The Carter Option

Given the fear of “another Nicaragua,” the October 1979 coup came as a deep relief to the Carter administration. As ambassador in El Salvador at the time, Frank Devine, stated, “The finest hour that El Salvador had in its memorable history was that coup of October 15, 1979.” Yet, while clearly eager to see General Romero go, declassified cable traffic from San Salvador seeking guidance on how to respond to the coup reveals that American officials had only limited prior knowledge of the putsch. The United States did, however, move quickly to help the new government. State Department spokesman Hodding Carter told the press that the new leaders appeared to be “centrist and moderate” and that the direction they had laid out for the new government was “encouraging.” Ambassador Devine later recounted that the coup members’ program “emphasized the correction of past wrongs, respect for human rights, release of all political prisoners, return of political exiles, and the implementation of a program of thoroughgoing reform of the nation's antiquated economic, social and political structures.” The big threat to America's interests, Devine contended, was that the far left would undermine the new junta. “[It is] increasingly clear that [the] extreme left will continue its violent effort to undermine [the] new junta and at some point [the] very survival of [the] latter might depend on greater outside assistance to cope with these elements.”

Two weeks after the coup, U.S. officials announced that Washington would provide the new government with “significant” military aid as well as moderate amounts of “nonlethal” riot control and military gear as an inducement to get the junta to implement further reforms. However, there was no consensus among the senior officials. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, for example, feared that greater aid and more training would lead to even higher levels of U.S. involvement, creating a “quagmire effect” similar to what had happened in Vietnam.