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5 - Cambodia: organizational dysfunction, partial learning, and mixed success

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Lise Morjé Howard
Affiliation:
Georgetown University, Washington DC
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Summary

Introduction

The United Nations mission in Cambodia was one of the largest in UN history, employing over 87,000 people, and costing approximately $2 billion. The size of the operation was designed to counter the vast problems in Cambodia, a land that had been torn by warfare for over twenty years. This large operation produced mixed results. It was able to alter some of the institutions that enabled the outbreak of war, but this did not mean that the civil war in Cambodia ended during the eighteen-month tenure of UNTAC (United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia), or that UNTAC was able to create state institutions that would secure the welfare and prosperity of Cambodian citizens after UNTAC's departure. UNTAC's accomplishments, however, contributed to the eventual demise of the Khmer Rouge, the end of the civil war, the return of hundreds of thousands of refugees, and a shift toward electoral politics, if not more substantially rooted democracy.

International support for the UN's operations was generally consistent throughout the peace process, the signing of the accords, and implementation of the agreements. What was not constant was the ability and behavior of the UN operation. The warring parties generally exhibited a reactive profile: while all voiced consent for the operations after the signing of the Paris Peace Accord, local support for the operations waned as it became clear that the UN Secretariat was unable to fulfill many of the tasks set out for it in the accord.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2007

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