A. E., Abbas. The algebra of utility inference. CoRR, cs.AI/0310044, 2003.Google Scholar

A. E., Abbas. From Bayes' nets to utility nets. Proceedings of the 29th International Workshop on Bayesian Inference and Maximum Entropy Methods in Science and Engineering, pages 3–12, 2009.Google Scholar

A. E., Abbas and R. A., Howard. Attribute dominance utility. Decision Analysis, 2(4): 185–206, 2005.Google Scholar

N. H., Abel. Untersuchung der functionen zweier unabhängig veränderlichen Gröszen x und y, wie f(x, y) welche die Eigenschaft haben, dasz f[z, f(x, y)] eine symmetrische function von z, x, und y ist. J. reine u. angew. Math. (Crelle's Journal), 1:11–15, 1826.

J., Aczél. Lectures on Functional Equations and Their Applications. Academic Press, New York, 1966.Google Scholar

K. J., Arrow. Social Choice and Individual Values. John, Wiley, NewYork, 1951. 2nd ed., 1963.Google Scholar

K. J., Arrow. The Limits of Organization. W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 1974.Google Scholar

K. J., Arrow. Rationality of self and others in an economic system. In R. M., Hogarth and M. W., Reder, editors, Rational Choice. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1986.Google Scholar

R., Axelrod. The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books, New York, 1984.Google Scholar

R., Axelrod and W. D., Hamilton. The evolution of cooperation. Science, 211:1390–1396, 1981.Google Scholar

K., Bailey. Social Entropy Theory. State University of New York Press, Albany, NY, 1990.Google Scholar

S., Benn. Rationality and political behaviour. In G. W., Mortimore and S. I., Benn, editors, Rationality and the Social Sciences. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1976.Google Scholar

S. I., Benn. The problematic rationality of political participation. In P., Laslett and J., Fishkin, editors, Philosophy, Politics and Society. Blackwell, Oxford, 1979.Google Scholar

C., Bicchieri. Rationality and Coordination. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993.Google Scholar

K. G., Binmore. Game Theory and the Social Contract: Just Playing. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1998.Google Scholar

G. E., Bolton and A., Ockenfels. A stress test of fairness measures in models of social utility. Economic Theory, 24(4), 2005, pages 957–982.Google Scholar

T., Burns and G. M., Stalker. The Management of Innovation. Tavistock Publications, London, 1961.Google Scholar

C., Camerer. Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2003.Google Scholar

C., Camerer, G., Lowenstein, and M., Rabin, editors. Advances in Behavorial Economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2004a.Google Scholar

C., Camerer et al. Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-scale Societies. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004b.Google Scholar

R. W., Cooper. Coordination Games. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999.Google Scholar

T. M., Cover and J. A., Thomas. Elements of Information Theory. John Wiley, New York, 1991.Google Scholar

R. G., Cowell, A. P., Dawid, S. L., Lauritzen, and D. J., Spiegelhalter. Probabilistic Networks and Expert Systems. Springer Verlag, New York, 1999.Google Scholar

R. T., Cox. Probability, frequency, and reasonable expectation. American Journal of Physics, 14:1–13, 1946.Google Scholar

F. G., Cozman. Credal networks. Artificial Intelligence, 120:199–233, 2000.Google Scholar

B., de Finetti. La prévision: ses lois logiques, ses sources subjectives. Annales de l'Institut Henri Poincaré, 7:1–68, 1937. Translated as Forsight. Its logical laws, its subjective sources, in H. E. Kyburg Jr. and H. E. Smokler, editors, Studies in Subjective Probability, Wiley, New York, 1964, pages 93–158.

B., de Finetti. Theory of Probability, volume 1. Wiley Interscience, New York, 1990.Google Scholar

J., Dewey. Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1938.Google Scholar

F. Y., Edgeworth. Mathematical Psychics. C. Kegan Paul & Co., London, 1881.Google Scholar

H. J., Einhorn and R. M., Hogarth. Decision making under ambiguity. In R. M., Hogarth and M. W., Reder, editors, Rational Choice. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1986.Google Scholar

A., Einstein. On the method of theoretical physics. Philosophy of Science, 1(2):163–169, 1934.Google Scholar

J., Elster, editor. The Multiple Self. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985.Google Scholar

J., Elster, editor. Rational Choice. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986.Google Scholar

E., Fehr and S., Gächter. Cooperation and punishment. American Economic Review, 90(4):980–994, 2002.Google Scholar

E., Fehr and K., Schmidt. A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114:817–868, 1999.Google Scholar

R., Feynman. The Character of Physical Law. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1967.Google Scholar

P. C., Fishburn. The Theory of Social Choice. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1973.Google Scholar

H. G., Frankfurt. Freedom of the will and the concept of a person. Journal of Philosophy, 68:5–20, 1971.Google Scholar

M., Friedman. Price Theory. Aldine Press, Chicago, 1961.Google Scholar

J., Gale, K., Binmore, and L., Samuelson. Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game. Games and Economic Behavior, 8:56–90, 1995.Google Scholar

N., Georgescu-Roegen. The Entropy Law and the Economic Process. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1971.Google Scholar

G., Gigerenzer, Z., Swijtink, T., Porter, L., Daston, J., Beatty, and L., Krüger. The Empire of Chance. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989.Google Scholar

H., Gintis. The Bounds of Reason: Game Theory and the Unification of the Behavioral Sciences. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2009.Google Scholar

U., Gneezy. Deception: The role of consequences. American Economic Review, 95(1): 384–394, 2005.Google Scholar

R. E., Goodin. Cross-cutting cleavages and social conflict. British Journal of Political Science, 5:516–519, 1975.Google Scholar

R. E., Goodin. Laundering preferences. In J., Elster and A., Hylland, editors, Foundations of Social Choice Theory, chapter 3, pages 75–101. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986.Google Scholar

S., Goyal. Connections. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2007.Google Scholar

R. W., Hamming. The Art of Probability for Scientists and Engineers. Addison-Wesley, Redwood City, CA, 1991.Google Scholar

B., Hansson. The independence condition on the theory of social choice. Working paper no. 2, The Mattias Fremling Society, Department of Philosophy, Lund, 1972.

J., Harsanyi. Cardinal welfare, individualistic ethics, and interpersonal comparisons of utility. Journal of Political Economy, 63:315, 1955.Google Scholar

J., Harsanyi. Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1977.Google Scholar

J., Henrich et al. “Economic man” in cross-culturative perspective: Behavorial experiments in 15 small-scale societies. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28(6):795–855, 2005.Google Scholar

R. M., Hogarth and M. W., Reder, editors. Rational Choice. University Chicago Press, Chicago, 1986.Google Scholar

M., Hollis. Models of Man. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1977.Google Scholar

S., Holmes. The secret history of self-interest. In J. J., Mansbridge, editor, Beyond Self- Interest, chapter 17. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1990.Google Scholar

G. C., Homans. Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms. Harcourt Brace & World, New York, 1961.Google Scholar

G. C., Homans. The Nature of Social Science. Harcourt Brace & World, New York, 1967.Google Scholar

R. A., Howard and J. E., Matheson. Influence diagrams. In R. A., Howard and J. E., Matheson, editors, Readings on the Principles and Applications of Decision Analysis. Strategic Decisions Group, Menlo Park, CA, 1984.Google Scholar

P., Jaccard. Étude comparative de la distribution florale dans une portion des alpes et des jura. Bulletin de la Société Vaudoise des Sciences Naturelles, 37:547–579, 1901.Google Scholar

W., James. The Will to Believe and Other Essays. Dover, New York, 1956.Google Scholar

E. T., Jaynes. Probability Theory: The Logic of Science. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003.Google Scholar

R., Jeffyrey. Probability and the Art of Judgment. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992.Google Scholar

F. V., Jensen. Bayesian Networks and Decision Graphs. Springer Verlag, New York, 2001.Google Scholar

P. E., Johnson. Social Chice: Theory and Research. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, 1998.Google Scholar

R. L., Keeney and H., Raiffa. Decisions with Multiple Objectives. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993. First published by John Wiley & Sons, 1976.Google Scholar

J., Kemeny. Fair bets and inductive probabilities. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 20(1): 263–273, 1955.Google Scholar

A., Kolmogorov. Grundbegriffe der Warscheinlichkeitsrechnung. Springer, Berlin, 1933.Google Scholar

A., Kraskov, H., Stöbauer, R. G., Andrzejak, and P., Grassberger. Hierarchical clustering based on mutual information. ArXiv q-bio/0311039 (http://arxiv.org/abs/ q-bio/0311039), 2003.

J. W., Krutch. The Measure of Man. Grosset and Dunlap, New York, 1953.Google Scholar

T. S., Kuhn. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962.Google Scholar

H. T., Kung, F., Luccio, and F. P., Preparata. On finding the maxima of a set of vectors. Journal of the Association for Computing Machinery, 22(4):469–476, 1975.Google Scholar

S. L., Lauritzen. Graphical Models. Springer Verlag, New York, 1996.Google Scholar

I., Levi. The Enterprise of Knowledge. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1980.Google Scholar

I., Levi. The Covenant of Reason. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997.Google Scholar

D. K., Lewis. Convention. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1969.Google Scholar

M., Li, J. H., Badger, X., Chen, S., Kwong, P., Kearney, and H., Zang. An information-based sequence distance and its application to whole mitochondrial genome phylogeny. Bioinformatics, 17(2):149–154, 2001.Google Scholar

R. D., Luce and H., Raiffa. Games and Decisions. John Wiley, New York, 1957.Google Scholar

T., Macaulay. Mill's essay on government: Utilitarian logic and politics. In J., Lively and J., Rees, editors, Utilitarian Logic and Politics. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1978.Google Scholar

T. W., Malone and K G., Crowston. Toward an interdisciplinary theory of coordination. Technical Report No. 120. Center for Coordination Science, SS WP#3294-91- MSA, MIT, 1991.

T. W., Malone and K G., Crowston. The interdisciplinary study of coordination. In T. W., Malone, K. G., Crowston, and G. A., Herman, editors, Organizing Business Knowledge. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2003.Google Scholar

H., Margolis. Dual utilities and rational choice. In J. J., Mansbridge, editor, Beyond Self-Interest, chapter 15. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1990.Google Scholar

J., Maynard-Smith. Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982.Google Scholar

L., Mérö. Moral Calculations. Springer-Verlag, New York, 1998.Google Scholar

J. A. H., Murray, H., Bradley, W. A., Craigie, and C. T., Onions, editors. The Compact Oxford English Dictionary. The Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991.

J., Neveu. Mathematical Foundations of the Calculus of Probability. Holden Day, San Francisco, 1965.Google Scholar

M. A., Nowak, K. M., Page, and K., Sigmund. Fairness versus reason in the ultimatum game. Science, 289:1773–1775, 2000.Google Scholar

P., Ordeshook. Game Theory and Political Theory: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986.Google Scholar

José Ortega y, Gasset. Mirabeau: An essay on the nature of statesmanship. Historical Conservation Society, Manila, 1975.

M. J., Osborne and A., Rubinstein. A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1994.Google Scholar

F. R., Palmer. Grammar. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Penguin, 1971.Google Scholar

V., Pareto. Manual of Political Economy. Augustus M., Kelley, New York, 1927/1971. Translated in 1971 by Ann S., Schwier from the French edition of 1927.Google Scholar

J., Pearl. Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems. Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA, 1988.Google Scholar

G., Polya. Induction and Analogy in Mathematics. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1954.Google Scholar

K. R., Popper. Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. Harper & Row, New York, 1963.Google Scholar

I., Prigogine. Thermodynamics of Irreversible Processes. Thomas Press, Springfield, IL, 1955.Google Scholar

H., Raiffa. Decision Analysis. Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, 1968.Google Scholar

F. P., Ramsey. Truth and probability. In R. B., Braithwaite, editor, The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays. The Humanities Press, New York, 1950.Google Scholar

E., Rasmusen. Games and Information. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1989.Google Scholar

J. B., Rawls. A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1971.Google Scholar

S., Ross. A First Course in Probability. Prentice-Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ, 6th ed., 2002.Google Scholar

S. J., Russell and P., Norvig. Artificial intelligence: A Modern Approach. Prentice-Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ, 2nd ed., 2003.Google Scholar

T. C., Schelling. The Strategy of Conflict. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1960.Google Scholar

A. K., Sen. Choice, ordering and morality. In S., Körner, editor, Practical Reason, pages 54–67. Blackwell, Oxford, 1979a.Google Scholar

A. K., Sen. Collective Choice and Social Welfare. North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1979b.Google Scholar

A. K., Sen. Rational fools: A critique of the behavorial foundations of economic theory. In J. J., Mansbridge, editor, Beyond Self-Interest, chapter 2. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1990.Google Scholar

G., Shafer. A Mathematical Theory of Evidence. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1976.Google Scholar

C., Shannon and W., Weaver. The Mathematical Study of Communication. University of Illinois Press, Urbana, IL, 1949.Google Scholar

Y., Shoham and K., Leyton-Brown. Multiagent Systems. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009.Google Scholar

M., Shubik. Game Theory in the Social Sciences. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1982.Google Scholar

M., Shubik. Game theory and operations research: Some musings 50 years later. Yale School of Management Working Paper No. ES-14, 2001.

K., Sigmund, E., Fehr, and M. A., Nowak. The economics of fair play. Scientific American, 286:83–87, 2002.Google Scholar

H. A., Simon. A behavioral model of rational choice. Quartly Journal of Economics, 59: 99–118, 1955.Google Scholar

H. A., Simon. Rationality in psychology and economics. In R. M., Hogarth and M.W., Reder, editors, Rational Choice. University Chicago Press, Chicago, 1986.Google Scholar

H. A., Simon. The Sciences of the Artificial. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 3rd ed., 1996.Google Scholar

M., Slatkin. Altruism in theory [review of Scott, Boorman and Paul, Levitt, The Genetics of Altruism]. Science, 210(4470):633–634, 1980.Google Scholar

M., Slote. Beyond Optimizing. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1989.Google Scholar

E., Sober and D. S., Wilson. Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1998.Google Scholar

I., Steedman and U., Krause. Goethe's Faust, Arrow's Possibility Theorem and the individual decision maker. In J., Elster, editor, The Multiple Self, chapter 8, pages 197–231. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985.Google Scholar

W. C., Stirling. Satisficing Games and Decision Making: With Applications to Engineering and Computer Science. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003.Google Scholar

M., Tribus. Rational Descriptions, Decisions and Designs. Pergamon Press, New York, 1969.Google Scholar

A., Tversky and D., Kahenman. Rational choice and the framing of decisions. In R. M., Hogarth and M. W., Reder, editors, Rational Choice, pages 67–94. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1986.Google Scholar

J., von Neumann and O., Morgenstern. The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1944. 2nd ed., 1947.Google Scholar

J., von Plato. Creating Modern Probability. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994.Google Scholar

M., Weber. Economy and Society. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1968. Edited by G., Roth and C., Wittich.Google Scholar

J. W., Weibull. Evolutionary Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1995.Google Scholar

G., Wolf and M., Shubik. Concepts, theories and techniques: Solution concepts and psychological motivations in prisoner's dilemma games. Decision Sciences, 5:153–163, 1974.Google Scholar

L. A., Zadeh. What is optimal?IRE Transactions on Information Theory, 4(1):3, 1958.Google Scholar

L. A., Zadeh. Fuzzy sets as a basis for a theory of possibility. Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 1:3–28, 1978.Google Scholar