Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-7479d7b7d-wxhwt Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-09T17:05:15.306Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

7 - The SPLA Split Surviving Factionalism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 June 2021

Get access

Summary

Internal differences within the SPLA

The South's first civil war had been plagued by factional fighting between guerrilla movements, and the SPLA's policy of preventing military factionalism was a direct attempt to apply lessons learnt from this past. In its suppression of internal dissent and its attack on military rivals, the SPLA followed a pattern similar to that of many other contemporary African liberation movements. The SPLA's military organization was the foundation of its success on the ground. It achieved far greater centralization and cohesion than the old Anyanya and maintained an expanding ability to take and hold territory far beyond that of any of the Southern guerrilla movements of the 1960s.

The political price of the policy was that the leadership relied on force rather than persuasion to maintain cohesion. Dissenters were removed while the causes of dissent were not, and the civil base of the Movement was neglected in favour of the military organization. Civil administration was most advanced in those areas providing the strongest popular support (Bahr al-Ghazal, Upper Nile and much of Lakes and Jonglei), and where political mobilization was easiest. In the remoter regions of the southern Blue Nile and Nuba Mountains, SPLA presence before 1989 was seasonal, at best. In the territories formerly opposed to the SPLA (Eastern Equatoria and Pibor) administration was more military occupation than popular liberation.

As long as Garang had Mengistu's support he was able to exert considerable control over the Movement's hierarchy. After its founding meeting in 1983 the SPLM held no national convention until 1994, and civilian figures, such as the respected judge Martin Majier or the veteran politician Joseph Oduho, had scarcely any role in the formulation or implementation of policy. The central organizing body of the Movement, the Political- Military High Command, whose members were appointed by Garang, was not convened in full between 1986 and 1991. In 1987 it became a doubletiered structure of full (or permanent) members and alternate commanders with limited voting rights and duties. Garang was often aloof or unapproachable, frequently on the move between the Movement's headquarters in Addis Ababa and Boma, its bases around Itang or in the Sudan, or visiting the capitals of friendly countries.

Type
Chapter
Information
The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars
Old Wars and New Wars (Expanded 3rd Edition)
, pp. 91 - 110
Publisher: Boydell & Brewer
Print publication year: 2016

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×