One of the most biting comments on postwar American history comes from the pen of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. It goes like this: “As the traumatic experience of the Great Depression led to the resolution to make the economy depression-proof, so the traumatic experience of Pearl Harbor led to the resolution to make the nation war-proof.” Laudable though those goals might be, Schlesinger's advice is simply, “Let's not get carried away” seeking certainty where none is available.

According to the now conventional wisdom, American foreign policy-makers in particular must “accept the fact of uncertainty and learn to live with it. Since no magic will provide certainty, our plans must work without it.” Modern deterrence theory is especially deeply imbued with this renunciation of the quest for certainties. There is no such thing as a perfect deterrent, we are firmly told. There is no absolute guarantee of perpetual peace. The Harvard Nuclear Study Group advises, “Any form of atomic escapism is a dead end. Living with nuclear weapons is our only hope. It requires that we persevere in reducing the likelihood of war even though we cannot remove the possibility altogether.” Or in the immortal words of John Foster Dulles, “You have to take chances for peace, just as you must take chances in war.”

At this point, however, I can only echo Schlesinger's admonition. Let's not get carried away, renouncing the quest for certainties even where they can reasonably be sought.