There have been many attempts at explaining the substantive peculiarities of EU competition law. The monograph suggests that these features (such as the alleged formalism or the perceived reluctance to embrace mainstream economics) can be credibly rationalised as the expected consequences of the preferences of an authority like European Commission. An authority with its role and status in the system may be naturally inclined to define the scope of its powers in a relatively expansive manner. Arguably, this institutional explanation is more persuasive than alternative ones. This fundamental insight could be expanded in different directions. First, the relationship between institutions and substance could be explored in relation to other notions that the monograph has not examined. This include the notion of agreement within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU. Second, it should be possible to apply the analytical framework on which the monograph is based to identify patterns in the behaviour of authorities and courts in other jurisdictions. This includes not only other competition authorities in the EU but also around the world. Finally, the ideas discussed in the monograph can contribute to a growing body of administrative law literature exploring the relationship, in general, between courts and agencies.