During Putin's third presidential term we have witnessed an unprecedented official preoccupation with identity issues. It has been unrivalled both in the intensity with which the images of Russian national identity were communicated to the public by the authorities and by the specificity of these images. This chapter analyses the Kremlin's changing attitudes towards nationalism since 2012, particularly focusing on the post-2014 period. The described changes are analysed against two primary factors: the regime's efforts to sustain popular legitimacy through concluding a new social contract and the grassroots’ perceived need for a more articulated national identity. The analysis suggests an emerging dilemma for the regime between the Russo-centric and great-power elements of Russian national identity.

I first briefly discuss challenges related to national self-determination and self-identification in post-Soviet Russia, presenting the Kremlin's pre-2012 approach to handling the national issue. I then describe how an existing social demand for a more pronounced national identity coupled with Russia's new post-2012 social contract led the Kremlin to take an active and unprecedentedly bold stand in the national identity discourse. Thereafter I examine the changes that took place in the official representation of Russianness during Putin's third presidency. Finally, I discuss the limitations and pitfalls encountered of employing identity as the main base for the regime's legitimacy.

The chapter argues that since 2012 the Kremlin's handling of the national issue has undergone a twofold change: first, the authorities’ mobilisation strategy shifted from a reactive approach towards a proactive and initiating mode aimed at seizing firm and complete control over the nationalist agenda. Second, official identity discourse became profoundly national in its orientation, and was significantly ethnicised, up until the when the Kremlin felt the danger of being taken hostage by its own propaganda and the nationalist discourse it had unleashed. Accordingly, after mid-2014 the Kremlin shifted to a more traditional, though greatly amplified, statist great-power discourse, which in turn revealed its own limitations. This has left the Kremlin with newly reconfigured frames of possible identity discourses and dilemmas regarding potential sources of legitimacy.