The chequered story of SDI is but one chapter in the saga of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) or Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM), as strategic defences have variously been known. In the USA, waves of hope and disillusionment about the prospects for intercepting nuclear missiles have only partially affected the relatively steady expansion in the infrastructure of laboratories, corporations and field agencies developing BMD. The history of strategic defence illuminates the causes of SDI and offers important clues as to the course SDI may now take.

EARLY BMD

With Nazi Germany defeated, the two new superpowers strove to develop their own rocketry, using the German V-2 as a prototype. The US Army mounted ‘operation paperclip’ to recruit the inventors of the V-2, including Wernher von Braun. By 1945, 120 German rocket engineers were working for the Americans at Fort Bliss, Texas. They helped to develop Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) and, later, Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), which both superpowers had successfully tested by the end of the 1950s.

During the Cold War, the superpowers invested heavily in air defences. This research laid the foundations for the first ABM programmes. It seemed that BMD could be allocated an increasingly important share of the defence budget and, in the United States, the army and the air force competed for the job of running the programme.

In claiming a right to the ABM role, the army could point out that it was already developing an air defence of the Continental United States (CONUS).