In the summer of 1945, Dutch society, still reeling from the effects of German occupation, had been taken unaware by developments in the East Indies. Once Indonesian nationalist leader Sukarno proclaimed the independent Republic of Indonesia on August 17, 1945, the Dutch were forced to embark on the process we now know as decolonization. Obviously, the Netherlands was hardly the only country to confront a rapidly changed colonial situation and forced to improvise new policies so soon after war’s end. Colonialism, reform, and ultimately decolonization were both regional and global phenomena. In Burma and Malaysia, the British quickly and relatively easily reestablished their authority, whereas the situation in India demanded immediate and sustained attention. Negotiations between British authorities, the Indian Congress, and the Muslim League commenced months before war’s end, but not without their share of contention. Although significant change evidently lay on the horizon, the future of the British Raj remained up in the air in 1945: An Indian dominion, a united India, and a partitioned state all appeared as potential options. Meanwhile, in their Southeast Asian territories, the French confronted developments similar to those in the Dutch East Indies, for on September 1, 1945, Ho Chi Minh declared the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. However, unlike the Dutch, who refused to work with Sukarno, the French negotiated with the nationalist leader, a strategy that allowed them to implement their stated plans for the Indochinese territories. In a March 1945 declaration addressing the political future of Indochina, the French minister of colonies proclaimed that an “Indochinese Federation” would join with France “and other parts of the French community to form a ‘French Union’.” Ho’s semiautonomous Republic of Vietnam initially appeared to be compatible with this planned Indochinese Federation, but, as we well know, the French-Vietnamese arrangement remained subject to revision, whether by negotiation or by force, over the course of the next decade. The Dutch, however, followed a uniquely two-pronged approach: They negotiated with republican leaders other than Sukarno while demonstrating their willingness to engage in military conflict. Even at the time, this dual strategy was a spectacular failure. If the Dutch had wished to retain any semblance of a relationship with the Indonesians, the events of 1947 to 1949 appeared to prove otherwise.