Democrats should worry when philosophers begin to speak the language of “republicanism.” When philosophers espouse purportedly objective principles, such as the common good, the rule of law, depolitization – that is, normative standards that they claim will make democracy operate more justly – democrats should be very worried indeed. History teaches that this discourse of republicanism – of a common good not fully achievable through extensive popular participation and ultimate popular judgment – enjoys a rather dubious legacy. Republicanism, in its original forms, either prompted aristocratic coups against popular governments, or justified oligarchic consolidation once democratic regimes had been overthrown. On principle, neither of these outcomes is necessarily problematic for contemporary adherents of philosophical republicanism; after all, as I demonstrate in what follows, they value popular participation much less than they do policy outcomes that supposedly benefit the populace at large or track the common good. Minimal authorization of elite governance by common citizens, they suppose, is sufficient to promote and protect liberty.