Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-x5gtn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-05-13T02:40:16.388Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

4 - Paradoxes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

By
R. M. Sainsbury
Edited by
Jonathan E. Adler  and
Lance J. Rips
R. M. Sainsbury
Affiliation:
University of Texas
Jonathan E. Adler
Affiliation:
Brooklyn College, City University of New York
Lance J. Rips
Affiliation:
Northwestern University, Illinois
Get access

Summary

ACTING RATIONALLY

Newcomb's Paradox

You are confronted with a choice. There are two boxes before you, A and B. You may either open both boxes, or else just open B. You may keep what is inside any box you open, but you may not keep what is inside any box you do not open. The background is this.

A very powerful being, who has been invariably accurate in his predictions about your behavior in the past, has already acted in the following way:

  1. He has put $1,000 in box A.

  2. If he has predicted that you will open just box B, he has in addition put $1,000,000 in box B.

  3. If he has predicted that you will open both boxes, he has put nothing in box B.

The paradox consists in the fact that there appears to be a decisive argument for the view that the most rational thing to do is to open both boxes; and also a decisive argument for the view that the most rational thing to do is to open just box B. The arguments commend incompatible courses of action: If you take both boxes, you cannot also take just box B. Putting the arguments together entails the overall conclusion that taking both boxes is the most rational thing and also not the most rational thing. This is unacceptable, yet the arguments from which it derives are apparently acceptable.

Type
Chapter
Information
Reasoning
Studies of Human Inference and its Foundations
 , pp. 67 - 93
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2008

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Asher, Nicholas M., and Kamp, Johan A. W. [1986] “The knower paradox and representational theories of the attitudes.” In Halpern, J., ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge. Morgan Kaufman, New York, pp. 131–148.Google Scholar
Bar-Hillel, Maya, and Margalit, Avishai [1972] “Newcomb's paradox revisited.” British Journal for Philosophy of Science 23: 295–304.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Benditt, T. M., and Ross, David J. [1976] “Newcomb's paradox.”British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27: 161–4.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Burge, Tyler [1978] “Buridan and epistemic paradox.” Philosophical Studies 34: 21–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gibbard, A., and Harper, W. L. [1978] “Counterfactuals and two kinds of expected utility.” In Hooker, C. A., Leach, J. J., and McClennen, E. F., eds. Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory, vol. 1. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 125–162.Google Scholar
Goodman, Nelson [1955] Fact, Fiction and Forecast. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.; 2nd ed., Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1965.Google Scholar
Hempel, Carl [1945] Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. The Free Press, New York. Reprint ed., 1965.Google Scholar
Hughes, G. E., ed. and trans. [1982] John Buridan on Self-Reference. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge & New York. This work by Buridan was originally entitled Sophismata.Google Scholar
Jackson, Frank [1975] “Grue.” Journal of Philosophy 72: 113–131.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jeffrey, Richard C. [1965] The Logic of Decision. McGraw-Hill, New York.Google Scholar
Kyburg, Henry [1961] Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief. Wesleyan University Press, Middletown, CT.Google Scholar
Levi, Isaac [1967] Gambling with Truth. RKP, London.Google Scholar
Montague, Richard, and Kaplan, David [1960] “A paradox regained.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 1: 79–90.Google Scholar
Nozick, R. [1969] “Newcomb's problem and two principles of choice.” In Rescher, Nicholas, ed. Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel. Reidel, Dordrecht.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Quine, Willard van O. [1953] “On a so-called paradox.” Mind 62: 65–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ramsey, Frank P. [1926] “The foundations of mathematics.” Reprinted in Mellor, D. H., ed. Foundations. Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, NJ. 1978, pp. 152–212.Google Scholar
Schlesinger, G. [1974] “The unpredictability of free choice.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25: 209–221.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

  • Paradoxes
  • Edited by Jonathan E. Adler, Brooklyn College, City University of New York, Lance J. Rips, Northwestern University, Illinois
  • Book: Reasoning
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511814273.006
Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

  • Paradoxes
  • Edited by Jonathan E. Adler, Brooklyn College, City University of New York, Lance J. Rips, Northwestern University, Illinois
  • Book: Reasoning
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511814273.006
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Paradoxes
  • Edited by Jonathan E. Adler, Brooklyn College, City University of New York, Lance J. Rips, Northwestern University, Illinois
  • Book: Reasoning
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511814273.006
Available formats
×