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Bibliography

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Arthur Ripstein
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Ronald Dworkin , pp. 169 - 176
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2007

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References

Burley, Justine, ed. Dworkin and His Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004.
Fish, Stanley. Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies. Durham: Duke University Press, 1989.CrossRef
Guest, Stephen. Ronald Dworkin. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991.
Hunt, Alan, ed. Reading Dworkin Critically. New York and Oxford: Berg, 1992.
Hurley, Susan. Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.
Perry, Stephen. “Interpretation and Methodology in Legal Theory,” in Law and Interpretation, ed. Marmor, A. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
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Schlink, Bernhard. “Hercules in Germany?” International Journal of Constitutional Law 1 (2003): 610–20.Google Scholar
Westmoreland, Robert. “Dworkin and Legal Pragmatism.” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 11 (1991): 174–192.Google Scholar
Atkinson, Max. “Taking Dworkin Seriously.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (1983): 27–39.Google Scholar
Balkin, J. M “Taking Ideology Seriously: Ronald Dworkin and the CLS Critique.” UMKC Law Review 55 (1987): 392–433.Google Scholar
Brubaker, Stanley C. “Reconsidering Dworkin's Case for Judicial Activism.” Journal of Politics 46 (1984): 503–19.Google Scholar
Brubaker, Stanley C. “Taking Dworkin Seriously.” The Review of Politics 47 (1985): 45–65.Google Scholar
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Coleman, Jules, ed. Hart's Postscript. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Coleman, Jules. The Practice of Principle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Coleman, Jules, and Shapiro, Scott, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001 (various chapters).
Corlett, J. Angelo. “Dworkin's Empire Strikes Back!” Statute Law Review 21 (2000): 43–56.Google Scholar
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Hershovitz, Scott. Exploring Law's Empire: The Jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
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Kornhauser, Lewis A. “No Best Answer?” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 146 (1998): 1599–1637.Google Scholar
Kramer, Matthew H. “Also Among the Prophets: Some Rejoinders to Ronald Dworkin's Attacks on Legal Positivism.” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence: An International Journal of Legal Thought 12 (1996): 53–82.Google Scholar
Kramer, Matthew H.Law Without Trimmings: A Defense of Legal Positivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Kress, Ken, and Anderson, Scott W.. “Dworkin in Transition.” The American Journal of Comparative Law 37 (1989): 337–51.Google Scholar
Lyons, David. “Moral Aspects of Legal Theory.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 7 (1982): 223–54.Google Scholar
Lyons, David. “Principles, Positivism and Legal Theory.” Yale Law Journal 87 (1977): 415–35.Google Scholar
Leiter, Brian. “Beyond the Hart–Dworkin Debate.” American Journal of Jurisprudence 48 (2003): 17–51.Google Scholar
MacCallum, Gerald C. Jr. “Dworkin on Judicial Discretion: Comments.” The Journal of Philosophy 60 (1963): 638–41.Google Scholar
MacCormick, D. N “Dworkin as Pre-Benthamite.” The Philosophical Review 87 (1978): 586–607.Google Scholar
Mackie, John. “The Third Theory of Law.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 7 (1977): 3–16.Google Scholar
Mureinik, Etienne. “Dworkin and Apartheid,” in Law and Social Practice, ed. Corder, H. (Cape Town: Juta, 1988) 181.
Nino, Carlos S. “Dworkin and Legal Positivism.” Mind 89 (1980): 519–43.Google Scholar
Pannick, David. “A Note on Dworkin and Precedent.” The Modern Law Review 43 (1980): 36–44.Google Scholar
Raz, Joseph. “Authority, Law and Morality,” in Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).
Raz, Joseph. The Authority of Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979.
Regan, Donald H. “Glosses on Dworkin: Rights, Principles, and Policies.” Michigan Law Review 76 (1978): 1213–64.Google Scholar
Soper, E. Philip. “Legal Theory and the Obligation of a Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute.” Michigan Law Review 75 (1977): 473–519.Google Scholar
Waluchow, Wilfrid J. “Strong Discretion.” The Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1983): 321–39.Google Scholar
Waluchow, Wilfrid J.Inclusive Legal Positivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
Woodman, Gordon. “Dworkin's ‘Right Answer’ Thesis and the Frustration of Legislative Intent: A Case-Study on the Leasehold Reform Act.” The Modern Law Review 45 (1982): 121–38.Google Scholar
Woozley, A. D “No Right Answer.” The Philosophical Quarterly 29 (1979): 25–34.Google Scholar
Altman, Andrew. “Policy, Principle, and Incrementalism: Dworkin's Jurisprudence of Race.” The Journal of Ethics 5 (2001): 241–62.Google Scholar
Lagerspetz, Eerik. “Ronald Dworkin on Communities and Obligations: A Critical Comment.” Ratio Juris: An International Journal of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law 12 (1999): 108–15.Google Scholar
Mian, Emran. “The Value Of Community, Or How Burke Compromises Dworkin.” Legal Theory 9 (2003): 125–56.Google Scholar
Neal, P. “Liberalism & Neutrality.” Polity 17 (1985): 664–84.Google Scholar
Peerenboom, Randall P. “A Coup d'Etatin Law's Empire: Dworkin's Hercules Meets Atlas”. Law and Philosophy: An International Journal for Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy 9 (1990): 95–113.Google Scholar
Pildes, Richard. “Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism.” Journal of Legal Studies 27, no. 2 (June 1998): 725–63.Google Scholar
Richardson, Genevra. “The Legal Regulation of Process,” in Administrative Law and Government Action, ed. Richardson, Genevra and Genn, Hazel (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).
Waldron, Jeremy. “The Circumstances of Integrity.” Legal Theory 3 (1997): 1–22.Google Scholar
Waldron, Jeremy. “Pildes on Dworkin's Theory of Rights.” The Journal of Legal Studies 29 (2000): 301–7.Google Scholar
Winston, Kenneth I. “Principles and Touchstones: The Dilemma of Dworkin's Liberalism.” Polity 19 (1986): 42–55.Google Scholar
Wolfe, Christopher. “Liberalism and Paternalism: A Critique of Ronald Dworkin.” The Review of Politics 56 (1994): 615–39.Google Scholar
Wolfe, Christopher. “The Egalitarian Liberalism of Ronald Dworkin,” in Liberalism at the Crossroads: An Introduction to Contemporary Liberal Political Theory and Its Critics (2nd ed.), ed. Wolfe, Christopher (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).
Anderson, Elizabeth. “What Is the Point of Equality?” Ethics 109, no. 2 (Jan. 1999): 287–337.Google Scholar
Armstrong, Chris. “Equality, Risk and Responsibility: Dworkin on the Insurance Market.” Economy and Society 34 (2005): 451–73.Google Scholar
Arneson, Richard. “Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare.” Philosophical Studies 56 (1989): 77–93.Google Scholar
Arneson, Richard. “Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism, and Equal Opportunity for Welfare.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 19 (1990): 158–94.Google Scholar
Arneson, Richard. “Egalitarianism and Responsibility.” Journal of Ethics 3 (1999): 225–47.Google Scholar
Arneson, Richard. “Equal Opportunity for Welfare Defended and Recanted.” Journal of Political Philosophy 7 (1999): 488–97.Google Scholar
Arneson, Richard. “Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism.” Ethics 110 (2000): 339–49.Google Scholar
Arneson, Richard. “Luck and Equality II.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. vol (2001): 73–90.Google Scholar
Bennett, John G. “Ethics and Markets.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (1985): 195–204.Google Scholar
Champeau, Serge. “Ronald Dworkin, le Libéralisme et l'Égalité.” Revue Philosophique de Louvain 97 (1999): 550–80.Google Scholar
Christian, Arnsperger. “Reformulating Equality of Resources.” Economics and Philosophy 13 (1997): 61–77.Google Scholar
Christofidis, Miriam Cohen. “Talent, Slavery and Envy in Dworkin's Equality of Resources.” Utilitas: A Journal of Utilitarian Studies 16 (2004): 267–87.Google Scholar
Clayton, Matthew, and Williams, Andrew, eds. The Ideal of Equality. New York: Macmillan and St. Martin's Press, 2000.
Clayton, Matthew. “Liberal Equality and Ethics.” Ethics 113 (2002): 8–22.Google Scholar
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  • Bibliography
  • Arthur Ripstein
  • Book: Ronald Dworkin
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139167109.007
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  • Bibliography
  • Arthur Ripstein
  • Book: Ronald Dworkin
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139167109.007
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  • Bibliography
  • Arthur Ripstein
  • Book: Ronald Dworkin
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139167109.007
Available formats
×