With the promulgation of a new constitution in 2008 and subsequent elections in 2010 and 2015, Myanmar has undergone a process of political transition which could lead eventually to full-scale democratization. One important aspect of the political transition is the changing pattern of civil–military relations, which started with the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) coming to power in 2011, ending more than two decades of direct military rule by the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed Forces). This process of structural adjustment in civil–military relations, from domination to influence, was expected to enter into a new phase when the National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Nobel laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, came to power in March 2016, as there were high expectations for further steps towards democratization and democratic consolidation.

What should be an ideal model of civil–military relations in a democratic setting? In conventional literature, the most desirable form of civil–military relations in a democracy is what Samuel Huntington called “objective civilian control” over the military. Huntington's model emphasizes the separation of civilian and military institutions, non-involvement of the military in domestic politics, and the subordination of the military to the civilian authorities. According to Huntington, “objective civilian control” can be achieved by maximizing military professionalism, which involves the recognition of an independent military sphere within government and a clear distribution of power and responsibilities between the military and civilians. The other form of civil–military relations, according to Huntington, is “subjective civilian control”, which is maintained through “maximizing the power of the civilian groups in relation to the military”. Historically, subjective civilian control has been identified with maximizing the power of particular governmental institutions, social classes, or constitutional forms. Subjective civilian control is possible in the absence of a professional officer corps and a lack of democratic principles in governance. In a recent study on civil–military relations, Zoltan Barany claimed that, “democracy cannot be consolidated without military elites who are committed to democratic rule and obedient to a democratically elected political elite”.

On the other side of the equation is the military's supremacy over civilians, where the military holds the monopoly of power to make political decisions. This pattern of civil–military relations is not democratic in nature. Rebecca Schiff has put forward an alternative model of civil–military relations, known as “concordance theory”.