This monograph deals with the legal status of the United States involvement in the Vietnam war. It tries to move beyond the existing legal literature in two principal respects:

It is important to make clear that I do not attempt a balanced, fully documented argument on “the grand question” of aggression and self-defense in Vietnam. There is an abundant literature on this question that reflects a variety of normative perspectives. My objective is to develop a coherent position that builds upon, rather than duplicates, my previous writing on the subject. In this respect, the monograph proceeds from the presupposition that international law forbids both the underlying involvement and the battlefield practices being relied upon in Vietnam by the United States government.

At the same time, my purpose is not to engage in polemics; it is rather to argue for a constructive reconsideration of the governmental procedures and practice that enable an American President to involve the country in the internal affairs of a foreign society, especially through policies designed to influence the outcome of struggle for control of governmental machinery. The need for reconsideration extends far beyond the power that commits United States armed forces to battle without any prior legislative authorization. It extends to the discretionary use of the CIA to effectuate desired political changes in foreign countries, if necessary, by means that violate the legal order of the target state. The need for reconsideration extends, as well, to the provision of military aid and advice to regimes that govern in a manner violating the liberal democratic creed that our government is pledged to uphold within the United States.