From a Latin American perspective, Venezuela has often been a contrary case. It was one of the last major South American countries to give any kind of democracy a try (1946); democracy took firmer root in the early 1960s, just as authoritarian regimes were beginning to sweep most of South America; and it was reputed to be an old and well-established democracy by the time its neighbors underwent their democratic transitions in the late 1970s and early 1980s. During these periods, Venezuela was so out of step with its neighbors that it tended to be written off as an exceptional case. Its concerns were not on the regional research agenda, and the theories developed for other countries were assumed not to apply to Venezuela. In the 1990s, however, observers began to wonder whether Venezuela was a harbinger of its neighbors' political future. Violent repression in 1989, two coup attempts in 1992, and the rise of an antisystem president with authoritarian proclivities in 1998 presaged or coincided with setbacks in democracy in Peru, Guatemala, Paraguay, Ecuador, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic. Now we commonly assume that the influential theories do apply to Venezuela and that whatever explains Venezuela's crisis may be relevant for other countries. Venezuelan exceptionalism is over.

It is time, therefore, to reinsert Venezuela in the major theoretical debates. Here I do that by first examining how well general theories – not developed with Venezuela in mind – explain Venezuela's regime changes.