Burdens of proof, standards of proof and presumptions are supposed to constrain decision-makers to follow the law’s guidance on which mistake to favour – ideally in reaching their conclusions, and at least when it comes to justifying them. The Federal Court’s judgments in the preceding chapters leave the members of the Canadian Refugee Board fully unconstrained. They could hardly be freer to follow their own sense of which mistake is worse. As long as they are in doubt, or can credibly claim to be, members can decide whether their uncertainty will help or harm claimants, which will often allow them to justify either conclusion on the same evidence. Not only are members free to adopt either of the Court’s two conflicting approaches to resolving doubt, but they will often be able to frame their findings to take advantage of either the lower or the higher of the law’s two standards of proof, and the debates within the Court about rational action and memory have created two powerful ‘permissible inferences’ that allow members the option to preserve or to displace the presumption of truthfulness.