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4 - International Forces

from PART II - EXPLAINING FAILURES

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2015

Pippa Norris
Affiliation:
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Massachusetts
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Summary

In recent decades, a growing body of literature in international relations and comparative politics has focused upon the role of external actors seeking to strengthen regime transitions, processes of democratization, and the quality of elections. This approach seeks to assess the impact arising from the engagement of an alphabet soup of the UN agencies and bureaus, regional intergovernmental organizations, and bilateral donors working on elections in many countries facing extremely challenging structural conditions. These organization deploy a range of “carrots and sticks” designed to build local capacity, to strengthen electoral authorities and processes, to incentivize recalcitrant rulers, to persuade disgruntled losers to accept the outcome without resort to violence, and to monitor that elections meet international norms of electoral integrity. The international perspective is essentially a model about “exporting” democracy, emphasizing the active role of the West (especially the foreign and developmental policies followed by the United States and Europe) over the rest. But at the same time this approach is largely silent about the black box of exactly what is imported, how reforms are implemented, and what works.

The 4th March 2013 Kenyan general elections illustrate this process. The 2007 contests had attracted international concern due to the bloody violence that broke out in the immediate aftermath. Estimates suggest that up to 1300 Kenyans were killed and roughly six hundred thousand were displaced during the two-month conflict. The mayhem shocked the world and ultimately brought about a power-sharing agreement on 28 February 2008, brokered by former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan. The agreement ended the violence and mandated a formal coalition government, with Mwai Kibaki as President and Raila Odinga as prime minister. Formal indictments for crimes against humanity were later levied at the International Criminal Court against President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto. Enormous efforts were devoted to reconciling the ethnic divisions, resulting in a new constitution, agreed in 2010. Nevertheless, there remained widespread fears that the 2013 Kenyan general election would trigger renewed outbreaks of ethnic violence.

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Why Elections Fail , pp. 87 - 112
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2015

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