Many people nowadays do not consider the problem of the ethical implications of human genetic engineering (hereafter: HGE) a serious subject of discussion. There are both theoretical and practical reasons for adopting this sceptical attitude. As far as the former are concerned, our present knowledge of HGE is very modest: we cannot be sure what the limits of possible genetic transformations of human beings are and of the consequences of these transformations. Hence, it may be claimed that the whole debate has more in common with mere speculation rather than with a serious discussion based on firm scientific evidence. The practical objection concerns the possible benefits of engaging in this discussion. It is often claimed that moral and social philosophers should deal with more urgent, and undoubtedly more ‘tangible’ problems, like the fair distribution of medical services in general, sexual discrimination, taxation etc. Being aware of the two aforementioned problems, we must acknowledge the fact that there is a fierce ethical debate on HGE. A wide spectrum of views on HGE has been developed: from the so-called radical trans-humanists to radical bio-conservatives. The mere fact of there being a debate on a subject is not a sufficient reason for treating this subject seriously. Nevertheless, I think that the discussion mentioned here is not without value.