Introduction

The previous chapters studied welfare to work (WTW) relationships from diverse disciplinary perspectives in four contemporary European welfare states – Denmark, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK – and shared a common interest in considering WTW from a normative perspective focused on power relations. This chapter draws together the book's main conclusions by connecting the findings of its various chapters. It first analyses the relationship between the human rights perspective presented in the book's legal section and the republican theory of non-domination. Accordingly, it assesses the cross-national variations found in the legal and sociological chapters. Based on this analysis, it proposes institutional, organizational and legal improvements to WTW policies that seek to minimize relations of domination.

The human rights perspective and the republican theory of non-domination

The main human rights perspective in this book is based on the prohibition of forced labour and the right to freely chosen work, both enshrined in international treaties. Dermine (Chapter 4) identified six legal safeguards based on these human rights, which were applied to WTW law in Switzerland (Chapter 5), Denmark, the Netherlands, the UK and Switzerland (Chapter 6). These legal safeguards include: (1) the quality of work; (2) exit options (sanctioning policies); (3) capability for voice; (4) time to train and look for regular work; (5) the programme's goals and effects; and (6) procedural requirements. This section shows how these safeguards correspond with parts of the republican theory of non-domination as developed in the book's introduction and philosophical chapters (12, 13 and 14).

The first correspondence concerns the focus on the recipient's dependency on the welfare officer. Lovett argues that social relationships characterized by a high degree of dependency and an unequal division of socioeconomic power should be constrained by effective, external rules to prevent the powerful party from exercising arbitrary power over the weaker party. Limited exit options thus increase the likelihood of being subjected to domination. Put differently, in the absence of dependency, there can be no domination. In Dermine's analysis, dependency undermines the ability to exercise the right to freely choose one's work.