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Ruling by Statute
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  • Cited by 18
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    This book has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Williams, Brian D. 2012. Institutional Change and Legislative Vote Consensus in New Zealand. Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, Issue. 4, p. 559.

    Palanza, Valeria and Sin, Gisela 2014. Veto Bargaining and the Legislative Process in Multiparty Presidential Systems. Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 47, Issue. 5, p. 766.

    Goodfellow, Tom 2014. Legal Manoeuvres and Violence: Law Making, Protest and Semi-Authoritarianism in Uganda. Development and Change, Vol. 45, Issue. 4, p. 753.

    Hiroi, Taeko and Renno, Lucio 2014. Dimensions of Legislative Conflict: Coalitions, Obstructionism, and Lawmaking in Multiparty Presidential Regimes. Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, Issue. 3, p. 357.

    Becher, Michael and Christiansen, Flemming Juul 2015. Dissolution Threats and Legislative Bargaining. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 59, Issue. 3, p. 641.

    Singh, Shane P. and Carlin, Ryan E. 2015. Happy Medium, Happy Citizens. Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 68, Issue. 1, p. 3.

    Cheibub, José Antonio Martin, Shane and Rasch, Bjørn Erik 2015. Government Selection and Executive Powers: Constitutional Design in Parliamentary Democracies. West European Politics, Vol. 38, Issue. 5, p. 969.

    Bonvecchi, Alejandro Calvo, Ernesto and Stein, Ernesto 2016. Legislative Knowledge Networks, Status Quo Complexity, and the Approval of Law Initiatives. Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, Issue. 1, p. 89.

    Calvo, Ernesto and Chasquetti, Daniel 2016. Legislative success in open sky congresses: weak gatekeeping prerogatives and the loss of majority support. The Journal of Legislative Studies, Vol. 22, Issue. 1, p. 83.

    Chaisty, Paul and Chernykh, Svitlana 2017. How Do Minority Presidents Manage Multiparty Coalitions? Identifying and Analyzing the Payoffs to Coalition Parties in Presidential Systems. Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 70, Issue. 4, p. 762.

    Boranbay-Akan, Serra König, Thomas and Osnabrügge, Moritz 2017. The imperfect agenda-setter: Why do legislative proposals fail in the EU decision-making process?. European Union Politics, Vol. 18, Issue. 2, p. 168.

    Zápal, Jan 2017. Crafting consensus. Public Choice, Vol. 173, Issue. 1-2, p. 169.

    Klüver, Heike and Zubek, Radoslaw 2018. Minority governments and legislative reliability. Party Politics, Vol. 24, Issue. 6, p. 719.

    Altman, David 2018. Citizenship and Contemporary Direct Democracy.

    Kikuchi, Hirokazu 2018. Presidents versus Federalism in the National Legislative Process. p. 145.

    CHAISTY, PAUL and POWER, TIMOTHY J. 2018. Flying solo: Explaining single-party cabinets under minority presidentialism. European Journal of Political Research,

    Breunig, Christian and Koski, Chris 2018. Topping Off and Bottoming Out: Setting Budget Priorities Through Executive Power. Policy Studies Journal,

    Kikuchi, Hirokazu 2018. Presidents versus Federalism in the National Legislative Process. p. 1.

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Book description

What are the main factors that allow presidents and prime ministers to enact policy through acts of government that carry the force of law? Or, simply put, when does a government actually govern? The theory presented in this book provides a major advance in our understanding of statutory policy making. Using a combination of an original analytical framework and statistical techniques, as well as historical and contemporary case studies, the book demonstrates that, contrary to conventional wisdom, variations in legislative passage rates are the consequences of differences in uncertainty, not partisan support. In particular, it shows that a chief executive's legislative success depends on the predictability of legislators' voting behavior and whether buying votes is a feasible option. From a normative standpoint, the book reveals that governability is best served when the opposition has realistic chances of occasionally defeating the executive in the legislative arena.


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