Book contents
- What Is a Mathematical Concept?
- What Is a Mathematical Concept?
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Images
- Notes on Contributors
- Introduction
- Part I
- 1 Of Polyhedra and Pyjamas: Platonism and Induction in Meaning-Finitist Mathematics
- 2 Mathematical Concepts? The View from Ancient History
- Part II
- Part III
- Part IV
- Part V
- Part VI
- Part VII
- Part VIII
- Index
- References
1 - Of Polyhedra and Pyjamas: Platonism and Induction in Meaning-Finitist Mathematics
from Part I
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 July 2017
Book contents
- What Is a Mathematical Concept?
- What Is a Mathematical Concept?
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Images
- Notes on Contributors
- Introduction
- Part I
- 1 Of Polyhedra and Pyjamas: Platonism and Induction in Meaning-Finitist Mathematics
- 2 Mathematical Concepts? The View from Ancient History
- Part II
- Part III
- Part IV
- Part V
- Part VI
- Part VII
- Part VIII
- Index
- References
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- What is a Mathematical Concept? , pp. 19 - 35Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2017
References
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Bloor, D. (1973). Wittgenstein and Mannheim on the Sociology of Mathematics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 4(2), 173–191.Google Scholar
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