INTRODUCTION

Imagine Bill McCartney in the throes of deciding whether Amendment 2 merits his support. He is, we may assume, rationally justified in believing that same-sex relations are an abomination to God and in believing that, if the state forces a landlord to rent to homosexual persons, then the state forces that landlord to allow her tenants to use her property to engage in what she rationally regards as morally abominable activity. Assume further that McCartney is rationally justified in adhering to the time-honored claim stating that to violate divine law is to risk divine retribution and in applying that claim to the present case: McCartney rationally believes that for the state to employ its coercive power in such an irresponsible way is to risk divine retribution. On the basis of some such “National Defense Argument for Amendment 2,” McCartney is strongly inclined to support Amendment 2 and in so doing, to put it a bit melodramatically, to use his modicum of power with the aim of averting a national tragedy.

Suppose, however, that McCartney is convinced by the argument from respect and believes that he ought not support his favored coercive laws if he lacks a public justification for those laws. To determine whether he may support Amendment 2, McCartney must determine whether his rationale for Amendment 2 counts as a public justification. The justificatory liberal will advise him that it isn't, but he is surely not going to take the justificatory liberal's word on the matter.