Flying blind: A policy bureaucrat's predicament

Most democratic governments have a well-established norm concerning ‘politics’ and ‘bureaucracy’ in the executive branch: ministers set goals and assign priorities whereas civil servants advise them and strive to implement ministerial and cabinet decisions. Decades of research into the relations between politics and administration in numerous countries have shown that this norm is alive and well, but, at the same time, it does not accurately describe practice at either the national or local government levels (Savoie 2003; Peters 2001; 't Hart and Wille 2006). Politicians cannot keep track of, let alone explicitly direct, everything their vast, complex, highly specialized bureaucracies are involved in. Hence many officials, even those working in governmental departments that are relatively close to the political executives, spend a lot of time and energy anticipating, second-guessing or actively seeking ‘a steer’ from their superiors, who, in turn, will seek to obtain ministerial guidance (Page and Jenkins 2005). The further away from the political centre civil servants operate, the more fictitious the idea becomes that their work is dictated by explicit political decisions or directions.

Many civil servants in service delivery agencies, particularly ‘street-level bureaucrats’ have learned to cope with this, to the extent that they would regard political ‘micromanagement’ of their day-to-day work processes as highly undesirable interference in their professional domain (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003). But, for departmental civil servants, acting without a clear sense of political direction amounts to ‘flying blind.’ What should they be engaged in when politicians don't know, don't care, or don't lead? What coping mechanisms have they developed for dealing with this normatively anomalous situation? And what does this mean for the shaping of public policy and for the nature of the politics-administration nexus within the executive branch?

These are the questions that inspired this chapter. To explore it empirically, we have chosen what we regard as a clear-cut case of civil servants working in a ‘political leadership vacuum’: the policy work engaged in by national officials who participate in processes of international governance in ‘low politics,’ ‘technocratic’ areas. We shall present an in-depth study of Dutch officials who are involved in cooperative European policing efforts. Below, we briefly introduce the case, its relevance for our present purposes, and the research methods used to study it.