(1) To describe conversations with leaders of the North Vietnamese government and the National Liberation Front that shed some light on the distinction between “hard” and “soft” negotiating issues;

(2) To convey my central impression that the cumulative attitude of the North Vietnamese government toward the outcome of negotiations accords more closely with official American conditions for peace in Vietnam than has been generally understood in this country;

(3) To call attention to the fact that the North Vietnamese government thinks that it has already backed down from earlier negotiating demands, and seems prepared to take an especially conciliatory position on the central question of the reunification of Vietnam;

(4) To convey a sense of why I think the formation of the Alliance of National, Democratic, and Peace Forces is an important political development whether or not it is a front of the Front;

(5) To convey some impression of the human quality of the political leadership in Hanoi and of the destructive impact that American war policies have had upon North Vietnam;

(6) To report upon the degree to which there remains in North Vietnam an awareness and appreciation of America's own revolutionary tradition and an eventual hope for the establishment of normal diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations;

(7) To give some report on why the leaders of North Vietnam now feel that they were deceived by President Johnson's offer of peace negotiations on March 31, 1968.