Reasons are central in understanding both practical reason and theoretical reason. But there are many kinds of reasons. Partly because of this, philosophical writing is often unclear about what counts as a reason and about how reasons are connected with various closely related elements. One of these is reason, as a general capacity. A second is reasoning, as an exercise of that capacity. My concern is the practical domain, but much of what I say also applies to the theoretical realm. I begin with the nature of reasons for action, proceed to connect these with practical reason, and then connect both with practical reasoning. I am particularly interested in the assessment of practical reasoning and in how such reasoning bears on practical rationality.

I Three overlapping categories of reasons for action

There are at least three main kinds of reason for action (similar conceptual categories may be identified for belief, which in this respect is analogous to action). The first kind is normative, the second motivational, the third explanatory.

Normative reasons are reasons (in the sense of objective grounds) there are to do something. They are reasons for anyone, or at least anyone of a certain general description, to do certain things, for instance (for normal persons) to wear coats in a cold wind and to make amends for wrong-doing. Some normative reasons are person-relative: reasons there are for a specific person, say me. The fact that it will help my friend can be a reason for me to do an errand.

A second broad category is that of motivational reasons. There are two main kinds. The first is possessed reasons: reasons someone has, such as my reason to wear a coat, which I have in virtue of needing warmth. The second kind is both possessed and motivating (and is described below).