In “Some Remarks on Extending and Interpreting Theories with a Partial Truth Predicate”, Reinhardt [21] famously proposed an instrumentalist interpretation of the truth theory Kripke–Feferman ( $\mathrm {KF}$ ) in analogy to Hilbert’s program. Reinhardt suggested to view $\mathrm {KF}$ as a tool for generating “the significant part of $\mathrm {KF}$ ”, that is, as a tool for deriving sentences of the form $\mathrm{Tr}\ulcorner {\varphi }\urcorner $ . The constitutive question of Reinhardt’s program was whether it was possible “to justify the use of nonsignificant sentences entirely within the framework of significant sentences”. This question was answered negatively by Halbach & Horsten [10] but we argue that under a more careful interpretation the question may receive a positive answer. To this end, we propose to shift attention from $\mathrm {KF}$ -provably true sentences to $\mathrm {KF}$ -provably true inferences, that is, we shall identify the significant part of $\mathrm {KF}$ with the set of pairs $\langle {\Gamma , \Delta }\rangle $ , such that $\mathrm {KF}$ proves that if all members of $\Gamma $ are true, at least one member of $\Delta $ is true. In way of addressing Reinhardt’s question we show that the provably true inferences of suitable $\mathrm {KF}$ -like theories coincide with the provable sequents of matching versions of the theory Partial Kripke–Feferman ( $\mathrm {PKF}$ ).

The language of linear temporal logic can be interpreted on the class of dynamic topological systems, giving rise to the intuitionistic temporal logic ${\sf ITL}^{\sf c}_{\Diamond \forall }$ , recently shown to be decidable by Fernández-Duque. In this article we axiomatize this logic, some fragments, and prove completeness for several familiar spaces.

Any intermediate propositional logic (i.e., a logic including intuitionistic logic and contained in classical logic) can be extended to a calculus with epsilon- and tau-operators and critical formulas. For classical logic, this results in Hilbert’s $\varepsilon $ -calculus. The first and second $\varepsilon $ -theorems for classical logic establish conservativity of the $\varepsilon $ -calculus over its classical base logic. It is well known that the second $\varepsilon $ -theorem fails for the intuitionistic $\varepsilon $ -calculus, as prenexation is impossible. The paper investigates the effect of adding critical $\varepsilon $ - and $\tau $ -formulas and using the translation of quantifiers into $\varepsilon $ - and $\tau $ -terms to intermediate logics. It is shown that conservativity over the propositional base logic also holds for such intermediate ${\varepsilon \tau }$ -calculi. The “extended” first $\varepsilon $ -theorem holds if the base logic is finite-valued Gödel–Dummett logic, and fails otherwise, but holds for certain provable formulas in infinite-valued Gödel logic. The second $\varepsilon $ -theorem also holds for finite-valued first-order Gödel logics. The methods used to prove the extended first $\varepsilon $ -theorem for infinite-valued Gödel logic suggest applications to theories of arithmetic.

In this paper I argue for an association between impurity and explanatory power in contemporary mathematics. This proposal is defended against the ancient and influential idea that purity and explanation go hand-in-hand (Aristotle, Bolzano) and recent suggestions that purity/impurity ascriptions and explanatory power are more or less distinct (Section 1). This is done by analyzing a central and deep result of additive number theory, Szemerédi’s theorem, and various of its proofs (Section 2). In particular, I focus upon the radically impure (ergodic) proof due to Furstenberg (Section 3). Furstenberg’s ergodic proof is striking because it utilizes intuitively foreign and infinitary resources to prove a finitary combinatorial result and does so in a perspicuous fashion. I claim that Furstenberg’s proof is explanatory in light of its clear expression of a crucial structural result, which provides the “reason why” Szemerédi’s theorem is true. This is, however, rather surprising: how can such intuitively different conceptual resources “get a grip on” the theorem to be proved? I account for this phenomenon by articulating a new construal of the content of a mathematical statement, which I call structural content (Section 4). I argue that the availability of structural content saves intuitive epistemic distinctions made in mathematical practice and simultaneously explicates the intervention of surprising and explanatorily rich conceptual resources. Structural content also disarms general arguments for thinking that impurity and explanatory power might come apart. Finally, I sketch a proposal that, once structural content is in hand, impure resources lead to explanatory proofs via suitably understood varieties of simplification and unification (Section 5).

The Gödel translation provides an embedding of the intuitionistic logic $\mathsf {IPC}$ into the modal logic $\mathsf {Grz}$ , which then embeds into the modal logic $\mathsf {GL}$ via the splitting translation. Combined with Solovay’s theorem that $\mathsf {GL}$ is the modal logic of the provability predicate of Peano Arithmetic $\mathsf {PA}$ , both $\mathsf {IPC}$ and $\mathsf {Grz}$ admit provability interpretations. When attempting to ‘lift’ these results to the monadic extensions $\mathsf {MIPC}$ , $\mathsf {MGrz}$ , and $\mathsf {MGL}$ of these logics, the same techniques no longer work. Following a conjecture made by Esakia, we add an appropriate version of Casari’s formula to these monadic extensions (denoted by a ‘+’), obtaining that the Gödel translation embeds $\mathsf {M^{+}IPC}$ into $\mathsf {M^{+}Grz}$ and the splitting translation embeds $\mathsf {M^{+}Grz}$ into $\mathsf {MGL}$ . As proven by Japaridze, Solovay’s result extends to the monadic system $\mathsf {MGL}$ , which leads us to a provability interpretation of both $\mathsf {M^{+}IPC}$ and $\mathsf {M^{+}Grz}$ .

Alongside the analogy between maximal ideals and complete theories, the Jacobson radical carries over from ideals of commutative rings to theories of propositional calculi. This prompts a variant of Lindenbaum’s Lemma that relates classical validity and intuitionistic provability, and the syntactical counterpart of which is Glivenko’s Theorem. The Jacobson radical in fact turns out to coincide with the classical deductive closure. As a by-product we obtain a possible interpretation in logic of the axioms-as-rules conservation criterion for a multi-conclusion Scott-style entailment relation over a single-conclusion one.

Kreisel’s conjecture is the statement: if, for all $n\in \mathbb {N}$ , $\mathop {\text {PA}} \nolimits \vdash _{k \text { steps}} \varphi (\overline {n})$ , then $\mathop {\text {PA}} \nolimits \vdash \forall x.\varphi (x)$ . For a theory of arithmetic T, given a recursive function h, $T \vdash _{\leq h} \varphi $ holds if there is a proof of $\varphi $ in T whose code is at most $h(\#\varphi )$ . This notion depends on the underlying coding. ${P}^h_T(x)$ is a predicate for $\vdash _{\leq h}$ in T. It is shown that there exist a sentence $\varphi $ and a total recursive function h such that $T\vdash _{\leq h}\mathop {\text {Pr}} \nolimits _T(\ulcorner \mathop {\text {Pr}} \nolimits _T(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner )\rightarrow \varphi \urcorner )$ , but , where $\mathop {\text {Pr}} \nolimits _T$ stands for the standard provability predicate in T. This statement is related to a conjecture by Montagna. Also variants and weakenings of Kreisel’s conjecture are studied. By the use of reflexion principles, one can obtain a theory $T^h_\Gamma $ that extends T such that a version of Kreisel’s conjecture holds: given a recursive function h and $\varphi (x)$ a $\Gamma $ -formula (where $\Gamma $ is an arbitrarily fixed class of formulas) such that, for all $n\in \mathbb {N}$ , $T\vdash _{\leq h} \varphi (\overline {n})$ , then $T^h_\Gamma \vdash \forall x.\varphi (x)$ . Derivability conditions are studied for a theory to satisfy the following implication: if , then $T\vdash \forall x.\varphi (x)$ . This corresponds to an arithmetization of Kreisel’s conjecture. It is shown that, for certain theories, there exists a function h such that $\vdash _{k \text { steps}}\ \subseteq\ \vdash _{\leq h}$ .

We devise imperative programming languages for verified real number computation where real numbers are provided as abstract data types such that the users of the languages can express real number computation by considering real numbers as abstract mathematical entities. Unlike other common approaches toward real number computation, based on an algebraic model that lacks implementability or transcendental computation, or finite-precision approximation such as using double precision computation that lacks a formal foundation, our languages are devised based on computable analysis, a foundation of rigorous computation over continuous data. Consequently, the users of the language can easily program real number computation and reason about the behaviours of their programs, relying on their mathematical knowledge of real numbers without worrying about artificial roundoff errors. As the languages are imperative, we adopt precondition–postcondition-style program specification and Hoare-style program verification methodologies. Consequently, the users of the language can easily program a computation over real numbers, specify the expected behaviour of the program, including termination, and prove the correctness of the specification. Furthermore, we suggest extending the languages with other interesting continuous data, such as matrices, continuous real functions, et cetera.

Abstract taken directly from the thesis.

E-mail: sewonpark17@gmail.com

URL: https://sewonpark.com/thesis

The dissertation introduces new sequent-calculi for free first- and second-order logic, and a hyper-sequent calculus for modal logics K, D, T, B, S4, and S5; to attain the calculi for the stronger modal logics, only external structural rules need to be added to the calculus for K, while operational and internal structural rules remain the same. Completeness and cut-elimination are proved for all calculi presented.

Philosophically, the dissertation develops an inferentialist, or proof-theoretic, theory of meaning. It takes as a starting point that the sense of a sentence is determined by the rules governing its use. In particular, there are two features of the use of a sentence that jointly determine its sense, the conditions under which it is coherent to assert that sentence and the conditions under which it is coherent to deny that sentence. The dissertation develops a theory of quantification as marking coherent ways a language can be expanded and modality as the means by which we can reflect on the norms governing the assertion and denial conditions of our language. If the view of quantification that is argued for is correct, then there is no tension between second-order quantification and nominalism. In particular, the ontological commitments one can incur through the use of a quantifier depend wholly on the ontological commitments one can incur through the use of atomic sentences. The dissertation concludes by applying the developed theory of meaning to the metaphysical issue of necessitism and contingentism. Two objections to a logic of contingentism are raised and addressed. The resulting logic is shown to meet all the requirement that the dissertation lays out for a theory of meaning for quantifiers and modal operators.

Abstract prepared by Andrew Parisi

E-mail: andrew.p.parisi@gmail.com

URL: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/dissertations/1480/

The thin set theorem for n-tuples and k colors ( $\operatorname {\mathrm {\sf {TS}}}^n_k$ ) states that every k-coloring of $[\mathbb {N}]^n$ admits an infinite set of integers H such that $[H]^n$ avoids at least one color. In this paper, we study the combinatorial weakness of the thin set theorem in reverse mathematics by proving neither $\operatorname {\mathrm {\sf {TS}}}^n_k$ , nor the free set theorem ( $\operatorname {\mathrm {\sf {FS}}}^n$ ) imply the Erdős–Moser theorem ( $\operatorname {\mathrm {\sf {EM}}}$ ) whenever k is sufficiently large (answering a question of Patey and giving a partial result towards a question of Cholak Giusto, Hirst and Jockusch). Given a problem $\mathsf {P}$ , a computable instance of $\mathsf {P}$ is universal iff its solution computes a solution of any other computable $\mathsf {P}$ -instance. It has been established that most of Ramsey-type problems do not have a universal instance, but the case of Erdős–Moser theorem remained open so far. We prove that Erdős–Moser theorem does not admit a universal instance (answering a question of Patey).

In the literature, predicativism is connected not only with the Vicious Circle Principle but also with the idea that certain totalities are inherently potential. To explain the connection between these two aspects of predicativism, we explore some approaches to predicativity within the modal framework for potentiality developed in Linnebo (2013) and Linnebo and Shapiro (2019). This puts predicativism into a more general framework and helps to sharpen some of its key theses.

In [20] Krajíček and Pudlák discovered connections between problems in computational complexity and the lengths of first-order proofs of finite consistency statements. Later Pudlák [25] studied more statements that connect provability with computational complexity and conjectured that they are true. All these conjectures are at least as strong as $\mathsf {P}\neq \mathsf {NP}$ [23–25].One of the problems concerning these conjectures is to find out how tightly they are connected with statements about computational complexity classes. Results of this kind had been proved in [20, 22].In this paper, we generalize and strengthen these results. Another question that we address concerns the dependence between these conjectures. We construct two oracles that enable us to answer questions about relativized separations asked in [19, 25] (i.e., for the pairs of conjectures mentioned in the questions, we construct oracles such that one conjecture from the pair is true in the relativized world and the other is false and vice versa). We also show several new connections between the studied conjectures. In particular, we show that the relation between the finite reflection principle and proof systems for existentially quantified Boolean formulas is similar to the one for finite consistency statements and proof systems for non-quantified propositional tautologies.

We study from the proof complexity perspective the (informal) proof search problem (cf. [17, Sections 1.5 and 21.5]):

• • Is there an optimal way to search for propositional proofs?

We note that, as a consequence of Levin’s universal search, for any fixed proof system there exists a time-optimal proof search algorithm. Using classical proof complexity results about reflection principles we prove that a time-optimal proof search algorithm exists without restricting proof systems iff a p-optimal proof system exists.

To characterize precisely the time proof search algorithms need for individual formulas we introduce a new proof complexity measure based on algorithmic information concepts. In particular, to a proof system P we attach information-efficiency function $i_P(\tau )$ assigning to a tautology a natural number, and we show that:

• • $i_P(\tau )$ characterizes time any P-proof search algorithm has to use on $\tau $ ,

• • for a fixed P there is such an information-optimal algorithm (informally: it finds proofs of minimal information content),

• • a proof system is information-efficiency optimal (its information-efficiency function is minimal up to a multiplicative constant) iff it is p-optimal,

• • for non-automatizable systems P there are formulas $\tau $ with short proofs but having large information measure $i_P(\tau )$ .

We isolate and motivate the problem to establish unconditional super-logarithmic lower bounds for $i_P(\tau )$ where no super-polynomial size lower bounds are known. We also point out connections of the new measure with some topics in proof complexity other than proof search.

In this paper we examine various requirements on the formalisation choices under which self-reference can be adequately formalised in arithmetic. In particular, we study self-referential numberings, which immediately provide a strong notion of self-reference even for expressively weak languages. The results of this paper suggest that the question whether truly self-referential reasoning can be formalised in arithmetic is more sensitive to the underlying coding apparatus than usually believed. As a case study, we show how this sensitivity affects the formal study of certain principles of self-referential truth.

This paper is dedicated to extending and adapting to modal logic the approach of fractional semantics to classical logic. This is a multi-valued semantics governed by pure proof-theoretic considerations, whose truth-values are the rational numbers in the closed interval $[0,1]$. Focusing on the modal logic K, the proposed methodology relies on three key components: bilateral sequent calculus, invertibility of the logical rules, and stability (proof-invariance). We show that our semantic analysis of K affords an informational refinement with respect to the standard Kripkean semantics (a new proof of Dugundji’s theorem is a case in point) and it raises the prospect of a proof-theoretic semantics for modal logic.

There has been a recent interest in hierarchical generalizations of classic incompleteness results. This paper provides evidence that such generalizations are readily obtainable from suitably formulated hierarchical versions of the principles used in the original proofs. By collecting such principles, we prove hierarchical versions of Mostowski’s theorem on independent formulae, Kripke’s theorem on flexible formulae, Woodin’s theorem on the universal algorithm, and a few related results. As a corollary, we obtain the expected result that the formula expressing “ $\mathrm {T}$ is $\Sigma _n$ -ill” is a canonical example of a $\Sigma _{n+1}$ formula that is $\Pi _{n+1}$ -conservative over $\mathrm {T}$ .

We present a new manifestation of Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem and discuss its foundational significance, in particular with respect to Hilbert’s program. Specifically, we consider a proper extension of Peano arithmetic ($\mathbf {PA}$) by a mathematically meaningful axiom scheme that consists of $\Sigma ^0_2$-sentences. These sentences assert that each computably enumerable ($\Sigma ^0_1$-definable without parameters) property of finite binary trees has a finite basis. Since this fact entails the existence of polynomial time algorithms, it is relevant for computer science. On a technical level, our axiom scheme is a variant of an independence result due to Harvey Friedman. At the same time, the meta-mathematical properties of our axiom scheme distinguish it from most known independence results: Due to its logical complexity, our axiom scheme does not add computational strength. The only known method to establish its independence relies on Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem. In contrast, Gödel’s theorem is not needed for typical examples of $\Pi ^0_2$-independence (such as the Paris–Harrington principle), since computational strength provides an extensional invariant on the level of $\Pi ^0_2$-sentences.

The paper provides a proof theoretic characterization of the Russellian theory of definite descriptions (RDD) as characterized by Kalish, Montague and Mar (KMM). To this effect three sequent calculi are introduced: LKID0, LKID1 and LKID2. LKID0 is an auxiliary system which is easily shown to be equivalent to KMM. The main research is devoted to LKID1 and LKID2. The former is simpler in the sense of having smaller number of rules and, after small change, satisfies cut elimination but fails to satisfy the subformula property. In LKID2 an additional analysis of different kinds of identities leads to proliferation of rules but yields the subformula property. This refined proof theoretic analysis leading to fully analytic calculus with constructive proof of cut elimination is the main contribution of the paper.

Inferentialism is a theory in the philosophy of language which claims that the meanings of expressions are constituted by inferential roles or relations. Instead of a traditional model-theoretic semantics, it naturally lends itself to a proof-theoretic semantics, where meaning is understood in terms of inference rules with a proof system. Most work in proof-theoretic semantics has focused on logical constants, with comparatively little work on the semantics of non-logical vocabulary. Drawing on Robert Brandom’s notion of material inference and Greg Restall’s bilateralist interpretation of the multiple conclusion sequent calculus, I present a proof-theoretic semantics for atomic sentences and their constituent names and predicates. The resulting system has several interesting features: (1) the rules are harmonious and stable; (2) the rules create a structure analogous to familiar model-theoretic semantics; and (3) the semantics is compositional, in that the rules for atomic sentences are determined by those for their constituent names and predicates.

Akama et al. [1] systematically studied an arithmetical hierarchy of the law of excluded middle and related principles in the context of first-order arithmetic. In that paper, they first provide a prenex normal form theorem as a justification of their semi-classical principles restricted to prenex formulas. However, there are some errors in their proof. In this paper, we provide a simple counterexample of their prenex normal form theorem [1, Theorem 2.7], then modify it in an appropriate way which still serves to largely justify the arithmetical hierarchy. In addition, we characterize a variety of prenex normal form theorems by logical principles in the arithmetical hierarchy. The characterization results reveal that our prenex normal form theorems are optimal. For the characterization results, we establish a new conservation theorem on semi-classical arithmetic. The theorem generalizes a well-known fact that classical arithmetic is $\Pi _2$ -conservative over intuitionistic arithmetic.