Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 Riots in Kosovo
- 2 Albanian Resentment Comes to a Boil
- 3 Armed Conflict Grows
- 4 Cease-Fire Breaks Down
- 5 Establishing the United Nations' First Colony
- 6 Living Under a Colonial Regime
- 7 Responding to the Wake-Up Call
- 8 The Politics of Purgatory
- 9 Enter Martti Ahtisaari
- 10 The Stage for Final Status
- 11 “Practical” Negotiations
- 12 Negotiations over Status Itself
- 13 The Ahtisaari Plan
- 14 The Plan Runs into Trouble
- 15 The Troika Takes Over
- 16 Independence Day
- 17 Kosovo's Future
- 18 Implications for the International Order
- Glossary of Acronyms
- Bibliography
- Index
7 - Responding to the Wake-Up Call
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 January 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 Riots in Kosovo
- 2 Albanian Resentment Comes to a Boil
- 3 Armed Conflict Grows
- 4 Cease-Fire Breaks Down
- 5 Establishing the United Nations' First Colony
- 6 Living Under a Colonial Regime
- 7 Responding to the Wake-Up Call
- 8 The Politics of Purgatory
- 9 Enter Martti Ahtisaari
- 10 The Stage for Final Status
- 11 “Practical” Negotiations
- 12 Negotiations over Status Itself
- 13 The Ahtisaari Plan
- 14 The Plan Runs into Trouble
- 15 The Troika Takes Over
- 16 Independence Day
- 17 Kosovo's Future
- 18 Implications for the International Order
- Glossary of Acronyms
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Prior to the March 2004 riots, there had been little incentive for international decision makers to rock the boat. Kosovo was calm, progress was obviously being made in developing local political capacity, and lots of money was being spent on physical reconstruction, studies, and education. The status quo could continue for another ten years or more, many hoped.
The March 2004 riots changed all that. Although sharp disagreement exists about the nature of the riots, it is indisputable that they were spontaneous, at least to a considerable extent, and reflected the impatience and rage of Kosovar Albanians. Claims persist that the violence was orchestrated behind the scenes by clandestine Kosovar Albanian organizations centered on the war veterans. Whether or not that is true, no evidence exists that the senior Kosovar Albanian government officials led them. To the contrary, Rexhepi and Thaçi went out of their way – under considerable international pressure – to call for calm, and they seemed genuinely worried that they might not be able to regain control.
It is undeniable that the paroxysm of Kosovar Albanian rage directed against UNMIK and Kosovo Serbs on those two days reflected a deep-seated Albanian frustration with political affairs and with the pace of transition from UN administration of Kosovo to final status. Nearly every Kosovar Albanian interpreted final status to mean independence.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Road to Independence for KosovoA Chronicle of the Ahtisaari Plan, pp. 79 - 90Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2009