NATURE OF THE INQUIRY

Thus far this book has explained the concept of property and shown that some body rights should be considered property rights. It is now time to address the chief subject of this book – property rights in external things of the world. This chapter concerns mainly the analytical foundations of such rights. It is the point of departure for placing, over the succeeding three chapters, persons and property in the context of a full social world. Only within this full context can one later grapple adequately with the justification of public and private property.

In this chapter, the central question is: If persons can acquire property rights in unowned things, how are these rights acquired? One answer – the incorporation theory – holds that external things become property by being brought into the body. Another answer – the projection theory – maintains that they become property by embodying the person in external things.

The discussion of these two possible answers takes this course. Section 4.2 rejects the incorporation theory for all but a few cases. Section 4.3 then sets out briefly Hegel's somewhat murky version of the projection theory. The balance of the chapter restates the projection theory in clearer language. Section 4.4 argues for two “transcendental” features of property rights in external things. One is the essential intentionality and causality of owners of property.