and as individuals? The paper argues that the state and the police are relatively autonomous from class control; that the police have interests of their own which will influence both what they do or refuse to do; and that the police are a very weak reed for the ruling class to relay upon.

Since the dawn of history, mankind has developed a variety of practices which are intricately related to complex social orders and to traditional codes of behavior. Over the years many of these, especially those with harmful effects, were gradually abandoned while others remained. One of those which still survives is the practice of female circumcision with its long past and its serious health complications (Taba, 1980: 21).

There is no conclusive evidence to indicate where female circumcision first originated and how it was initially performed. Circumcized females have been discovered among the mummies of ancient Egyptians. Herodotus, the Greek historian, found the Egyptians practicing male and female circumcision when he visited their country around the middle of the fifth century B.C. A Greek papyrus in the British Museum, dated 163 B. C., refers to operations performed on girls in Memphis at the age when they received their dowries. Strabo, the Greek geographer, also reported circumcision of girls as a custom he found when visiting Egypt in 25 B. C. (Hosken, 1982). More recently, the German traveller Niebuhr, the sole survivor of a European scientific expedition to Arabia, Egypt, and Syria in the late 1700s, reported that this operation was fairly prevalent (Taba, 1980: 21). Such noted explorers as Sir Richard Burton and Sir Samuel White Baker described female circumcision in their writings from the 1800s (Hosken, 1982).