In recent years there has been a move to ‘naturalize’ the philosophy of science. This has meant basing work in the philosophy of science upon the actual historical record of real scientific practice and stressing (in varying degrees) the use of the methods of science in studying the scientific enterprise. This attention to actual scientific practice has been supported by traditional realists, an example being Ernan McMullin (1984) who early on (1976a) argued for a central role for the history of science in the philosophy of science; by philosophers of various anti-theoretical bents, such as Nancy Cartwright (1983) and Ian Hacking (1983); and by empiricists, like Bas van Fraassen (1980, 1985). In the early 1960s, it was attention to the historical record that led Thomas Kuhn (1970), in his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, to stress the importance of social factors in the practice of real science. The spirit of the present work is that careful and detailed study must be made of the actual development of science before conclusions are drawn about the appropriateness of any particular methodology of science. Ours is mainly a story about theory, but not one uncoupled from its relation to experiment.

We claim that many of the philosophically interesting questions in science, especially in regard to possible changes in the methodology and goals of science, can be seen and appreciated only upon examination of the technical details of that practice.