Introduction

Strikes continue to puzzle economists in part because they are, ex post, often inefficient for both parties concerned, particularly for union members who typically cannot shift their consumption patterns over time in the way that employers can shift production schedules. Whereas, overall, the costs of strikes for employers appear to be low, those for union members may be high (Hirsch and Addison, 1986: 76–8, Gennard, 1982).

Few economic models of strike activity explicitly consider the institutional interests of the union and the impact of strike activity on union organisation. Several models simply posit profit-maximising behaviour by firms confronted by non-rational behaviour from union members: the strike acts to bring member expectations in line with market pressure. These which do include a role for union leaders see them either as passive or narrowly self interested. Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969) assume no independent leader interest; they simply act as rational agents for irrational principals, going along with the strike simply to avoid challenge to their tenure. In other models, such as Swint and Nelson (1978, 1980), they pursue personal interests, again subject to some minimum gain from the strike below which they lose office. The institutional interests of the union and the organisational effects of strikes are otherwise excluded.

The proposition that unions as institutions may actually benefit from strike activity is of some interest. Both on logical and empirical grounds we might not expect it. Looked at financially, strikes involve an interruption to revenue and, possibly, higher organisational costs. Employer subsidies are likely to be withdrawn and the union must rely on its own reserves. For many unions, such reserves would be quickly exhausted.