What is the future of ‘leader democracy’ – and the democratic system of government in general? In a short run, we expect a continuation of leadercentric and leader-democratic trends, as charted in Chapter 3. In the longer run, we should consider two popular but alternative scenarios: a ‘demooptimistic’ one predicting a further spread and evolution of democratic values and practices, and a ‘demo-pessimistic’ vision forecasting a decline of democracy.

Considering the central role mass parties have played in the process of democratisation, the coincidence of current party decline with ‘demooptimistic’ visions may be considered as a paradox. It is less paradoxical if we remember that the demo-optimistic visions are strongly coloured by direct-participatory ideals (allegedly ignored, if not corrupted, by parties), and that their spread has coincided with a powerful ‘third wave’ of democratisation. Fukuyama's (1992) announcement of the ‘end of history’ – the ultimate victory of liberal-democratic ideology – followed a worldwide political restructuring that put, for the first time in our history, the majority of countries and world population in the ‘free’ or ‘democratic’ category. Few readers noted a sceptical note in Huntington's (1991) famous diagnoses of the historical democratic waves (he predicted that each historical tide eventually ebbs) and the optimists dominate the field predicting a continuation of the ‘wave’ in the Middle East and China. They forecast not only the continuous spread of democracy, but also – and more controversially – a shift towards direct democracy and participatory engagement.