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  • Print publication year: 2020
  • Online publication date: April 2020

Chapter 3 - The Truthmaking Relation

from Part I - Foundations


This chapter defends the unorthodox view that metaphysical necessitation is both necessary and sufficient for truthmaking. For x to be a truthmaker for y is for it to be metaphysically necessary that if x exists, then y is true. The necessity of necessitation is defended by considering the truthmakers for truths about truthmaking: facts of the form ‘x is a truthmaker for y’. The sufficiency of necessitation is defended by addressing the many counterexamples that been offered against it (notably those involving necessary truths), and showing how they pose no problem for truthmaking when understood as the task of ontological accounting. It is also shown how this view avoids the triviality challenge posed by Greg Restall.

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