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8 - Mexico – Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services (WT/DS204/R): A Comment on “El mess in TELMEX”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 July 2010

Damien J. Neven
Affiliation:
Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva and Centre for Economic Policy Research, London
Petros C. Mavroidis
Affiliation:
Columbia Law School, New York and University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland
Henrik Horn
Affiliation:
Stockholms Universitet
Petros C. Mavroidis
Affiliation:
Université de Neuchâtel, Switzerland
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Summary

Introduction

This chapter reviews the panel report on Mexico – Measures Affecting Telecommunication Services. The Panel considered claims by the United States that Mexico acted inconsistently with its obligations in respect to the liberalization of its market for telecommunication services. It is the first Panel to consider solely the rules agreed upon in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). It is also the first Panel to deal with the telecommunication services industry and its complex layers of legislation, in particular the rules agreed to in the Telecommunications Reference Paper (TRP) on pro-competitive regulatory principles. Viewed from this perspective, this report is, because of its potential as a precedent, of particular significance.

This case essentially revolves around the question of under what conditions foreign telecom operators can terminate calls in Mexico. The United States argued that the Mexican regulation of termination charges was not in conformity with the obligations contained in the TRP. It argued in particular that the termination charges were not cost-oriented and that Mexico had set up a cartel of telecom operators.

The following section of this chapter, Section 2, briefly discusses the Mexican regulation in dispute from an economic perspective and presents the legal framework of the dispute, focusing on the relevant provisions of the TRP. Section 3 analyzes whether and how the termination charges can be covered by the TRP. In this section, we first observe that the US operators do not supply cross-border services under mode 1, as the Panel stated in its report.

Type
Chapter
Information
The WTO Case Law of 2003
The American Law Institute Reporters' Studies
, pp. 188 - 219
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2006

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References

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