We have made frequent references to ‘Rorty's critics’ throughout this book. Now, it is time to say a bit more about them, about who they actually are and what it is they object to in Rorty's work. Because of his broad influence, Rorty has elicited responses from members of a variety of intellectual disciplines, but for brevity's sake we will focus on those of philosophers. It is in their area, in any case, that Rorty's views have stirred up a hornets' nest. In philosophy, those views receive the roughest treatment, accompanied by the least satisfactory attempts to tease out their full implications or even accurately portray them. Presumably these lapses occur because it is in philosophy, rather than, say, literary or political theory, that Rorty is perceived to be the biggest threat, and hence a great deal rides on the possibility of seeing such a threat as ‘bogus’. But this invokes the puzzle we mentioned in the Preface. Why, if Rorty's views are so clearly wrong, are his philosophical critics so quick to reach for their rhetorical guns? Why are they so inclined to foist false claims on Rorty? Why do they so often content themselves with simply reasserting claims that he has long questioned, instead of showing what is right about those claims? One of the most disconcerting features of the hostile critical literature on Rorty is its sheer complacency, its self-satisfied failure to rise to his challenge