Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 Riots in Kosovo
- 2 Albanian Resentment Comes to a Boil
- 3 Armed Conflict Grows
- 4 Cease-Fire Breaks Down
- 5 Establishing the United Nations' First Colony
- 6 Living Under a Colonial Regime
- 7 Responding to the Wake-Up Call
- 8 The Politics of Purgatory
- 9 Enter Martti Ahtisaari
- 10 The Stage for Final Status
- 11 “Practical” Negotiations
- 12 Negotiations over Status Itself
- 13 The Ahtisaari Plan
- 14 The Plan Runs into Trouble
- 15 The Troika Takes Over
- 16 Independence Day
- 17 Kosovo's Future
- 18 Implications for the International Order
- Glossary of Acronyms
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
15 - The Troika Takes Over
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 January 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 Riots in Kosovo
- 2 Albanian Resentment Comes to a Boil
- 3 Armed Conflict Grows
- 4 Cease-Fire Breaks Down
- 5 Establishing the United Nations' First Colony
- 6 Living Under a Colonial Regime
- 7 Responding to the Wake-Up Call
- 8 The Politics of Purgatory
- 9 Enter Martti Ahtisaari
- 10 The Stage for Final Status
- 11 “Practical” Negotiations
- 12 Negotiations over Status Itself
- 13 The Ahtisaari Plan
- 14 The Plan Runs into Trouble
- 15 The Troika Takes Over
- 16 Independence Day
- 17 Kosovo's Future
- 18 Implications for the International Order
- Glossary of Acronyms
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
Summary
In July and August of 2007, the United States and the EU worked to organize the additional rounds of negotiation. After the Security Council impasse, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Zalmay Khalilzad was quoted as saying, “The Contact Group will lead a new process to move forward as proposed in the resolution. There will be 120-day negotiation, but outside the Security Council because the process there was blocked. Russia is in the Contact Group, but it doesn't have a veto there. Therefore, we have a new process that is not related to the Security Council.”
Ahtisaari asked to be excused from managing the 120-day process; his plan, he thought, was the best that could be achieved to serve the legitimate interests of Belgrade and Pristina, and it would be counterproductive to expose it to tinkering. “The last thing we needed was for the Plan to be reopened,” he says. “I didn't want any further role for UNOSEK. My folks and I did not want to put the Plan into play for cherry picking by Serbia and Russia.” Better would be a process that would show all of Europe that every avenue for resolving Kosovo's status had been explored, leaving the Ahtisaari Plan as the only feasible option. “It was time now for the member states of the EU to step up and do their part. The Quint had to be in the driver's seat,” Ahtisaari said later.
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- Chapter
- Information
- The Road to Independence for KosovoA Chronicle of the Ahtisaari Plan, pp. 191 - 210Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2009