For the past decade and a half Christopher Fuchs and Rüdiger Schack (originally in collaboration with Carlton Caves) have been developing a new way to think about quantum mechanics. Fuchs and Schack have called it Qbism [2]. Their term originally stood for “quantum Bayesianism.” But QBism is a way of thinking about science quite generally, not just quantum physics [3], and it is pertinent even when probabilistic judgments, and therefore “Bayesianism,” play no role at all. I nevertheless retain the term QBism, both to acknowledge the history behind it, and because a secondary meaning remains apt in the broader context: QBism is as big a break with 20th-century ways of thinking about science as cubism was with 19th-century ways of thinking about art.

QBism maintains that my understanding of the world rests entirely on the experiences that the world has induced in me throughout the course of my life. Nothing beyond my personal experience underlies the picture that I have formed of my own external world. This is a statement of empiricism. But it is empiricism taken more seriously than most scientists are willing to do.

To state that my understanding of the world rests on my experience is not to say that my world exists only within my head, as recent popularizations of QBism have wrongly asserted [4]. Among the ingredients from which I construct my picture of my external world is the impact of that world on my experience, when it responds to the actions that I take on it.