Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-vvkck Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-26T15:45:21.407Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

7 - Watchdog and proxy war campaigns against firms

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 July 2010

Ralf Boscheck
Affiliation:
Institute for Management Development, Lausanne
Christine Batruch
Affiliation:
Lundin Petroleum
Stewart Hamilton
Affiliation:
Institute for Management Development, Lausanne
Jean-Pierre Lehmann
Affiliation:
Institute for Management Development, Lausanne
Caryl Pfeiffer
Affiliation:
E.ON U.S
Ulrich Steger
Affiliation:
Institute for Management Development, Lausanne
Michael Yaziji
Affiliation:
Institute for Management Development, Lausanne
Get access

Summary

Firms are increasingly facing campaigns by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) over a broad range of issues such as the environment, labor, human rights, consumer rights and animal rights. The number of international NGOs has increased by 400% in the last decade and the number of mentions of NGOs in the Wall Street Journal has increased twenty-fold during this period. Corporate managers often fail to appreciate the deeper dynamics behind these campaigns and, as a result, respond to them in ineffective or even counterproductive ways. These managers are also often surprised at how effective small – and often ideologically radical – NGOs can be in tackling much larger firms. In this chapter I will (1) differentiate between two very different types of campaigns – watchdog campaigns and proxy war campaigns, which need to be understood and responded to in very different ways; (2) explain how it is that these small “David” NGOs can beat “Goliath” corporations; and (3) provide some guidance for managers on how to avoid and respond to these campaigns. The discussion presented here draws on three years of qualitative research including interviews, case studies and a large-scale global survey of NGOs that have campaigned against firms.

Differentiating watchdog campaigns from proxy war campaigns

Early neo-institutional theory focused on how organizations, in order to gain and maintain the legitimacy necessary to survive, must conform to institutional demands in the form of norms and rules.

Type
Chapter
Information
Strategies, Markets and Governance
Exploring Commercial and Regulatory Agendas
, pp. 115 - 133
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2008

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×